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Abstract 
Demand for energy and its associated services in order to meet social and economic 
development, is on the rise worldwide. Yet, with electrification coverage of 
approximately 26%, Myanmar still has a long way to go. One of the options considered 
in this regard is to expand upon Myanmar’s huge hydropower potential. However, 
whilst Myanmar’s hydropower potential is enormous, the sources are located in ethnic 
minority and conflict areas. Until now, consultation with local population and ethnic 
armed groups has been minimal at best, and non-existent on average. Given this lack of 
consultation in the decision-making process, and the fact that a concrete ceasefire with 
all ethnic armed groups has yet to be signed, fighting around (potential) dam sites has 
been frequent, leading to human rights abuses and forced resettlement of people among 
other things. What is more, these dam projects so far are a result of contracts signed 
with foreign investors in China and Thailand, meaning that whilst Myanmar itself is in 
dire need of electricity, the energy gained from the dams will mostly be exported to 
those investor countries, hence the revenue of these contracts flow back to the central 
government, not the ethnic states.  
Thus, this thesis looks into this problem by specifically focusing on the Salween River, 
and there in particular the Hat Gyi dam in Karen State. The thesis attempts to 
extrapolate to what extent such dam construction may lead to further escalation of 
conflict. Throughout the thesis, the themes of ethnicity, participation, and the 
importance of history will be explored and utilised in order to provide a greater 
understanding of the subject. The key messages derived from the fieldwork conducted is 
the stark economic and political push in favour of dams emanating from state 
governments versus the villagers’ strong connection to nature and the Salween River 
and lack of say in how the River will be utilised, further marginalising the ethnic 
minority groups and contributing to conflict.  
A political ecology framework will be employed, specifically looking at the power 
relationships between actors involved as well as the degree of local participation in the 
dam project and the effects of such participation (or lack thereof) on and the on-going 
conflict. The analysis is based on data collected during fieldwork in Chiang Mai, 
Yangon and the area around Hpa’an (Karen State) in November-December 2014.  
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1 Introduction 
Myanmar has always been a country of special interest to me. How could a country of 
such history and beauty remain under authoritarian rule for so long? Why did the 
sanctions placed against Myanmar by a number of nations not seem to affect its rulers? 
And, what triggered the democratization process that has slowly begun to take place in 
recent years, baffling many political analysts? It seemed a magical and mystical place to 
me, where time had stood still for so many decades and only now awaking from its 
slumber, its people eager to talk to the ever growing number of tourists visiting their 
country, ever smiling and welcoming. One of the things that particularly struck me 
when walking through the busy streets of Yangon, was that one is bombarded by 
telecommunication ads at every turn: the familiar blue hue of Telenor popping up at 
everywhere, in a beautiful written language I will never be able to read myself, whilst 
shops sell cell phones and electronics on virtually every corner. High end products 
being advertised at the shopping centre close to my guesthouse, most prominently of 
which, huge Land Rovers. The younger generation blending their traditional clothing 
with dyed hair, emulating Korean K-Pop singers. The country is trying to come to terms 
with the new influx of international products, mixing it with their own traditions. Yet 
one thing driving all these new images and businesses is electricity, a scarce commodity 
in Myanmar. Whether it be the television which allows people to watch their Korean 
and Thai soap operas, the smart phones that everyone now seems to possess, or the air-
condition present in many shopping centres and office buildings, all these things require 
electricity. Yet with an electrification rate of approximately 25-28% - a rate that drops 
dramatically in rural areas – these new appliances are too much for the country’s grid to 
handle, leading to frequent blackouts. One response to this energy shortage is a focus on 
building up the country’s hydropower capacity. Whilst renewable energy has generally 
been viewed in positive terms
1
, it can have potential adverse effects in this case. What 
particularly intrigued me was the lack of research that has been done on the question of 
dams and their link to (ethnic) conflict so far, especially given the effect on-going 
conflict at dam sites and other major infrastructure projects has had on the peace 
process, an issue that will be analysed in further details in this thesis. The lack of 
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international coverage and interest in this as a subject matter only served to further peak 
my interest. It is mainly local NGOs (with few international exceptions) who have been 
researching, documenting, and advocating against dam construction on the Salween 
River. Whilst the subject of hydropower dams and conflict is slowly gaining traction in 
the international sphere (Brennan 2015), it is still mainly swept under the rug. Thus, one 
of the purposes of this thesis is to help shed some light on the matter.  
Given my previous interest in the country, I had gone into the field believing I had at 
least some working knowledge and background about the country. After my fieldwork 
in Myanmar and the extensive research conducted, I realised the deep intricacies 
involved when discussing Myanmar. The complexities surrounding this nation and the 
current state of transformation only added to the intrigue and the importance, in my 
opinion, of looking into this subject matter further. The immense cultural diversity 
among its population, the nuances and problems, the question of electrification or lack 
thereof, the history and the hatred that seems to still be simmering below the surface 
when you speak to people about the government, coupled with the lack of research on 
Myanmar given its isolation until a few years ago, made hydropower dams in Myanmar 
an intriguing subject of study. Moreover, with Myanmar opening up to business and 
foreign investment more and more, understanding the history of ethnic conflict and 
protest to such dams is of growing importance. Myanmar’s currently untapped 
economic and industrial potential, coupled with its geostrategic position between Asia’s 
two powerhouses - India and China – suggests a bright future for Myanmar and its 
people, especially considering its vast natural resources (for example natural gas, oil, 
and hydropower) and the continent’s growing demand for electricity (Kuenzer et al. 
2013, 565). It also leaves it potentially vulnerable to exploit or mismanagement of its 
natural resources, which makes an early acknowledgment of such problems and their 
correct handling vital.  
Yet despite the progress that has occurred, up until only a few years ago Myanmar was 
known as “a country which has experienced almost incessant armed conflict, 
international isolation, enduring poverty and the gradual consolidation of military 
government” (Thant Myint-U 2001, 253). This picture has shifted considerably after the 
new government started the democratization process in 2011, thrusting the country from 
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decades of isolation and earning it praises worldwide
2
. Contracts for hydropower dams, 
gas pipelines and other energy projects have been signed in vast numbers in Beijing, 
Delhi, Bangkok and Naypyidaw in recent years (Simpson 2014, 1). These large-scale 
investment projects are mostly located in the borderland regions of the country, the 
areas where most of Myanmar’s natural resources are in fact located. These borderlands 
are where “regional cross-border infrastructure and millennium-old trade networks 
converge” and represent some of the last remaining resource-rich areas in Asia 
(Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013, 2). 
However, the borderlands are also those regions of Myanmar that are most 
impoverished and isolated. Moreover, Myanmar is still entangled in some of the world’s 
longest running civil conflicts
3
 (South 2011, 6) on multiple fronts and with various 
ethnic minorities of those border-regions, with human rights violations consistently 
occurring (PHR 2012, 10). A large component of what has fuelled this on-going civil 
war has been the economic grievances experienced by ethnic groups. These are often 
tied to resources
4
 being extracted from the peripheral border areas (where the majority 
of ethnic minority groups reside) to help develop the urban core (which is controlled by 
the military and business elite) without them having any say in the matter, or receiving 
compensation/funds from it (Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013, 3). Thus, whilst the 
government of Myanmar has been promising pro-poor reforms as well as people-
centred development to benefit the farmers who arguable represent the backbone of 
Myanmar`s economy, reforms have tended to focus on urban elite and middle-class 
entrepreneurs, whilst over 75% of the population still remains underserved in transport 
infrastructure and electricity (Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013, 3).   
Hence, whilst these sort of large infrastructure investments are likely to impact on the 
peace process and are far from conflict-neutral, these issues have often been 
downplayed by donors and investors alike, who instead seem to be focusing more on the 
country’s progress, as well as its economic and developmental potential. What then are 
the realities on the ground? Can Myanmar’s huge energy potential be reconciled with 
environmental conservation and indigenous rights?  The intention then is to explore 
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how the lack of participation of local ethnic communities in such large-scale projects in 
Myanmar can contribute to further marginalisation and fuel armed ethnic conflict.  
Hydropower for sustainable energy  
Demand for energy and its associated services is on the rise worldwide in order to meet 
social and economic development (Edenhofer et al. 2012, 7). Energy services
5
 are 
required in order to help meet basic human needs, such as for lighting, cooking, 
transport, industries and much more. And whilst access to electricity has a positive 
impact on a wide range of factors impacting rural communities, from improved health, 
to access to communication and information, to better educational facilities, economic 
prosperity and improved standard of living (Muchunku et al. 2013, 3), it has, at the 
same time, led to a stark growth in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions through the 
increased global use of fossil fuels. According to UNEP, irreversible climate changes 
due to carbon dioxide emissions have already taken place (UNEP 2009, 11). Continuing 
down the same path as we have done in the past does not seem like a valid option 
anymore. How do we then reconcile developing countries’ energy needs in order to 
expand and build up their industries with the catastrophic consequences of continuing 
with “business as usual”? How can we possibly manage to feed the energy needs of the 
1.3 billion people still without access to electricity (WWAP 2014, 13)?   
One way of doing so is a higher use of and reliance on renewable energies. Renewables 
are “forms of energy that are not exhaustible, as are fossil fuels” (Goldemberg 2012, 
46). They represent energy sources that are produced from “geophysical or biological 
sources that are naturally replenished at the rate of extraction” (Goldemberg 2012, 29). 
As well as having a large potential to mitigate climate change, renewable energy can 
provide wider benefits, such as contributing to social and economic development, 
improving sustainable energy access, a secure energy supply, as well as reducing 
negative impacts on the environment (Edenhofer et al. 2012, 7).   
There seems to be a certain trend of countries slowly jumping on board the renewables 
train. And within that pool of possibilities, many seem to be favouring hydropower. In 
                                                 
5
 Energy services are “an energy system that is made up of an energy supply sector and energy end-use 
technologies” with the objective of delivering such goods as lighting, cooked food, refrigeration and 
transportation, to the consumers (UNDP 2000, 4). 
5 
 
2008 and 2009, hydropower provided approximately 16% of the world’s electricity 
generation, which accounted for more than 80% of renewable energy sourced electricity 
generation (Turkenburg et al. 2012, 795). Indeed some countries run virtually solely on 
hydropower, as seen in the example of Norway (Energy 2015, 25). However, even here, 
where 90% of people are positively inclined towards hydropower as an energy source 
(TNSGallup 2014, 24), large-scale hydropower dam development has effectively drawn 
to a halt after the last big project was constructed in Alta in the 1980s against large 
opposition from conservationists and indigenous activists (Karlstrøm and Ryghaug 
2014, 657). This can in part be explained by the fact that whilst people might generally 
have a tendency of looking at renewable energy favourably, many subscribe to the “Not 
In My Back Yard (NIMBY)” idea when it comes to the actual construction of e.g. 
hydropower dams or wind farms, though one cannot generalize and must view support 
and opposition for particular developments within their specific context (Karlstrøm and 
Ryghaug 2014, 658).  
In Asia, and China in particular, dams have had a longstanding history. This has no 
doubt contributed to the vast amount of installed hydropower capacity in Asia, which 
will only expand in the next years as the economies in the region are expected to expand 
further. Whilst China needs more energy to sustain its past growth rate, Thailand’s 
government estimates that the country’s electricity demands will almost double by 2021 
(EGAT 2009, 61). In order to achieve this augmented electricity demand, both 
countries, along with India, have been looking towards Myanmar to help satisfy their 
electricity needs, a move heavily contested by civil society (Middleton, Garcia, and 
Foran 2009, 23).  
Myanmar on the other hand, has abundant water resources and hydropower potential
6
, 
and only about 1% of this potential is being realized so far (UNDP 2013, 13). Myanmar 
has 24 operational dams and is constructing 7 more, while preliminary agreements have 
been signed for 35 projects according to Min Khaing, director of the department of 
hydropower implementation at the Ministry of Electric Power (Vrieze 2015). If all 
projects are built it would raise the total amount of hydropower generated in Myanmar 
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to 43,709 MW, up from the currently installed 3,011 MW, according to Min Khaing 
(Vrieze 2015).  
Myanmar provides a very interesting case study due to its vast amount of 
hydroelectricity resources, rich biodiversity and oil and gas reserves whilst at the same 
time demonstrating an electricity coverage of only 28% (Bodenbender, Messinger, and 
Ritter 2012, 14). Electrifying the country will require vast investments and Myanmar’s 
economy is expected to grow, mainly due to foreign investments in hydropower, natural 
gas and oil and commodity exports (PwC 2014, 8). Not only does energy exploration 
and export help build up trade relations, whilst also being of geostrategic interest in the 
region, it also brings in a vast amount of revenue and technological know-how from 
foreign companies willing to invest in infrastructure in the country which also helps 
Myanmar in its quest for electrification. However, these big dam sites are located within 
ethnic minority states that are more often than not, still experiencing on-going conflict 
between the rebel groups and the Burmese military (MPM 2013, 5-9). Whilst not 
necessarily the main point of contention, the going ahead of such big infrastructure 
projects without people`s consent on the ground, has definitely been one of the reasons 
why conflict around such projects has occurred (MPM 2013, 3). 
1.1.1 The many peoples of Myanmar 
In a region where millions of people depend on the natural resources provided by rivers, 
as well as the ethnic diversity that has flourished for centuries across these rivers, many 
proposed dams pose not only environmental risks, but could also lead to the 
extinguishing of century old traditions.  
Classified as “one of the world’s most ethnically diverse countries” (Gravers 2014a, 
149), Myanmar has officially identified and recognized 135 ‘national races’. Of the 51 
million people living in Myanmar, approximately one third is calculated as belonging to 
ethnic minority groupings. Thus, the Burman majority makes up about 70%, followed 
by the Shan (9%), the Karen (7%)
7
, the Mon (5%), the Rakhine (4%), the Kachin 
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(3.5%), and the Chin (2%)
8
. This large amount of ethnic diversity does not come as a 
surprise when taking a close look at the geography of the country. However, the lines of 
ethnicity cannot be demarcated that easily. Some ethnic designations may serve as an 
umbrella term covering a vast amount of sub-groups (e.g. the name ‘Chin’ encompasses 
approximately 60 further sub-groups, not all of which would actually designate 
themselves as ‘Chin’). On the other end of the spectrum you have other groups that are 
not even officially recognized (most notably the Rohingya) (Gravers 2014a, 149).  
The Karen Ethnic Group 
As we have seen, there is a myriad of ethnicities in Myanmar. However, as my 
fieldwork focused on the Karen State area and Karen populated villages, I would like to 
take the time here to introduce a little more specific information about this particular 
ethnic group. The term ‘Karen’ generally refers to a group of people inhabiting the hills 
and plains on both sides of the Thai-Myanmar border (Hayami and Darlington 2000, 
137), as well as the central delta area (KWO 2010). The majority reside within Karen 
State, Pegu Division, Tenasserim Division and the Delta Region and traditionally have 
an agrarian lifestyle (KRW 2004, 17). Yet, whilst the term ‘Karen’ is used to lump 
together approximately 4-5 million
9
 people into this one group, those labelled with the 
term actually hail from some quite different, but in the same vein related cultural and 
language groups, with their own distinct identities and do not even necessarily 
understand one another. My contacts with whom I visited the more rural villages with, 
who were all ethnically Karen but hailing from different language groups, had to speak 
Burmese with each other and with the villagers because they could not understand each 
other otherwise. The image becomes further complicated by the fact that in Myanmar 
ethnic labels often also can serve as political labels for insurgent groups (Hayami and 
Darlington 2000, 138), so that for example some of the Pa-O have their own insurgent 
groups and vehemently distance themselves from the other major Karen insurgent 
groups (Hayami and Darlington 2000, 138). The two main groups are the Sgaw and 
Pwo Karen. Here Karen will be used to refer to those mostly living by the Salween 
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River. Whilst the struggle of the Karen and other minority groups is often termed 
‘ethnic’, as if the ethnic dimension is the most prevalent factor, it is actually more like 
an after-the-fact interpretation of conflict situations (Gravers 2014b, 177). The concept 
of social memory plays an important role in how violent conflict in Myanmar has been 
termed ‘ethnic’, and this has been translated into the Karen identity formation. Thus, for 
the Karen,  
suffering, victimhood, fear and mistrust are the major results of their long 
conflict and these grievances have occupied Karen ethnic identity as 
dominant elements of their identity together with classification of the 
Burmans as the ‘incompatible others’ (Gravers 2014b, 177). 
This is not only a distant memory. Many Karen-populated areas have been “subject to 
insurgency and often brutal government counter-insurgency operations since 1949” 
(South 2011, 2). The impact on the civilian population has been immense and has 
resulted in as many as 89.000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Karen State alone, 
in addition to 130.000 mostly Karen refugees in camps on the Thai-Burmese border as 
of 2012 (Schroeder and U 2014, 199). Poverty, displacement as well as human rights 
abuses have been widespread across the region and have almost become the norm 
(Schroeder and U 2014, 199).  
The specific focus on the Karen ethnic group was chosen for a variety of reasons. One 
of these reasons was a mix of coincidence and practicality in that the village I was able 
to visit on the Thai side of the border during a Conference which preceded my 
fieldwork in Myanmar, majority-wise belonged to the Karen ethnic group and would be 
impacted by the Hat Gyi dam. Moreover, the contacts I had made during my stay in 
Thailand were with an ethnic Karen organisation that provided me with access to the 
area. However, it also had to do with the proximity of and accessibility of Karen State 
to Yangon and the amount of information available on the Karen people.  
1.2 Objectives and Research Questions 
With this thesis I wish to show the importance of and interconnectedness of history, 
ethnicity, inclusion and power relations with regards to hydropower development in the 
case of Myanmar. It also hopes to demonstrate the importance of creating open and 
participative processes in hydropower projects in order for it to be an inclusive process, 
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benefiting all stakeholders involved. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
driving forces behind the Hat Gyi dam on the Salween River – both political and 
economic - and how the prospect of it being built affects ethnic conflict in Karen State.  
Myanmar is a relevant case, because of its high potential for hydropower development; 
the extremely low electrification rate; and the high dependence of ethnic minority 
groups in the rural border areas of the country on natural resources.  
This thesis will explore how economic drivers within dam development, both domestic 
and international, and local grievances attached to their lack of access to economic 
benefits (among other things) contribute to conflict on the ground. I will use a historical 
approach, drawing on political ecology, specifically analysing the positions and 
perspectives of various stakeholders and the power relations between them, ranging 
from the local, to the international (regional) sphere. The thesis thus aims to provide a 
multi-faceted analysis considering the “historical, political and economic contexts at 
different spatial and temporal scales” (Castree in Budds 2004, 324).  
Sub-questions 
1) How does the dam relate to the on-going ethnic conflict and the socio-historic 
background of the country? 
2) What are the international drivers behind the dam construction and what are 
their implications?    
3) What are the perspectives of the various stakeholders in Myanmar on the dam 
and to what extent are they involved in planning process behind it? 
1.3 Thesis structure 
In this thesis I will examine the drivers behind the expansion of hydropower dams in 
Myanmar, and what consequences these dams may have for ethnic conflict, particularly 
within Karen State. Furthermore, I will be looking at how the local population who will 
be impacted by the dam in question has been informed and allowed to participate within 
the planning of the dam project. For this purpose, a short account of how ethnic 
conflicts have historically evolved in this country will be provided. There are many 
complex issues related and interlinked with the dam-conflict nexus, and whilst such 
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issues as geopolitics, human rights issues and to an extent land rights will be dealt with 
throughout this thesis, others such as deforestation and democratization efforts will not 
be treated in the present work.  
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. The introduction chapter provides a short 
overview of the problem of dam construction within Myanmar, introduced the Karen 
ethnic group which will be the focus of this study and presented the research questions.  
In Chapter 2 the analytical framework utilised in this thesis will be discussed. In 
Chapter 3 the Methodology will be presented, providing a detailed description of the 
methods utilised and the limitations encountered when conducting research. The 
historical background of Myanmar will be introduced in Chapter 4, presenting its 
history and colonial past, specifically focusing on the issues of ethnic minorities, tracing 
the current conflict back to when it started after independence in 1948. Moreover, the 
developments behind the peace and ceasefire processes and their current states and why 
they are important when discussing the question of dam construction in Myanmar will 
be presented. Chapter 5 will present the importance of the energy-development nexus 
and focus on the discussion surrounding hydropower dams in order to provide a holistic 
overview of the subject, presenting the positive and negative issues associated with such 
forms of renewable energy. It will also introduce the dams on the Salween in general 
and the Hat Gyi dam as our case study in particular, describing the importance of the 
area, how people feel about the River and what they use it for, before introducing the 
international political dimension of the push for dam construction in Myanmar in 
Chapter 6, whilst also presenting the various stakeholders involved and showcasing the 
government’s attitude towards dam construction. Chapter 7 in turn will focus on the 
local perspective by looking into the case studies of this study, as well as presenting the 
views of civil society and ethnic armed groups on the matter of the construction of the 
Hat Gyi dam. In Chapter 8, all these elements will be put together in a joint discussion 
of the overall theme: how the construction of such large dams, without the consent and 
participation of ethnic minority groups living there not only serves to marginalize those 
same people, but also results in fuelling the armed conflict that is still on-going in Karen 
State. Lastly, Chapter 9 will offer some concluding thoughts and remarks.  
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2 Analytical Framework 
A thesis is like a complicated dinner recipe: it requires the right ingredients, time, 
patience, the occasional outbursts of shouting when things go awry, but most of all it 
needs instructions and guidelines for how to prepare the hopefully tasty end result of a 
dinner. The analytical framework presented in this chapter is exactly that – the recipe 
that will guide us to our main event: the analysis of the history and fieldwork findings. 
First, a general overview of the analytical setting will be provided as well as how I 
situate myself within it. I will then go on to present the main analytical tool utilised for 
this study, namely political ecology, and explain the reasons behind choosing this 
particular framework, as well as the other concepts of participation and ethnicity that 
will be additionally utilized. 
“In the field of development and the environment, the complexity of problems at hand 
calls for an interdisciplinary approach” (McNeill, Garcia-Godos, and Gjerdåker 2001, 
11). Doolittle concurs, noting that “the study of human-environmental relations is 
complex and by nature draws on theories and practices from multiple disciplines” 
(Doolittle 2010, 67). Thus, given the variety of issues and problems explored in this 
study, ranging from hydropower, politics, history, ethnicity and power relations, an 
interdisciplinary approach has been deemed most appropriate in order to gain a more 
holistic view of the question at hand. In this regard I will be drawing from the fields of 
anthropology, development studies, human geography and politics.  
Whilst certain disciplines have insisted on dividing the world of theory into two camps, 
namely inductive or deductive theorising, I will postulate, following Fine, that “the 
inductive and deductive models of research can never be disentangled” (Fine 2004, 11). 
Thus, I concur with Fine in that “theoretical analysis is not something that occurs only 
before entering the field or after one has been in the field, but is a continuing and 
recursive process” (Fine 2004, 11). I went into the field with my own set of 
preconceptions, “which can be labelled pro-poor, pro-participation and rights-based” 
(Hirsch 2010, 30), and focusing on power relations and the situation of marginalised 
groups.  
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The overarching theoretical framework utilised is political ecology. Political ecology 
was chosen due to the broad interpretation possibilities it provides, its inherent focus on 
interdisciplinarity, as well as its emphasis on power structures and scales (both temporal 
and spatial), all of which are invaluable when analysing large hydropower dams and 
their implications in the case of Myanmar.  
The framework takes into account the local, the regional, and the global levels. Thus, 
within political ecology, a specific focus will be laid on stakeholder analysis since it 
examines “the general role and significance of selected actors”, helping us to “situate 
the findings of much local-level empirical research in theoretical and comparative 
perspective” (Bryant and Bailey 1997, 24-25). This seeks to provide a relatively 
comprehensive picture of the motivations, interests and actions of those actors, 
specifically looking at their political strengths and weaknesses (Bryant and Bailey 1997, 
25). 
2.1 Political Ecology 
The definition of the term itself is not without its own set of problems since political 
ecology has different connotations for different people, with some even utilising the 
theory without explicitly referring to it (Walker 2006, 384). In general terms, political 
ecology is concerned with attempting to understand “the complex relations between 
nature and society through careful analysis of social forms of access and control over 
resources – with all their implications for environmental health and sustainable 
livelihoods” (Watts and Peet 2004, 3). It aims at demonstrating “empirical, research-
based explorations to explain linkages in the condition and change of 
social/environmental systems, with explicit consideration of relations of power” 
(Robbins 2004, 12). It is characterized by  
attention to the diversity of ecological environments; a sensitivity to the 
role of the state and the wider global economy in fashioning environmental 
change; contextual analysis of multiple scales of influence; emphasis on 
the diverse responses of decision-makers; and affirmation of the centrality 
of poverty, exploitation and inequality as causes of ecological deterioration 
(Jones 2008, 672). 
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Its analytical focus which looks at power-relations among varying groups and the 
influence between these relations and diverse aspects of their environment, has “led to 
results that challenge dominant interpretations of the causes of environmental 
degradation and contest prevalent prescriptions for solving such problems” (of 
environmental degradation) (Paulson, Gezon, and Watts 2003, 205).  
Political ecology emerged in the 1970s as a response to what can be referred to as 
‘apolitical ecology’, which represented the dominating way of describing environmental 
change. Apolitical ecology’s - mainly represented by neo-Malthusianism - central 
argument for environmental degradation and change was that of population growth and 
the scarcity of environmental resources. It viewed human-environment relationships in 
terms of “absolute, quantifiable, and discrete variables and limits, whether for 
population, resources, or economic growth” (McCarthy 2012, 616) and promulgated the 
necessity of population control in order to tackle ecological degradation, leaving out 
issues pertaining to the global distribution of power and goods (Robbins 2004, 7), thus 
tending to place the blame on the poor.  In comparison, political economy sought to 
look at those same relationships in a more holistic and relational manner, considering 
the politics involved within them (McCarthy 2012, 616). Its intellectual origins relate 
back to Neo-Marxism, which based itself on the three major frameworks of core-
periphery dependency analysis, global capitalist system/world system theory, and class 
inequality analysis
10
 (Khan 2013, 461). One of the key insights this emphasized was the 
link between local ecological changes and how they are interrelated with global 
relations of power (Baghel and Nüsser 2010, 233). 
This framework has, however, been marked with criticism, especially on the grounds of 
their economic reductionism, which has tended to overlook other non-material 
dimensions of power (Khan 2013, 462). In an attempt to provide a more encompassing 
framework and fill the gaps that political ecology exhibited, a post-Marxist turn can be 
                                                 
10
 Core-periphery theory: “Reflects on the lengthy structural subordination of third-world countries to the 
developed world through exchange relations, with perhaps less focus on the social relations of production 
underpinning those relations” (Khan 2013) 
Global capitalist system: Postulates that the “'laws of capitalism' to guarantee profit, in turn leading to 
social and economic disparity, political and cultural oppression and the depletion of natural resources” 
(Khan 2013) 
Class inequality analysis: Here the “emphasis is on profit accumulation by the capitalist class at the 
expense of the natural environment, natural resources, and other classes” (Khan 2013) 
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discerned from the end of the 1980s, which arose from various currents of 
postmodernism, post-colonialism, post-structuralism and feminism, and resulted in what 
has been labelled as ‘second-generation’ political ecology (Baghel and Nüsser 2010, 
233). This sought to demonstrate a more “complex understanding of how power 
relations mediate human-environmental interaction” (Bryant 1998, 82). Scholars have 
thus drawn on neo-Webarian theories, on ecofeminist and household studies to examine 
power relations within the household and its impact on the control of land and natural 
resources. Others have focused on social movements theorizing to link political ecology 
with grassroots actors and concepts of everyday resistance, just to name a few (Bryant 
1998, 82). Others have utilized discourse theory in order to study the ways in which 
“knowledge and power may inter-relate so as to mediate political-ecological outcomes” 
(Bryant 1998, 82).  
Thus, if put in general terms, early political ecologists sought to “demonstrate impacts 
of marginalization, land tenure, or production pressure on environmental changes such 
as soil erosion and deforestation” but often did not examine how the environment is 
“negotiated and affected through actions in arenas such as the household, the 
workplace, the community, and the state” (Paulson, Gezon, and Watts 2003, 210). 
Current research continues to seek better methods to understand how the “unequal 
power relations amongst social groups, and the 'knowledge' that mediates human-
environmental interactions, are reproduced as present-day ecological changes on all 
scales” (Baghel and Nüsser 2010, 233) and learn about and from participants in these 
arenas. What is more, whilst early political ecology focused on more broad regional 
themes (such as the deforestation in the Amazon), the 1990s saw as move towards 
focusing more on ‘micro-politics’ and individual ‘micro’-scale case studies (Walker 
2006, 387).  
Common Assumptions 
In summary then, some of political ecology’s general assumptions is the common 
premise that “environmental change and ecological conditions are the product of 
political process” (Robbins 2004, 11). Linked to this are three fundamental assumptions 
when looking at a research question. Thus, political ecologists  
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1) accept the idea that costs and benefits associated with environmental 
change are for the most part distributed among actors unequally…(which 
inevitably) 2) reinforces or reduces existing social and economic 
inequalities…(which holds) 3) political implications in terms of the altered 
power of actors in relation to other actors (Bryant and Bailey 1997, 28).  
It also implies an acceptance of “plural perceptions, plural definitions…and plural 
rationalities” (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987 quoted in Watts and Peet 2004, 10). In 
essence what this is demonstrating is that one person’s paradise can be another person’s 
hell. Political ecology then offers an analysis on how nature and the environment are 
represented and how the discourses surrounding these topics shape policy and practice 
(Watts and Peet 2004, 10). Lastly, as we have come to see, political ecologists share “a 
broadly similar political economy perspective but adopt a variety of approaches in 
applying that perspective to the investigation of human-environmental interaction”, 
which in turn reflects differing research priorities within the field (Bryant and Bailey 
1997, 20). In this study, I will be looking at the (economic) drivers behind dam 
construction in the first place, and how the various groups implicated view the cost-
benefit sharing among other things. Thus, it will in part, examine how politically and 
economically marginal ethnic minorities are affected by the potential hydropower 
developments.  
Beyond its broad applicability and interpretation possibilities, political ecology was also 
chosen because through its analysis, winners and losers, hidden costs, and the 
differential power that produces social and environmental outcomes can be revealed 
(Hirsch 2010, 34). Political ecology serves to formulate an understanding of the 
“connectedness of the social, economic, political and ecological impacts” of large dams 
(Baghel and Nüsser 2010, 233). It further helps zoom in on who the relevant actors in 
the dam debate are and what their specific interests may be (ranging from the global – 
as represented by the external influences of China and Thailand; to the local village 
perspective and civil society point of view). The acknowledgment of the importance of 
history is also a prominent feature of this thesis and in very broad strokes hopes to 
examine the link between history, ethnic conflict and the impacts it has on the debate 
over dams on the Salween.  
Taking an in-depth look at all the actors involved is useful because it provides us with 
comparative insights as to the role and significance of those actors: what motivates them 
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to act in certain ways, what their interests are and how those actions impact other actors 
at play (Bryant and Bailey 1997, 25). In so doing it helps us overcome the challenge of 
identifying the different and sometimes conflicting pressures on policy-makers in order 
to better understand how certain policies have come to pass (Bryant 1992, 18), but also 
helps us in exploring previous policy choices and how they resulted in environmental 
change. State policies are not formulated in a “political and economic vacuum. Rather, 
they result from struggle between competing actors seeking to influence policy 
formulation” (Bryant 1992, 18).  
General Critique 
For all political ecology has to offer in the realm of research, its all-encompassing ideal 
has also been criticized as being one of its biggest weaknesses. The incorporation of so 
many layers and different interpretations, has led to there not being one single coherent 
theoretical approach or message behind it (Walker 2006, 284). There are numerous 
interpretations and definitions that can be applied to such concepts as ecology or 
political economy on which the theory is based on (Watts and Peet 2004, 9). However, 
Peet and Watts also mention that political ecology lacks theoretical coherence, which 
has resulted in it becoming “radically pluralist and without politics or an explicit 
sensitivity to class interest and social struggle” (Watts and Peet 2004, 8). Others have 
responded to these allegations by countering that in fact political ecology “as an 
analytical approach has far greater theoretical coherence than existing methods for 
explaining how processes of environmental and social change occur within dynamic 
spatial and political configurations” (Rangan 2000, 62). Rangan further notes that this 
diversity is actually fundamental to its theoretical coherence (Rangan 2000, 63) .  
Political ecology has also been accused of knowing the answer before beginning 
research and being analytically weak in its approaches (Vayda and Walters 1999, 167). 
However, unlike apolitical theorization, political ecology “recognizes the human/non-
human relationships to be linked through dynamics that may yield unpredictable 
consequences” (Rangan 2000, 63). They insist that political influences, especially from 
“so-called wider political-economic system” are always important, further contesting 
that political ecology has managed to end up as “politics without ecology” (Vayda and 
Walters 1999, 168). Responding to this, Watts and Peet point to the fact that it is 
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important to look at exactly what we consider as being ‘the environment’. They go on to 
criticize Vayda and Walters by noting that they only consider the environment as being 
the expression of “the biophysical events of environmental change” (Watts and Peet 
2004, 19). Instead, political ecology seeks to open up the category of the environment 
itself and examine what we mean by it and the myriad of representations it encompasses 
(Watts and Peet 2004, 19).  
In conjunction with the overarching framework of political ecology, the following 
concepts have helped provide a more comprehensive shopping list of ingredients to 
choose from to make it a well-rounded dish.  
Power relations 
Understanding the unequal relations between different actors is key in order to 
understand the patterns of human-environment interaction and how they correlate to 
environmental problems. These unequal relations are predicated on notions of power 
and who wields it. Vast literature covering the various dimensions of power exists (e.g. 
Lukes and Foucault), however, political ecologists have “primarily understood this 
concept in relation to the ability of an actor to control their own interaction with the 
environment and the interaction of other actors with the environment” (Bryant and 
Bailey 1997, 39). A historical perspective of how those power relations came to be is 
also important, which will be covered in chapter 4.  
This power over another’s environment can be exerted in various ways. An actor can 
attempt to control access to a diversity of resources such as land or water. This may be 
done in order to gain the single control over those resources for the sake of economic 
gain associated with the extraction or commodification of those resources (Bryant and 
Bailey 1997, 39). States may demonstrate their power over other actors by determining 
“who exploits selected environmental resources, the conditions under which those 
resources are exploited and often even for what purposes they are used” (Bryant and 
Bailey 1997, 40). This can be interpreted twofold in the case of Myanmar. Thus, in 
general terms, the government, with the help of the military, is able to exert the above-
mentioned power over the population. On the other hand, armed ethnic groups have in 
the past controlled vast areas of importance concerning natural resources, and continue 
to do so in certain regions, leaving the local village population in the weakest position.  
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Bailey and Bryant argue that actors can exert control over the environment of others by 
influencing/determining the location of the sites at which industrial pollution is 
generated and released into the environment. “Power here, is about attempting to avoid 
or at least minimize the costs associated with the manufacturing process” (Bryant and 
Bailey 1997, 40).  
Bailey and Bryant further maintain that an actor can exert control over the environment 
of others in a more indirect manner and through discursive means. Here, “power is 
about control over material practices, but it is also linked to the attempted regulation of 
ideas” and thus can be seen in a way as “a matter of ‘winning the battle of ideas’ over 
human use of the environment” (Bryant and Bailey 1997, 41). This can be particularly 
seen by the fact that the government seeks to underline the positive characteristics of 
hydropower dams for the country and not mentioning what the negative issues could 
contain, especially with relation to local livelihoods, an issue often lamented over by my 
informants. Moreover, this can be tied to the notion of elites justifying the unequal use 
of the environment in terms of “the greater social good” (Bryant 1998, 87).  
Leftwich’s notes that “decisions about resource management always involve political 
relations of co-operation and conflict” (Leftwich, 1983, quoted in Howitt 2001, 81). 
This indeed seems to be the case in Myanmar, where the lack of power over resources 
and lack of co-operation between the central government and ethnic minority areas has 
resulted in de-facto conflict.  
2.2 Participation in Development 
What participation essentially means is the exercise of popular agency in relation to 
development. In general, the concept has often been associated with claims of 
“empowerment” and “transformation” (Hickey and Mohan 2005, 237) and indeed most 
development agencies now agree on the fact that “some form of participation by the 
beneficiaries is necessary for development to be relevant, sustainable and empowering” 
(Hickey and Mohan 2005, 237). What participation in development asserted in the 
1980s was the importance of placing local realities at the heart of development 
interventions (Hickey and Mohan 2004, 9). It was born out of the perception that many 
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top-down models of development in the past had failed (Hayward, Simpson, and Wood 
2004, 95). 
There are multiple definitions of participation and what the concept actually represents 
and entails. It has tended to mean different things to different people: “For some, it is a 
matter of principle; for others, a practice; and for still others, an end in itself” (Hayward, 
Simpson, and Wood 2004, 98). Hayward et al. have also suggested that in looking at 
participation, it is important to look at the why people participate and what the result of 
this participation is as a ways of gaging participation more inclusively (Hayward, 
Simpson, and Wood 2004, 98). Arnstein has defined participation as  
The redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently 
excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately 
included in the future. It is the strategy by which they can induce 
significant social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the 
affluent society (Arnstein 1969, 216). 
I find this definition very helpful and believe it to be pertinent in the case of Myanmar 
and its citizens, Burman and ethnic minorities alike. As will be demonstrated in 
following chapters, this redistribution of power has so far not materialised in a way that 
enables citizens to share in the benefits of development projects. Whilst we do need to 
take into account the fact that Myanmar has only started its reform process a few years 
ago and still has a long way to go in this regard, those suffering from development 
projects initiated under the military authoritarian regime are suffering now. As we will 
see, the problem in the context of the Karen people is that participation is not 
guaranteed when it comes to the dam project, with the majority of people still being 
unaware of any dam project on the Salween in the first place, not to mention having a 
say in the matter. This is particularly problematic considering Scudder emphasizes that 
not only is participation of local people vital for the success of a dam project, but 
participation should already start during the option-assessments process, because that is 
when the environmental, social and equity implications of various options are first 
considered (Scudder 2006, 309).  
The concept of participation has also received major criticisms, which stipulate that it 
focused on the local at the expense of addressing wider structures of injustice or that did 
not engage with issues of power and politics substantially enough (Hickey and Mohan 
20 
 
2005, 237; Hickey and Mohan 2004, 9). In order to achieve the desired “power” 
transformations between “uppers” and “lowers”, participatory roles need to be attributed 
to the “subjects of development” at every stage of such development interventions 
(Hickey and Mohan 2005, 241).  
2.3 Ethnicity 
Given the central role ethnicity will play in further discussions of both the history of 
Myanmar, but also in the analysis chapter, a closer look at “ethnicity” and what is meant 
by it, will follow. In Myanmar, as has been the case in other countries, discussions 
surrounding the role of ethnicity –it either being a source of conflicts and thus a threat 
to the nation-state, or whether it is an essential element in democratic development – 
have been abundant (Gravers 2007, vii). Indeed, the main point of view of the ruling 
military dictatorship, and one of the reasons often cited by it for justifying the power 
take-over in the first place, is the fact that the Tatmadaw (Burmese military) considers 
ethnic federalism (one of many insurgents’ point of contention with the government) as 
a relic from the colonial past and deemed as aiming to fragment the Union of Myanmar 
(Gravers 2007, x). Thus the ruling class, until recently has seen political claims based 
on ethnicity as a direct threat to the stability of the state.  
As we can see already, the term ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic minority’ carries with it a lot of 
weight and specific connotations to the different groups involved. All terms used to 
describe the ethnic groups, such as ‘nationality’, ‘tribal’, and ‘indigenous peoples’ can 
be politically sensitive and often may imply a particular form of political recognition by 
the user (Smith 1994, 36). Terms such as ‘tribe’ are considered pejorative, whereas the 
terms ‘indigenous’ for example also includes the Burman majority, but excludes more 
‘recent’ minorities like the Indians or the Chinese. Here, the terms ‘ethnic minority’ and 
‘ethnic group’ will be used simply to distinguish the various ethnic groups from the 
majority Burman population.  
But what exactly is meant by ethnicity? The word actually stems from the Greek word 
ethnos, originally meaning “heathen or pagan”, but appropriating a connotation with 
race in the mid-nineteenth century (Eriksen 2002, 4). It has become more commonplace 
to use such terms as ethnic groups or ethnicity since the 1960 in social anthropology, 
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although it has been noted that more often than not, researchers have a tendency of not 
defining what they actually mean by the term (Eriksen 2002, 4). According to Eriksen, 
social anthropology tends to regard ethnicity as referring to “aspects of relationships 
between groups which consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as being 
culturally distinctive” (Eriksen 2002, 4). He considers ethnicity  
as an aspect of social relationship between agents who consider themselves 
as culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they 
have a minimum of regular interaction. It can thus also be defined as a 
social identity characterized by metaphoric or fictive kinship. (…) Ethnic 
groups tend to have myths of common origin and they nearly always have 
ideologies encouraging endogamy, which may nevertheless be of highly 
varying practical importance (Eriksen 1999, 39).   
Ethnicity often forms one of the essential ways people imagine their place in the world. 
It represents an important source of “self-identification, solidarity and empowerment in 
terms of belonging to a community and to a common culture and history” (Gravers 
2007, 2). According to Gravers, the term often refers to the same criteria as that of the 
nation state, namely “a named population, historic territory, myths, culture and 
historical memory” (Gravers 2007, 2). Eriksen further emphasizes that ethnicity and 
culture are not interchangeable, noting that many social anthropologists conclude that 
social interaction and social organization are more important to consider rather than 
focusing on “cultural content” (Eriksen 2002, 43).  
This closer look at ethnicity is important in the context of this thesis, because many of 
the conflicts are framed in terms of ethnic conflict in the country. The colonial legacy 
and ethnic policies since then, have served to marginalize the minority ethnic groups 
and generate a complex array of actors involved in armed conflict. 
Having presented the core analytical framework, we will now go on to look at the 
necessary ingredients for our recipe, also known as the Methodology Chapter.  
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3 Methodology 
If the analytical framework is the typed out recipe, then the methods for collecting and 
interpreting ones data represent the ingredients needed in order for the true taste to be 
appreciated. It is the pinch of salt, garlic and pepper, perhaps even a bit of chilli powder 
if one is feeling particularly bold and experimental.  
Using quantitative or qualitative research will provide varying and potentially 
contrasting results. Rather than focusing on testing a given theory, qualitative research 
prefers to build up theory from observations in comparison to quantitative methods that 
tend to be rather more deductive in nature and test theories by trying to disprove their 
propositions (Brockington and Sullivan 2003, 57).  
There are various flavours at our disposal in order to cook up our qualitative research, 
which has been favoured in this instance with regards to data collection for the thesis, 
such as participant observation, semi-structured interviews, or the writing of 
ethnography, just to name a few (Brockington and Sullivan 2003, 57). The main tools 
utilised here have been drawn from semi-structured interviews with various actors in the 
field; consulting a large amount of reports from civil society organisations, NGOs and 
academic institutions; consulting historical sources; newspaper articles from local 
sources; history analysis; and participating in conferences.  
3.1 Case Study Research 
The case study contributes to our knowledge of individual, organizational, social and 
political phenomena. Many a time it is employed in an effort to help understand 
complex social going-ons. What the case study allows for is the retention of the 
“holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin 1994, 3). Whilst 
similar in character to that of a history, the case study offers two extra distinctions, 
namely direct observation and systematic interviewing (Yin 1994, 8). Its strength lies in 
being able to deal with a “full variety of evidence – documents, interviews and 
observations” (ibid.), all of which will be employed throughout this thesis. 
Yin defines a case study twofold. Firstly, the case study is an empirical inquiry that: 
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 Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; 
especially when 
 The boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; 
Secondly, from a more technical point of view, the case study inquiry: 
 Copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many 
more variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
 relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result 
 benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis (Yin 1994, 13). 
Given the complexity of the hydropower sector in Myanmar and the many dams either 
planned or under construction in various ethnic states, the case study method is 
employed in order to provide a more holistic picture of one particular dam project and 
understand why there is so much resistance to it and how the past developments have 
influenced the current situation. Whilst one must always be wary of generalisations, it 
could be argued that this case study provides a basic understanding of the situation that 
can be translated to and relevant for other cases in Myanmar, such as in Shan or Kachin 
State, to name a few.  
This thesis aims at utilizing various sources to make its point come across. This works 
well with the case study method, as using multiple sources is considered one of its core 
strengths (Yin 1994, 91). Essentially, what triangulation stipulates is the study of the 
same phenomenon from different sources. All sources of evidence collected and 
reviewed will be put together into one pot and analysed cognitively, resulting in a 
“convergence of information from different sources” (Yin 1994, 91).  
3.2 Data Collection in the field 
Embarking on fieldwork was an exciting yet intimidating endeavour. I felt like a novice 
holding a cooking knife for the first time and who has been asked to prepare a three 
course meal for a food connoisseur. My previous degrees have been in political science, 
and as such the closest to fieldwork I have come has been the library. Whilst that could 
be viewed as its own kind of jungle, this was a completely different experience, 
especially for someone who has never left the warm shelter and comforts of the Western 
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world before. Unfortunately, I do have to admit that my lack of previous fieldwork 
experience coupled with certain fears (some warranted, some not so much) did inhibit 
me in some respect. However, it also led to a great learning opportunity. Thus I can 
honestly state that data collection in the field has been one of the most rewarding 
experiences of my life so far and despite its shortcomings has provided me with much 
in-depth insights to Myanmar and its peoples.  
Conference attendance 
In mid-November I embarked on my fieldwork research, starting with a conference on 
the Salween River at Chiang Mai University in Northern Thailand. The conference is an 
important part of this thesis, as it inspired me to continue research on this topic rather 
than renewable energy potential in Myanmar in more general terms. It also provided me 
with multiple contacts and new friends that helped me understand the topic through 
informal talks. Moreover, it put me in contact with representatives of KESAN who 
offered to help me in my fieldwork once I landed in Yangon.  
The conference brought together experts, civil society organizations, academics, youth 
groups and some government representatives to discuss the issues pertaining to such a 
trans-boundary river as the Salween, as well as the current potential of dam construction 
and its consequences. During the two-day conference I learned a lot about various new 
topics, such as how dam construction can in some cases lead to more seismic activity as 
well as being introduced to various civil society networks and their experiences on the 
ground.    
Choice of respondents 
After the initial actor-mapping, I attempted to contact as many people as I could in 
order to gain more insights and understand the local context better, which turned out to 
be more difficult than initially hoped. This is due to the fact that thanks to Myanmar’s 
democratization process and the country opening up more and more, foreign actors – 
NGOs, international organisations, governments etc. – have started to gain, and 
demand, more access. In doing so, there is a huge influx of new information for 
grassroots in Myanmar to take in and deal with. This does not only apply to local 
NGOs, but also applies to government representatives and well-known academics and 
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researchers. What this meant in essence is that the majority of organisations were in 
quite a busy period meeting other new and important actors and since I was not 
affiliated with, nor representing any such organization, gaining access to people was 
more difficult given the time-frame available to me.   
The choice of respondents was very much congruent on what is known as “the snowball 
effect”. When I first arrived in Thailand, I was still very new to the topic, was still 
rather unsure what to exactly focus on in my research, and did not know whom to 
contact or if my fieldwork was even feasible. However, by chatting with various 
Conference participants, researchers and grassroots actors there, I was able to build a 
small network of people who gave me insights into Myanmar and who eventually 
helped me establish contact with KESAN in Yangon. Furthermore, I was able to travel 
to and take part in discussions with villagers from the Thai side of the border that would 
be impacted by the Hat Gyi Dam as well, thanks to the Conference who organized said 
trip. Whilst I did not per se conduct an interview in that village, reporters and academics 
travelling in the group were asking the questions and recording the event, which has led 
me to believe that using information gained there would be admissible.  
In total, ten interviews were held with various actors in different countries and 
locations. Ban Sob Moei village in Thailand will be counted as one interview in this 
regard. Six more were held in Myanmar during my fieldwork there, including an 
impromptu group interview. Interviewees were mainly grassroots actors (from KESAN 
and Shan Sapawa) and village leaders, with the exception of the group interview which 
was a spur of the moment happening and which was comprised of a group of retirees 
(around five women, and one man). In addition, I had informal conversations with 
journalists, who provided valuable insights to the situation on the ground that may not 
necessarily be openly discussed in the papers. In Norway, one interview was held with a 
representative from NVE, and one more interview was held via Skype with a researcher 
from the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Stockholm.  
Government officials were not considered feasible options to contact for interviews for 
this thesis, given the still restrictive nature of the state. Since I was travelling on a 
tourist visa, which specifically prohibits one from doing anything else –such as work or 
research – I did not deem it possible or wise to contact government representatives for 
interviews. Whilst I do recognize that this may have been an over-exaggeration on my 
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part, it was my first time travelling there and I did not have prior knowledge of how 
seriously these laws are still perceived. Moreover, after having spent some time there I 
have also come to realise that meeting government officials is almost an impossible 
feat, particularly if one is not a high-ranking official or representative.  
Access to informants 
Given that whilst Myanmar has indeed made strides when it comes to more freedom of 
speech and democratization efforts in comparison to some years ago, it is still a 
repressive government and travel restrictions for foreigners are still in place in many 
parts of the country. Furthermore, roads leading to the villages I visited would have 
been impossible to take on alone (notwithstanding the general rule that foreigners are 
not allowed to drive cars anyway). In this regard, I was very much dependent on the 
help of KESAN in the field to help me reach these rural areas in the first place. 
Moreover, foreigners visiting these areas need to apply for government permits, 
something I did not possess. Thus I did not strategically choose the two villages, but 
was rather joining KESAN on their awareness raising field trips.  
However, it should be noted that it was unfortunately harvesting time in the villages, 
which meant that I was not able to meet and talk to various people within the village, 
but rather spoke to the heads of the village, limiting the number of interviews I had 
initially intended to hold. What is more, other villages closer to the actual dam site were 
not accessible to me given the fact that they are still considered active conflict areas 
with a high military presence and check points that I would not be able to cross.  
Interviewing 
Interviewing is a central ingredient for many researchers to help understand the context 
of people’s everyday lives better (Crang and Cook 2007, 60). It aids the researcher to 
identify better “what a set of people think” or how people interpret things in general 
(Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 673). One of the main strengths of conducting 
interviews is that it can provide information not accessible in documents or books and 
that may not be available to the public in any capacity (Richards 1996, 200). However, 
one must always be aware of the fact that the mind is a tricky thing and is influenced by 
our other senses or key words, which makes it impossible to guarantee replicability. 
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Moreover, not only is the information gained filtered through the interviewee’s world 
view, but will also invariably be influenced by the interviewer’s own point of view and 
what message he or she will want to put across (Syse 2001, 228). Moreover, another 
thing to be wary about is that the interviewee’s neutrality can never be guaranteed. 
Some may have their own agenda to put forward, some may be influenced by other 
people around during the interview, some may just be having a bad day. All of this will 
have an impact on the results. Furthermore, interviews are not supposed to provide any 
kind of “truth” (Richards 1996, 200); rather, their purpose is to provide insights into 
different point of views on a given subject matter. Critique aside, interviews can help 
provide those not usually heard a voice (Syse 2001, 228), something which this thesis 
hopes to accomplish to some degree.  
More often than not interviews will be conducted in an open-ended manner, which 
allows for a more fluid discussion with the interviewee rather than a strict question and 
answer framework and can thus help reveal other interesting titbits of information that 
otherwise might not have been uncovered. This is precisely the type of interviewing that 
was attempted during fieldwork. The interview guide can be found in Appendix 2. 
Conducting interviews was a vital part of data collection for this thesis. Whilst in the 
end much of the information used has come from reports and other documents, the 
interviews conducted provided rare insights in more rural settings and how people there 
relate to the question of dams on their river.  
One of the biggest hurdles to overcome during the fieldwork process was the language 
barrier. I do not speak Burmese, nor Sgaw Karen, which is the language the local people 
spoke in the villages I visited. Language classes ahead of time were not possible, since 
the closest institute that offers Burmese as a language course- according to my research- 
was SOAS in London and I had neither the means nor the time to attend classes there. 
Whilst my contacts from KESAN spoke some English and I was able to communicate 
with them, some of them were self-taught (a feat I admire immensely), whilst villagers 
did not speak any English. Thus, I was sometimes unsure about how clearly the 
interviewees were able to understand the questions I was posing (my contacts were nice 
enough to act as translators), or the quality of answers I received translated by my 
friends. However, one of my friends in Yangon is a professional translator and with his 
help I was able to iron out any kinks in the translation. Whilst this helped with the 
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actual translation process afterwards, the question still remains as to how the inquiries I 
posed were interpreted and conveyed.   
Recording 
In order to keep a detailed record of the interview, a recording device and in some cases 
my mobile phone (or both to be safe) was utilised each time. The informants were 
always made aware before use, and I asked their permission to use it during our 
conversation. This could potentially have had implications for how people respond to 
questions; some people might become shy, others might become fearful. However, in 
my interpretation of the situation, no one seemed preoccupied by my using a recording 
device and all of them consented to it. In addition to recording interviews, I also kept 
fieldwork notes so as to not forget everyday occurrences.  
3.3 Ethical considerations and my role as a 
researcher 
England has warned that “(…) exploitation and possibly betrayal are endemic to 
fieldwork” (England quoted in Scheyvens and Leslie 2000, 119), raising the question to 
what extent it is appropriate for “privileged Western researchers” to conduct research 
outside their own cultures (Scheyvens and Leslie 2000, 119). Such statements raise 
important issues of what is at stake and how important ethical considerations are to 
fieldwork, something the researcher needs to be aware of at all times. As Madge writes, 
“ethical research should not only “do no harm”, but also have potential “to do good”, to 
involve “empowerment”” (quoted in Scheyvens, Nowak, and Scheyvens 2000, 139), 
something I agree should be aspired to. According to Scheyvens et al., there are two 
levels of power imbalances between researchers and research participants: “real 
differences associated with access to money, education, and other resources and; 
perceived differences which exist in the minds of those participants who feel that they 
are inferior, and researchers who give the impression that they are superior” 
(Scheyvens, Nowak, and Scheyvens 2000, 149). During my time in the field, I 
experienced both of the described power imbalances. Some things, such as our size, 
gender and colour, are things we cannot influence or change, but are also things that 
will invariably have an impact on how we are perceived and how we interact with 
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research participants. Being a single and female Westerner travelling on her own will 
have had an impact on my conversations with village residents and other informants in 
Myanmar, especially considering almost all of my interviews were conducted with 
village leaders who were all men. Whilst researchers have pointed out that “women will 
often be perceived as less threatening than men” (Devereux and Hoddinott quoted in 
Scheyvens, Nowak, and Scheyvens 2000, 151), which can help in lessening some of the 
above mentioned power discrepancies between researcher and research participants, it 
may also result in it being harder to be taken seriously (ibid.). I always made sure to be 
dressed in a respectful manner, wearing long-sleeved shirts and long pants covering 
shoulders and the knees, as is customary for women in Myanmar.  
Given my lack of knowledge of the villages and what people there may or may not 
need, I did not offer any gifts for their time, something which did illicit a feeling a guilt. 
I asked my friends from KESAN on multiple occasions what an appropriate form of 
thanking would be, but was told that no reciprocity was necessary and that I should not 
get anything. I did buy some Sepaktakraw
11
 balls for the children to play with and 
offered them as a thank you. However, one village leader explicitly asked me whether 
there was any way for me to offer support for education or health care on the island 
since the government does not provide such services to them, making me think that he 
perhaps interpreted me having more financial backing or power than is in fact the case. 
This came up in another interview as well, when one of the interviewees asked me what 
impacts the dam would have on them if it were built. Being painfully aware of the 
implications my answer to such a question could have, I tried to explain that I am not an 
engineer or geo-analyst and was in no position to know the answer to that question. As 
Scheyvens et al. have pointed out, power imbalances need to be taken into account, and 
marginalized groups may feel inferior during our conversation. Having that in the back 
of my mind, I did my best to always be respectful and communicate my gratitude.  
One of the most important aspects of conducting ethical fieldwork is that it ensures the 
participants’ needs and concerns are taken into account, and that their dignity, privacy 
and safety be made the top priority (Scheyvens, Nowak, and Scheyvens 2000, 140). 
Interviewees were asked directly whether their identity should be safeguarded and I 
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 A game traditionally played in Southeast Asia  
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made sure that they were aware of the fact that they can withdraw consent at any time of 
the process. However, this was only done orally, not in written form. Whilst this may 
come with its own set of complications (the only way they could retract once I left the 
field was through the KESAN contact we had in common), all of them gave consent and 
did not seem to have to even think about it.  
3.4 Secondary sources 
Documents and bias within the literature used  
Given the fact that Myanmar is still at the early stages of its democratization process, 
coupled with the controversies that surround the dam development generally and on the 
Salween in particular, official documents on the dams are extremely difficult to attain. 
Thus, unfortunately no government documents were able to be found during the 
research for this thesis. Moreover, the lack of access in conjunction with ongoing 
conflict has also impacted international access to information in the country. Thus, 
reports that have been utilised have to a large extent been produced by local civil 
society organisations that operate in these conflict areas, such as the Karen Environment 
and Social Action Network (KESAN), the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) and the 
Karenni Development Research Group. These are local NGOs that up until recently 
have often been operating from across the Thai border, but worked closely with local 
communities in order to gather information on the ground. Thus, a certain bias within 
the information gathering will already have taken place, which will undoubtedly colour 
my own perception and the way I will write and analyse the subject matter. It is 
unfortunate that this “one-sidedness” will prevail, however, whilst these groups are very 
much marked by their own experiences of living as refugees and seeing their people 
suffer, it is also my belief that they provide invaluable insights into the situation on the 
ground given their extensive knowledge of the terrain, the language, the culture and the 
situation at hand and are motivated to tell the story of people who usually do not have a 
voice. They are thus more equipped with dealing with the situation on the ground and 
able to perhaps gain more trust and information that way than perhaps an international 
organisation could. Information on how the government looks at dams was collected 
through the government’s English newspaper “The New Light of Myanmar”. This 
helped to understand the tone and the general attitude that prevails within government 
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officials with regards to dam construction and how they frame it. Moreover, local news 
articles from the Irrawaddy News, Mizzima News and the Myanmar Times, among 
others, have been heavily relied upon for information, given their expertise on the 
subjects and the lack of international reporting on these questions. Whilst one may 
argue that these newspapers will invariably be shaped by their own biases, given that 
they tend to be more closely linked to perceptions held by the populace, it may also be 
argued that that is exactly their strength, making their perspectives an important 
resource to be utilised. Moreover, due to the emphasis on and importance of the ethnic 
component in the thesis, I will also draw on local ethnic news agencies, such as Karen 
News, in order to provide more local perspective. Thus, what has been attempted 
throughout is a balanced approach by presenting all the different actors involved, 
however limitations of this were to some degree unavoidable.  
3.5 Reflections and Limitations  
In retrospect, I do admit that I would have done things very differently. I accept my 
shortcomings and hope that I have still proven myself worthy of the chef’s hat required 
to analyse the components included in this thesis in-depth. One of my regrets is that I 
did not go for what I think I always secretly knew I wanted to look at in the first place, 
namely Myanmar (I initially was considering fieldwork on solar power in Malawi). 
Valuable time was lost in this regard. Another issue was that I thought it best to go into 
the field with a “clear mind” and without extensive background reading. Of course I 
was aware of the current political debates, but given the complexity of the history of all 
of the actors involved in my research, I was slightly overwhelmed at first and it took 
quite some time for all of the information to settle in and for me to truly comprehend the 
situation. My fear is that this has led me to ask incomplete questions during my 
interviews. My focus was more on socio-economic factors, at the cost of looking at 
more cultural and spiritual questions with relation to the Salween River and the people 
who live by it. Moreover, I unfortunately only stayed in Hpa’an for a few days. I was 
slightly confused about how long I should stay there without overstaying my welcome 
in a way with my friends from KESAN, however in retro respect, I should have stayed 
there longer and visited more villages if possible. However, given the fact that I was 
notified about my trip to Hpa’an the same day that I left, there was little time to for me 
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to fully think the situation through. Furthermore, staying in any of the villages and 
conduct participant observation research would have lent itself well and would have 
provided many interesting insights into how people relate to and utilise the river. 
However, given government restrictions, this was in no way a viable option. Foreigners 
are not allowed to stay in villages overnight, and even visiting these villages without 
government permission, as was the case for me, is technically illegal. Thus, field trips 
during the day and interview meetings were unfortunately the only option.  
One of the limitations already described above is the language barrier. Whilst how the 
interviewee interprets ones question can always be up for debate, the picture becomes 
ever more blurry when one does not speak the language and is dependent on others for 
translation help. Not only that, but being dependent on one particular organisation may 
bias not only my point of view, but also the respondent`s point of view. Since the 
information they have gotten has mainly been supplied by members of KESAN, it is 
hard to perhaps gage where their own opinion on the subject begins and KESAN’s 
opinion ends.  
Moreover, not being able to directly speak with either government officials or ethnic 
armed group members could be considered to contribute to a certain bias throughout the 
thesis. Whilst it has been attempted to make up for the lack of actual interviews by 
gathering information from various news agencies, it might have influenced the analysis 
and conclusions.  
In this chapter I have sought to present the methods utilised in order to collect and 
analyse my data. Having presented the various sources, as well as the obstacles faced 
during the data collection process, the next chapter will explore the historic background 
of Myanmar and its use of natural resources in the past, and how this has shaped the 
present, as well as how that affects dam development projects.  
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4 Background 
 
Myanmar, long a pariah state among economic powerhouses, is now said to be 
transforming into “the keystone in a new and potentially immensely profitable trade 
bridge” (Johnston 2011). Sharing boarders with Bangladesh, India, China, Laos, and 
Thailand, as well as a coastline along the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal (ADB 2012, 
1), it provides access to the Indian Ocean to its partners in China, and great trade and 
energy export potential to India and Thailand. The population is estimated as being 51 
million (MIP 2014), more than 70% of which live in rural areas. Agriculture, especially 
rice production, is the backbone of the economy, employing the majority of the 
country’s workforce.  
 
Yet, as has been implied, this incredibly resource rich country has suffered much 
turmoil - turmoil that has yet to abate. Confucius famously said “study the past if you 
would define the future”. Indeed, the complexities behind the questions concerning dam 
construction and the strong resistance to such plans that have led to conflict (armed and 
otherwise) can be found to a great extent in the history and development of the country. 
As we will come to see, ethnic minorities have been marginalised throughout recent 
history and deeply impacted by such events as the Second World War and the military 
dictatorship that has ruled the country until recently. Thus, in order to better discern in 
what way exactly ethnicity has become so politicized in Myanmar and the consequences 
of said politicization, we will begin the journey with a trip through history.  
The importance of history in the case of dams and their potential to 
aggravate conflict  
This in-depth historical analysis is vital for understanding the current situation; why on-
going armed conflict persists in general and how these conflicts are linked to 
development projects such as dam constructions. Whilst the international community 
has tended to focus more on the struggle between the military government and the 
political opposition in the past, the underlying conflicts presented here may well 
represent a more “fundamental and intractable obstacle to peace, development and 
democracy” (Kivimäki and Pasch 2009, 7). The link between poverty, marginalization 
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and lack of ownership and power – among other things - have all played a part in the 
sustained armed conflict situation that we still see today and has its roots in the complex 
history of the nation. Whilst society in pre-colonial Myanmar was also fragmented and 
not without its own set of problems, British colonial rule served to delineate population 
and regions along ethnic lines whilst exacerbating this divide further by implementing a 
different ruling policy for the Frontier States and the Centre. Since then, ethnic minority 
groups have generally been left out of politics, have been marginalized and often 
suffered under the Tatmadaw’s counter-insurgency tactics, which have resulted in 
forced labour, rape and killing of local populations in rural areas. Ethnic minorities have 
been specific targets of repression throughout the decades (Doyle and Simpson 2006, 
755). Various repressive laws against freedom of speech have effectively meant that 
anyone protesting either the government itself, or its policies and decisions may risk 
their life in doing so, leaving local people no space to protest any development projects 
and the human rights abuses that have resulted from them. Moreover, the negotiations 
and signing of ceasefire agreements and the protracted conflict situation have severely 
impacted the local population. This historical background offers important insights 
needed to help understand the confusing web of problems facing Myanmar today, where 
they come from and why they have developed in such a manner. The political 
intricacies at play and lack of peace invariably impact the economy and development of 
the rural areas. 
4.1 Myanmar – A History 
The multiple roots of the various conflicts still prevalent in Myanmar today, are located 
in the complex historical development of the country (Gravers 2007, viii). The language 
one uses to describe events and the cultural diversity has political weight and meaning 
(Taylor 2005, 2), as can already be seen with the on-going confusion over the country’s 
name, but also what ethnic groups are called (e.g. Kayin or Karen). Moreover, given 
Myanmar’s strategic location at Asia’s crossroads, these ethnic and political crises that 
have evolved over the course of the last hundred years or so, also has significant 
international dimensions (Smith 2005, 56). This will also prove to be important when 
we will later on look at who Myanmar’s main investors have been in the past (e.g. 
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China) and how Myanmar’s foreign relations to such powerhouses influences its 
domestic affairs.  
Ethnic groups before British rule 
Like most Southeast Asian nations (with the exception of Thailand), Myanmar was part 
of a colonial power - Great Britain. I believe it would be useful to take a small detour 
into pre-colonial structures of the society, in order to better ascertain the changes that 
occurred with colonial rule. Post-colonial rebellions (except for the Communist one), 
have very much tended to emphasize the ethnic dimension of identity and difference, 
whereas in pre-colonial times, Gravers asserts that ethnicity had a different place 
(Gravers 2007, 9). Power was based on alliances, as well as a distinct social hierarchy 
and exhibited lines of relations and spheres or domains of influence instead of 
concretely shaped borders (Gravers 2007, 10). Political anxieties rather than ethnic ones 
dominated conflicts.  
At the same time, despite war and strife, cultural and ethnic interchange has been the 
norm throughout the centuries. Historically, many local communities and societies in 
Myanmar have actually been multi-ethnic (Smith 1994, 22). This serves to indicate an 
important precedent for inter-ethnic tolerance and understanding in the country. 
However, the question of ethnicity in Myanmar would be deeply impacted by British 
rule, with its repercussions lasting until today.   
British Colonial Rule and the lasting impact on ethnic relations 
“It is no exaggeration to say that the British made modern Myanmar” (Taylor 2005, 4). 
They established the borders with its neighbouring countries, defined much of the 
administrative structures of the state, and essentially divided the country into two 
different administrative parts, which resulted in lasting economic and developmental 
disparities. And whilst the British did not create Myanmar’s ethnic minorities per se, 
colonial rule did serve to exacerbate tensions between them (Charney 2009, 202), a fact 
often cited by the military as the root cause of all problems in Myanmar.  
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The British annexed Myanmar fully
12
 in 1885. The country was divided into two 
different administrative systems, that of Ministerial Burma, which mainly represented 
the lowland region predominantly inhabited by the Burmans, and that of the so-called 
Frontier Areas, which were the border areas, mainly inhabited by ethnic minority 
groups. Whilst Ministerial Burma was allowed a limited degree of parliamentary home 
rule, the Frontier Areas were generally left under the control of local chieftains or 
headmen (Smith 2005, 63).  
Ethnic differences were thus incorporated into the representative structures of the 
colonial state (Taylor 2005, 12). What is more, such notions as ‘native states’ and 
‘frontier areas’ were equated with ideas of backwardness and primitiveness. This is 
important to note, because these notions have persisted and have become deeply 
ingrained into the present “cognition and modelling of the political landscape” in 
Myanmar (Gravers 2007, 17).  
Beyond that, the British impacted the society by, in a sense, constructing ethnic 
identities. Thus, Jorgensen postulates that  
until the 19th century, the word ‘Karen’ was never used by the groups 
which constitute the category Karen today, until Christian missionaries and 
British colonial officers gave the term respectability. Since then it has 
gained itself a special reality as a term accepted by most educated Karens, 
Thai and Burmese (Jorgensen quoted in Buadaeng 2007, 76).  
However, in doing so, the British invariably aided in the blooming of ethnic 
consciousness as a result of this designation (Buadaeng 2007, 76), something which has 
had a big impact to this day.  
The Road to Independence and its impact on minorities 
The Second World War did little to alleviate ethnic tensions in Myanmar. Few areas of 
Myanmar remained unscathed during the war, as two colonial powers were fighting to 
gain hold over the territory, destroying any infrastructure and land in the process 
(Steinberg 2010, 36). Whilst the Burmans remained allied to the Japanese
13
, some of the 
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 I say “fully” because the annexation of the Kingdom of Burma was done in 3 wars 
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 Until early 1945 
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minority ethnic groups, especially the Karen and the Kachin, sided with the British, 
exacerbating ethnic tensions as both sides committed atrocities against each other. A 
Karen National Association (KNA) leader has said in this regard: “after all this (the 
murders and slaughters), how could anyone seriously expect us to trust any Burman 
government in Rangoon?” (Smith 1991, 62). The markedly different experiences by the 
various peoples of Myanmar during the war would have severe consequences for the 
post-Independence period. Not only did tensions exacerbate between various groups 
given that the war was fought along racial lines, but each ethnic group also gained first-
hand experience in leading their own people (Smith 1991, 64).  
Post-independence: Insurgencies and military rule  
Whilst Myanmar was a well-regarded and respected part of the international community 
during its parliamentary democracy days, it was confronted with internal insurgencies 
almost straight away, resulting in an almost complete collapse of the agreement with the 
ethnic groups, as “the logic of a unified state and economy came up against the realities 
of a highly divided society with a variety of unmet and often inchoate ethnically 
perceived demands and expectations” (Taylor 2005, 9).  
The Karen National Union (KNU) began its fight almost immediately, demanding more 
autonomy and equal rights within the Union. Losing control over vast parts of the 
country, the government began to heavily rely on the Tatmadaw to retain power and 
control (Taylor 2005, 15). The prohibition of learning ethnic minority languages in 
schools, among other things, was interpreted as a direct attack on the values and 
cultures of the ethnic minorities, and added fuel to the fire of ethnic separatist 
sentiments (Taylor 2005, 18). In turn, ethnic aspirations and expression of ethnic 
minority views was equated with the divisions of colonial rule by the Tatmadaw in 
particular (Smith 2005, 45).  
Disagreeing with the government’s attempt at cooperating with ethnic minority groups, 
the military staged a coup and set up a one-party state instead. The army justified its 
power-grabbing in the name of national unity. Economically, Ne Win’s “Burmese Way 
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to Socialism” ended up bankrupting the nation14 and Asia’s once largest rice exporter 
was faced with food deficits. The continuing neglect of health services, economic and 
developmental programmes in minority areas by the government only served to enhance 
their sense of marginalization (Smith 2005, 68). In response to the inability of the 
military to curtail insurgencies, the Tatmadaw implemented their “Four Cuts” counter-
insurgency strategy, which resulted in countless human rights abuses and forced 
population relocation, among other things. The strategy itself had one goal: to cut off 
the four main links (food, finance, intelligence, and recruits) between civilians and 
armed opposition forces through non-stop military harassment (Smith 1994, 46). This 
meant, in effect, that “areas occupied by resistance groups were termed “black areas,” 
which effectively made them free fire zones where soldiers were permitted to kill and 
abuse with impunity” (Apple and Martin 2003, 38). Even today areas within Karen state 
are designated “black areas”.  
Ne Win remained in power for 26 years. During that time, Myanmar became one of the 
most isolated and hermetically sealed off countries in the world (Smith 1991, 1) with a 
booming black market economy to compensate for the economic and developmental 
failures of Ne Win’s policies and buoying corruption. The old government was replaced 
by the new State Law and Restoration Council (SLORC), which toughened its stance 
and implemented tough new martial law decrees (Smith 1994, 70) in the name of the 
restoration of “law and order and peace and tranquillity” (Smith 1991, 15).   
In 1997, “when order (if not law) had been restored” (Steinberg 2010, 83), the SLORC 
decided to re-name itself the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)
15
. What 
mainly characterized the difference between these two phases of military rule is the fact 
that the SLORC time did not face Western sanctions yet, encountered numerous ethnic 
insurgencies, problems with neighbours and a continuous influence of leaders from the 
Ne Win period. The SPDC period was characterized more by heavy Western sanctions, 
the emergence of ceasefire agreements with many of the ethnic insurgent groups, 
membership in ASEAN and “the elimination of the Ne Win “old guard”” (Charney 
2009, 179). 
                                                 
14
 By the time Ne Win abdicated, Myanmar was on the UN’s “Least Developed Countries” Index 
15
 Reasons for the change are speculated, but it would seem to be a mix of needing a better reputation 
abroad in the wake of Myanmar’s application for ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
membership in 1997 and providing it the image of ‘fighting corruption’ (Charney 2009, 179) 
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The 2008 Constitution 
The new Constitution agreed upon in 2008 did not serve to address the main grievances 
of the armed ethnic opposition groups, but did stipulate a new parliament be instated, a 
new quasi-civilian government come to power and political prisoners be freed (Singh 
2013, 101). Whilst the SPDC ceased to exist as of March 2011, instead being replaced  
by a new relatively democratic government, headed by Thein Sein, the Constitution still 
provides the military with “the ultimate power of exercising emergency authority” if 
necessary, as well as providing the Tatmadaw with a quarter of the seats in the 
parliament (Singh 2013, 102). The Constitution also provides for three newly elected 
legislatures to be formed: the upper house (Amyotha Hluttaw) and lower house (Pyithu 
Hluttaw) of the national parliament, with 14 state or region assemblies (Buchanan, 
Kramer, and Woods 2013, 7).  
What is more, the government has attempted to build some bridges again by reaching 
out to Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD in order to work together. However, ethnic 
minorities still suffer from continued marginalisation, as even today ethnic languages 
are rarely taught in school, while the ethnic areas have so far received very little 
government support in developing their economies or for implementing infrastructure 
projects such as the building of roads.  
4.2 The Peace Process and ethnic armed groups 
Since the new government came to power in early 2011, Myanmar’s peace process16 
has become a pivotal element of their internal policy (Min Zaw Oo 2014, 7). However, 
we must distinguish between the ceasefires and the peace process itself. The ceasefires 
do not in themselves represent the peace process, although they are a pivotal first step 
towards it. Yet ceasefires in and of themselves only mean a cessation of armed conflict. 
However, ethnic armed groups have often wanted to approach both issues together, 
given that their armed power is their biggest bargaining chip and one not easily laid 
down, whereas the government insists on ceasefires before peace talks.  
 
                                                 
16
 For a detailed figure depicting the various actors involved in this process, please refer to Appendix 4.  
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Ethnic armed groups and their main grievances  
The main grievance ethnic minority groups will share is  
their lack of influence in the political decision-making processes; the 
absence of economic and social development in their areas; and what they 
see as a Burmanisation policy of the military government that translates 
into repression of their cultural rights and religious freedom (Kramer 2009, 
16).  
In response to the decades, or even centuries of neglect from the colonial power and the 
successive governments, ethnic armed groups have set up their own health, agriculture, 
justice and other departments within their territories, thus effectively running a state 
within a state (Kramer 2009, 18). In this regard, they also expect and rely on levies 
being paid by the local population in forms of direct taxes, recruits porters and food 
(Kramer 2009, 19).  
Whilst ethnic ceasefire groups
17
 have mostly rejected the concept of de-facto separatism 
from Myanmar, they all generally want to see it become a federal state and see their 
ethnic armies be transformed into federal armies. This remains one of the most divisive 
issues within the peace process. However, what has made a significant impact in the 
negotiations for the ceasefire and peace agreements is the fact that in the last years the 
ethnic ceasefire groups have come together to establish the Nationwide Ceasefire 
Coordination Team (NCCT), in order to negotiate with one united voice with the 
government. 
The specific case of the Karen National Union  
“The Karen are much more than a national minority. We are a nation” 
KNU publication quoted in (Smith 2005, 60) 
The KNU has been singled out as an ethnic armed group here, due to not only it 
“representing” the Karen ethnic group (to an extent), but also due to the fact that it only 
entered in a ceasefire with the government quite recently (2012) and the fact that the 
dam used as the main case study lies within KNU territory.  
                                                 
17
 Those ethnic armed groups that have already signed ceasefire agreements with the government. So far 2 
out of 16 have yet to do so.  
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The modern Karen nationalist movement can be traced back to the late 19
th
 century 
through the formation of the Karen National Association (KNA) in 1881, the forerunner 
of today’s Karen National Union (KNU), which aimed to promote Karen identity, 
education and leadership (Smith 1991, 44). The KNU was established in 1947 and led 
by Christian Karen, in order to represent Karen interests. It consists of both a civilian 
branch, responsible for humanitarian and social welfare within its sphere of influence, 
as well as an armed branch – the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) - which 
continues to fight for freedom (Hayami and Darlington 2000, 141). Failing to reach an 
agreement with the new government, it decided to go underground in 1949 and has been 
in active revolt ever since and up until the recent ceasefire agreement of 2012. The 
KNU has proclaimed that it follows the policy of national democracy, and ‘recognizes 
and encourages private ownership and welcomes foreign investment. All the people 
(…) shall be given democratic rights, politically, economically, socially and culturally’ 
(KNU 2006, 16). Among the Karen civilian population, a range of different points of 
view concerning the KNU invariably exists, however, many do express sympathy for 
the KNU and see it as representing ‘our people’ (South 2011, 40).  
In the past, the KNU virtually operated as a de facto government, controlling a large 
territory across Karen State and neighbouring areas. However, by the early 1990s its 
power began to dwindle and it had lost a great deal of its ‘liberated zones’. Moreover, 
growing Buddhist Karen concerns within the KNU over the Christian dominance in 
leadership (among other grievances) resulted in a large fraction of the organization 
leaving and forming the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) in 1994. The 
formation of the DKBA, as well as its prompt ceasefire agreement with the regime, 
represented hard blows for the KNU (Gravers 2014b, 188).  
The recent ceasefire agreement has not meant a complete cessation in conflict, 
especially in south-eastern Myanmar. The KNU has retained its weapons. Moreover, the 
Tatmadaw has yet to withdraw its troops from areas under ethnic armed group 
territories and indeed has been said to have increased its presence in such areas during 
ceasefire talks (Schroeder and U 2014, 207). Thus, whilst fighting has significantly 
decreased, Karen State still experiences armed conflict, especially near areas where 
large infrastructure projects are meant to be built and the local population is still 
vulnerable to conflict-related human rights abuses (Schroeder and U 2014, 212).  
42 
 
Ethnic armed groups operating in Karen State 
As we have seen, the conflict between the KNU and the Tatmadaw has a long history in 
general and in Karen State in particular. However, they are not the only military actors 
present within the State. In fact, the region has become more and more militarized in the 
last two decades due to the presence of not only the Tatmadaw, but also five non-state 
armed groups, namely the KNU, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the 
Karen Peace Force (KPF), the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and more recently the 
Border Guard Force (BGF) groups (CPCS 2014, 20). Whilst the KNU is by far the most 
dominant player and holds significant areas of control, the DKBA and KPF, both 
splinter groups of the KNU, are also active and control some territory in the State 
(CPCS 2014, 20). The KPF was created in 1997, but decided to assimilate into the BGF 
later on, a “state security force affiliated with the DKBA” (CPCS 2014, 20). The NMSP 
has reached an accord with the KNU to allow it to operate in the border region to Mon 
State, where the majority of the local population stems from the Mon ethnic group.  
Ceasefires 
Whilst the ceasefires the SLORC signed in the 1990s did little more than “freeze” – 
rather than resolve – conflicts, these truces did allow for civil society to emerge and 
marked a stark decrease in war-related deaths (South 2012). The cease-fires however, 
are merely military truces, and do not include political agreements (Kramer 2009, 13). 
None of the agreements have been made public and all the ceasefires have been verbal 
agreements, not a written and signed document (Steinberg 2010, 111). Furthermore, the 
relationship between the ceasefire groups and the government remain quite tense, with 
fighting still occurring between ceasefire groups and the Tatmadaw on multiple 
occasions.  
As part of the ceasefire agreements, ethnic armed groups are to be transformed into 
Border Guard Forces (BGFs) under direct control of the Tatmadaw (South 2011, 4). 
They were supposed to be a form of an armed unit that was ‘neither militia, nor part of 
the regular army’ (Min Zaw Oo 2014, 11) but were to be placed under the overarching 
authority of the Myanmar National Army. This in turn has caused factions that disagree 
with this to split from ceasefire groups and continue their own agenda in smaller sizes, 
representing battalions rather than an entire army, as has been the case with the DKBA 
43 
 
operating in Karen State, which has officially been transformed into BGFs, but with for 
example the DKBA-5 (DKBA Brigade 5) splitting and continuing its insurgency, now 
often aligning with the KNU again. This has had implications for the fighting around 
the Hat Gyi dam site area, since it is KNU (mostly) but also DKBA-5 territory. 
4.2.1 A Historical Perspective on the Use of Natural Resources 
in Myanmar 
Having looked at the historical political processes that have explained the current ethno-
political situation, a look at the utilization of natural resources further helps setting the 
scene for why conflict is directly linked to natural resource management and 
hydropower in particular.  
After Myanmar became part of the British Empire, the exploitation of natural resources 
“was largely left to the private sector, which meant foreign companies mainly from 
Britain” (Kyi et al. 2000, 87). However, laws and regulations for the management of 
natural resources were set up by the British, most importantly on the management of 
forests (especially teak trees) (Kyi et al. 2000, 87). In reference to Karen State, the area 
forming the watershed of the Salween River was incredibly fertile, exemplifying vast 
areas of teak forest, and was otherwise also known as the ‘Golden Teak’ forest zone 
(KRW 2004, 19). During colonial times, this was the main resource exported from 
Myanmar, and the transport of logs depended highly on the Salween River (KRW 2004, 
19). The other industry promoted by the British concerning natural resources was the 
establishment of the petroleum industry. Oil, timber and gems were the natural 
resources that drew British interests to Myanmar in the first place, and this is where the 
focus of extraction laid.  
After independence, the democratic government tended to follow the policies of the 
previous colonial rule when it came to resource management and conservation, 
diverging only in one (yet significant) aspect: that exploitation of most resources was 
now run by the state alone (Kyi et al. 2000, 88), meaning that all proceedings went 
directly and solely to the state. This was done in order to help finance the development 
measures that were being set up.  
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The use of obsolete technologies meant that Myanmar lost its “comparative advantage 
in producing value-added or manufactured exports”, leading to an over-reliance on 
natural-resource-based commodities for export (Kyi et al. 2000, 89). The prohibition of 
oil imports
18
 only served to exacerbate the already extensive shortage of energy within 
Myanmar (Kyi et al. 2000, 89) which has led to the country’s dependence on biomass as 
a main source of energy and leaving the majority of the population literally in the dark.  
To make things more complicated, certain areas during this time were not in fact 
administered by the government, but rather by the ethnic armed groups. Thus, again 
zooming in to Karen State and the KNU, it is interesting to see that during the “first 
three decades of the Karen resistance, beginning in 1949, the area was free from 
commercial logging” (KRW 2004, 20) due to the KNU not wanting to risk exploiting 
the natural resources too much. However, logging resumed once more in the area 
around 1983 when the KNU began to sell logging concessions to Thai companies. It 
was the KNU’s Forestry Department’s role to make laws pertaining to the maintenance 
of the environment according to the wishes of the people residing in their area of 
control. Thus, regulations covering such policies as rotational slash and burn farming, 
forest fire control, reforestation or replanting of teak forests, and the forbidding of 
hunting of rare wildlife were drawn up (KRW 2004, 20).  
In comparison to the above mentioned closed economy Ne Win practiced, the SLORC’s 
“open door” economic policy introduced a sharp turn for Myanmar’s economy, with the 
government emphasizing the importance of foreign investment and encouraging 
maximum freedom to market forces (Kyi et al. 2000, 89). Given the country’s lack of 
investment in its own labour force, education facilities and infrastructure development 
(i.e. roads), foreign investment has mainly focused on natural resource extraction (Kyi 
et al. 2000, 89). Moreover, the SLORC left foreign investors with a free hand in how to 
conduct their business. This has remained the dominating economic course ever since. 
Indeed, ever since the SLORC took power, a worrying trend of favouring business over 
issues of human rights or the environment has characterized the government’s attitude 
towards natural resources and the economy. The consequences of both the “Burmese 
Way to Socialism”, as well as the “open door policy” for ethnic minorities have been 
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 Due to a concern over the limited foreign exchange reserves 
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stark. Ethnic minority leaders have claimed that since 1988, “land traditionally 
inhabited by minority peoples is being seized or sold from under their feet by the 
SLORC, using emergency military powers. This has been most apparent in ethnic 
borderland areas” (Smith 1991, 97). Moreover, due to the regimes’ trade agreements 
(amongst other things on infrastructure and dam projects) with neighbouring countries 
such as China and Thailand, minority peoples have systematically been “evicted from 
their lands or denied access to their own resources by the collusion of government 
officials or businessmen wishing to appropriate territories and revenues for themselves” 
(Smith 1991, 98). Whilst this can be considered in direct violation of ILO Convention 
Nr. 169 which stipulates in Article 15.1 on the rights of peoples over the natural 
resources on their lands that “…these rights include the right of these peoples to 
participate in the use, management, and conservation of these resources” (ILO 1989), 
Myanmar has yet to ratify the Convention.  
However, control over the economy by the ruling Tatmadaw, as has been the case so far 
(and arguably still is considering the prevalence of military-owned companies (Ytzen 
and Gravers 2014, 67)) also served as a way to ensure the Tatmadaw’s domination and 
“guarantee the continued unity and efficacy of the state” (Steinberg 2005, 3). Thus, the 
military has come to view the economy as directly interlinked with their power.  
Worries and fears about the government’s hydropower plans were already being 
expressed in the early 1990s, as documented in Smith’s book (Smith 1991, 100). These 
worries have only persisted and become heightened. The signing of various deals with 
foreign firms, especially with and from Thailand, concerning teak, fisheries and 
agriculture, resulted in devastating consequences for the environment (Steinberg 2005, 
9). The signing of the ceasefires during this decade helped alleviate pressure off the 
military government as well as opening up large areas of the country that were 
inaccessible before, resulting in an augmenting of economic activities such as mining 
(Steinberg 2005, 9). On the flipside however, such infrastructure projects were also 
accompanied by forced relocation as well as forced labour among other things (Kyi et 
al. 2000, 173). Particularly, Refugees International has reported that the SPDC attacked 
villages “and committed a myriad human rights abuses as part of its forced relocation 
program necessary for the construction of infrastructure projects, including railways, 
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pipelines, and dams” (Apple and Martin 2003, 44), the revenue of which go back to the 
SPDC.  
This thorough historic description and analysis is an important component for 
understanding the current issues involved in the Hat Gyi dam debate, such as the deep 
mistrust towards the central government and the decades of neglect of the ethnic 
minority areas, to name a few. Having seen the history behind the political and 
economic developments in Myanmar, we now turn to look at the issues behind 
hydropower development, and the introduction of the Hat Gyi dam itself as a case 
study.  
47 
 
5 Energy, Development and Dams 
Myanmar is not only at a crossroads concerning its internal politics and democratization 
process, but also considering its economic growth and development and how this can 
contribute to poverty alleviation in the country. Whilst the McKinsey Group Report 
estimates that the economy will grow at a pace of 8% per year (Chhor et al. 2013), per 
capita income of about US$ 876 is still among the lowest of the East Asian Economies 
(Perera 2013). Moreover, the regions suffering most and who have experienced decades 
of neglect tend to be the border State areas. Rapid economic growth seems to be an 
important component in order to alleviate poverty and improve living standards (ADB 
2014, 8). In that regard, electricity is a fundamental basis in order to achieve economic 
and developmental growth (Dapice 2012, 6).  
The Energy-Development Nexus 
Access to energy services is now generally recognized internationally as an important 
component of development (Bradbrook 2005, 2). The link between poverty and the lack 
of access to modern energy services has only been recognized relatively recently
19
 
(Bradbrook 2005, 1) with such initiatives as the UN’s “Sustainable Energy for All”. 
That same initiative states that “sustainable development is not possible without 
sustainable energy. Access to modern energy services is fundamental to human 
development and an investment in our collective future” (SE4ALL 2011). At the same 
time, over 2.5 billion people rely on traditional biomass, such as fuel wood, and animal 
dung, to meet their energy needs for cooking, a number estimated to rise by 2030 
(Goldemberg 2012, 74).  
Whilst an increase in access to such energy services can contribute to better health care, 
and aid in eliminating extreme hunger by increasing food productivity or reducing post-
harvest losses (Goldemberg 2012, 74), “most current energy generation and use are 
accompanied by environmental impacts at local, regional and global levels” (UNDP 
2000, 3), which leaves us in a bit of a conundrum. Energy is necessary for everything 
from heating homes to delivering public services, to developing industries and 
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 Whilst the importance of universal energy services provision was recognized by the Brundtland Report 
in 1986, the issue was brought on to the central stage of discussion in 2000 (Bradbrook 2005, 3) 
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economies. The development of the rich (OECD) countries would have been 
unimaginable without the exploitation and consumption of energy to industrialize their 
economies (Wilhite 2012, 81). So can we really expect or demand country’s in that 
stage of development to not utilise energy in the same manner in order to develop their 
economies?  
Myanmar’s Electrification Rate  
Presently, Myanmar has an 
electrification rate of approximately 
28% according to government 
statistics - a rate that drops 
significantly in rural areas (Castalia 
2014, 1) as exemplified in Figure 1, 
where even in 2010 one can hardly 
see any sign of electrification. Even 
Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city and 
economic hub, experiences many 
power outages, especially during the 
dry season (ADB 2014, 142). One of 
the main issues in the past has been the fact that the military regime had prioritized the 
export of energy rather than focusing on providing electricity for its people. As such, 
the new government is now faced with the herculean task of both developing an energy 
supply system that will drastically expand stable electrification nation-wide, but also to 
domestic industries, especially in light of the new influx of investment in the country. 
This is especially important, not only because an increase in electrification rates could 
spur growth of “micro-, small, and medium-sized enterprises or home businesses, 
especially in rural areas” (ADB 2014, 143), but also because Myanmar’s dependence on 
biomass – specifically fuel wood – for cooking and heating invariably will impact the 
already shrinking forest coverage of the country (Bodenbender, Messinger, and Ritter 
2012, 41), as well as increased health risks due to indoor smoke-inhalation. In order to 
 
Figure 1 - Myanmar by night. Source:(The 
Economist 2012) 
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achieve full electrification by 2030, the government will place a strong emphasis on 
hydropower generation in its National Electrification Plan (NEP)20. 
Having established Myanmar’s low electrification rate and the need for hydropower 
development, an overview of what constitutes a large dam, as well as the problems and 
benefits associated with such dams will be provided.  
5.1 Hydropower Dams: An Overview 
Before looking at the role of hydropower dams in Myanmar in particular, I believe it is 
important to first look at what exactly qualifies as a “large dam”, and what the debate 
surrounding hydropower dams currently entails. In the past decades, global electricity 
production has more than doubled, providing a stark incentive for the building of large 
dams in many countries in order to provide electricity (WCD 2000, 14). At the same 
time, the debate surrounding hydropower dams has grown exponentially to go beyond 
just the ecological impacts that are associated with dams and include such issues as the 
“geographical distribution of electrical power and water resources, the inclusion of 
relevant stakeholders, the relocation and resettlement of displaced inhabitants, and the 
disruption of social, cultural, and economic life in communities affected by dam 
construction” (Tilt, Braun, and He 2009, 249). Hydropower is used in over 160 
countries, and about one third of these utilize it for 90% of their total electricity supply. 
Moreover, according to the World Energy Council, it represents “the most flexible and 
consistent of the renewable energy resources” (World Energy Council 2011).  
But what exactly is hydropower, how is it generated and what do we mean when we talk 
about “large dams”? Hydropower in and of itself is considered “green” in that the 
“electric energy production does not generate any emissions of greenhouse gases” 
(Olsson 2012, 21). Moreover, it is classified as a renewable energy source, that is to say 
that it is a source that is “naturally replenished at the rate of extraction” (Goldemberg 
2012, 29). The theoretical potential of renewable energy is enormous. However the 
practical and technical implementation potential of renewables is considerably smaller 
(yet still represents a considerable amount) (Goldemberg 2012, 55). On the flipside, 
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50 
 
hydropower cannot seriously be considered “clean” or “green” according to McCully, 
who goes on to state that not only can hydropower seriously “contaminate river water”, 
it also “emits greenhouse gases due to the rotting of submerged vegetation and soils” 
(McCully 1996, 140). As we can see, there is already quite a debate to be had over the 
pros and cons of building and justifying the construction of such large dams. McCully 
further claims that hydropower cannot be considered renewable energy, given that the 
“number of dam sites is finite, and because dams age and their reservoirs fill with 
sediments” (McCully 1996, 140).  
Dams can come in different sizes and serve various purposes, such as electricity 
generation, flood control and irrigation (Magee 2015, 217). According to the 
International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), a “large dam” is any dam that is 15 
meters or higher, and it estimates that around 40.000 such large dams permeate the 
world’s rivers (Goldemberg 2012, 48).  
Dams have been in use in one form or another for centuries already according to 
archaeological finds, the earliest of which are said to have been from 3000BC (McCully 
1996, 13). But from the 1930s to the 1970s, the construction of large dams became 
“synonymous with development and economic progress”, and were revered as symbols 
of modernization (Goldemberg 2012, 49), which explains their accelerated expansion 
during this period in time. What type of dam is built is very much dependent on the 
specific local conditions, however, no matter where one choses to place oneself within 
this debate, dams by design are disruptive given that they are designed to alter the 
natural flow regime of rivers (Magee 2015, 216). With the electricity demands of not 
only Myanmar itself, but the entire Asian Continent, including China, rising 
exponentially, hydropower dams are making a “come-back” in the region. Let us then 
move on to discuss some of the positive and negative characteristics and consequences 
dams can exhibit.   
Dams as the solution to climate change  
In the past, hydropower dams have been promoted as one of the vital steps towards 
industrialisation that would “elevate impoverished nations (…) toward First World 
status” (Fletcher 2010, 2). Whilst they garnered a sizeable amount of criticism over the 
last few decades in response to the huge amount of people who have been displaced due 
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to dam construction, their failure to deliver predicted benefits as well as the ecological 
impacts associated with dam projects such as a reduction of biodiversity and reduced 
water quality to name a few (Fletcher 2010, 3), they have started to make a come-back 
once more. With the emergence of the climate change debate and the growing concern 
attached to it especially during the last decade, hydropower dams have once again 
entered the stage and are being hailed by some as “the answer to global warming” 
(McCully quoted in Fletcher 2010, 4). This has resulted in hydropower dams being 
viewed as an important way to mitigate climate change and has spurred large 
investment in the industry. In 2010, hydro dams represented the “single largest project 
type in the clean development mechanism (CDM) portfolio” of the Kyoto Protocol 
(Mäkinen and Khan 2010, 99). This is important to note, because this major new source 
of funding, curtesy of the CDM, is one of the main factors that has spurred the new 
growth of hydropower dam construction worldwide. Many middle-income countries, 
such as China, Thailand, India and Brazil are driving the dam construction market, in 
part due to hopes that global warming will provide enough incentive to catapult 
hydropower into climate friendly technology territory, thus granting them carbon credits 
within the international emissions trading mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol 
(McCully 1996, xvii) (Aviva and Lanza 2010).  
This shift that has occurred – placing hydropower dams within the climate change 
mitigation sphere – has had huge repercussions for the debate surrounding large dams 
by making it a part of a moral discourse, e.g. hydropower is a necessity in order to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As Fletcher states, “whereas previously hydro dams 
were cast by their opponents as an immoral blight on the social and environmental 
landscape (e.g., McCully 2001), in contemporary climate discourse dams are recast as 
the moral alternative to fossil fuel-based electricity production” (2010, 5). However, as 
we will see in the section below, hydropower’s reputation as “clean energy” might not 
be as solid and clear-cut as promulgated by its proponents.  
5.1.1 Benefits and Problems with regards to Dams 
Hydropower generation is an attractive form of electricity generation, given its ability to 
store and save potential energy for long stretches at a time (Olsson 2012, 121), a 
function that is particularly practical in dry climate areas. Moreover, it is often hailed as 
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a relatively “low-cost” source of renewable energy, as once constructed it is deemed to 
have low operating costs and a long life (WCD 2000, 14). It can also represent energy 
security
21
 for some countries who are not endowed with fossil fuels and would thus 
otherwise have to import fuel to sustain power generation (WCD 2000, 14). Another 
argument often used in favour of dams is that they serve as flood-protection. With 
millions of people affected by floods and their consequences, one can understand this 
line of reasoning. As often emphasised by people I interviewed in Karen State, floods 
may also have beneficial functions, such as land fertilization. Other positive effects 
often attributed to dam construction is employment generation, especially given that a 
large number of unskilled workers are needed to help build the dam (WCD 2000, 99). 
However, this does not represent a long-term employment solution, given that once the 
dam is built, that same large amount of unskilled workers will find itself unemployed 
and without a livelihood. The dam’s most obvious positive attribute is that it produces 
electricity, a sizeable percentage of which could potentially go into powering industries 
in the respective regions, something we have seen could benefit those regions in 
Myanmar where hydropower potential is greatest, given that those also represent some 
of the poorest regions in the country. Moreover, “in countries with low levels of energy 
services, even small energy inputs bring significant welfare improvements” (WCD 
2000, 101). Hydropower development may also lead to an increase the diversification of 
energy sources, especially considering the huge dependence on fuelwood and its 
adverse effects in the case of Myanmar, whilst also enhancing energy self-sufficiency 
and energy security (Kattelus 2009, 66).  
However, hydropower generation comes with its own unique set of problems. Some of 
dam construction’s drawbacks include loss of soil fertility, an increase in flood risks 
especially when dams fail, as has been the case for at least 322 dams during the last 50 
years in China (Olsson 2012, 126), and permanently changing the biodiversity of an 
area either due to consequences for fishes in the river, or other wildlife affected by the 
dam construction. The impact on the fishing industry has been reported in several cases 
and carries a very significant impact for river communities, as are the ones that I visited 
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 Energy security is defined by the IEA as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an 
affordable price”. Moreover, “lack of energy security is thus linked to the negative economic and social 
impacts of either physical unavailability of energy, or prices that are not competitive or are overly 
volatile” (IEA 2015) 
53 
 
in Karen State where the majority of people rely on fishing and agriculture for 
sustenance. Due to the fact that ecosystem impacts are numerous and complex, it is 
extremely difficult to predict with any amount of certainty what the exact changes 
resulting from dam construction will be (WCD 2000, 73).  
Alterations in things such as “temperature, erosion patterns, dissolved gases and other 
factors” may lead to changes in the aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems, which also carry 
implications for the social systems that depend on those same ecosystems (Magee 2015, 
216). Reservoir dams may also result in salinization
22
, which occurs when, due to 
evaporative losses, the concentration of natural salts in the remaining water is altered, a 
problem especially prevalent in warm regions, such as South East Asia (Magee 2015, 
221). Given the country’s stark dependence on agriculture, salinization can have major 
consequences when reservoir water is utilized for irrigation purposes. Moreover, 
reservoirs are greenhouse gas emitters due to “rotting vegetation and carbon inflows 
from the catchment” and may in fact account for between “1% and 28% of the total 
global warming potential of GHG emissions” (WCD 2000, 75).  
A huge impact of dams - whether considered negative or positive - is that of 
resettlement. Reservoirs and dam construction sites may cover vast areas of land, 
flooding entire villages including archaeological or spiritually important sites, as well as 
important natural areas and fertile agricultural land (Olsson 2012, 128). The stress and 
trauma of involuntary resettlement can be grave, with Oliver-Smith naming it a 
“totalizing experience” since it is “one of the most acute expressions of powerlessness 
because it constitutes a loss of control over one’s physical space” (quoted in Scudder 
2006, 22). What is more, it not only impacts people’s economic, social, and cultural 
resources all at once, it also “takes away political power, most dramatically the power to 
make a decision about where and how to live” (Koenig quoted in Scudder 2006, 23). 
Moreover, whilst dam builders and proponents may emphasize the positive outcomes of 
dam construction, Scudder undertook an in-depth analysis of different dams worldwide, 
concluding that only in 7% of the cases did people who were resettled see an 
improvement in their living standards in comparison to a worsening of living standards 
reported in 82% of the cases (Scudder and Gay 2006, 61). Some of the most acute 
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 The process by which water-soluble salts accumulate in the soil. Salinization is considered problematic 
because excess salts hinder the growth of crops.  
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problems registered were issues pertaining to landlessness (as was the case 80% of the 
time) as well as joblessness (also 80% of the cases), stating that in fact only very few 
project-specific jobs are generally made available to resettlers (Scudder and Gay 2006, 
71). The dam’s impact on the riverine ecosystems, both upstream and downstream, also 
affects the resources at hand for land-use. This can prove especially problematic for 
river communities whose entire livelihood is predicated on the river, resulting in a  
loss of access to traditional means of livelihood, including agricultural 
production, fishing, livestock grazing, fuelwood gathering and collection 
of forest products, to name a few. Not only does this disrupt local 
economies, it effectively displaces people (…) (WCD 2000, 103). 
When talking about resettlement and displacement, the numbers that are dam-related are 
quite staggering and range from 40 to 80 million people worldwide. In China alone, 
dams are said to have displaced over 10.2 million people (WCD 2000, 104). Yet studies 
by the World Commission on dams shows that 
Communities situated downstream from the dam, those without land or 
legal title, indigenous people and those affected by project infrastructure 
(and not just the reservoir) were often not considered as affected people at 
the time of design. Among those assessed, compensation has usually gone 
only to those in possession of legal titles, leaving out a large number of 
people – often the poorest – who depend on common resources such as 
forests and grazing grounds for subsistence (WCD 2000, 105). 
Indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities especially suffer disproportionately in such 
cases due to issues pertaining to citizenship, tenancy and land tenure papers (WCD 
2000, 105), even though they make up a large number of those who lose their 
livelihoods to dams (McCully 1996, 70).  
Part of the consequences of dam construction can also be augmented health risks due to 
water-borne diseases such as bilharzia or schistosomiasis, as well as an increase in 
malaria and dengue fever instances. This problem can be particularly compelling at the 
Myanmar-Thai border, given that in recent years it has developed into a multi-drug-
resistant malaria area, an issue that has even been dubbed one of the world’s new 
potential big health crisis (Zweynert 2014). Increased health problems such as sexually 
transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS may also come as a consequence of loss of social 
cohesion due to the large influx of outsiders and strangers (WCD 2000, 100) either 
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within the new resettlement site or as a consequence of many workers from different 
areas coming to build the dam.  
5.2 Dams on the Salween River 
 
The Salween River
23
 is one of the Asia’s last largely free-flowing rivers and is shared 
by China, Thailand, and Myanmar. The river originates on the Tibetan Plateau and 
flows through China’s Yunnan Province, before becoming the Salween in Myanmar and 
Thailand and emptying into the Andaman Sea (International Rivers 2014b). It is a 
transboundary basin with a total area of 320 000 km
2
, which is distributed between 
China (53%), Myanmar (42%) and Thailand (5%) (FAO 2011) and is the second 
longest river in Southeast Asia. Within Myanmar, the river is situated in the eastern part 
of the country and forms the border between Thailand and Myanmar for 110 km, 
flowing through Shan State, Kayah State
24
, Kayin/Karen State
25
, and Mon State - all of 
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 The river is known under various names in different countries: Nu River in China; Thanlwin in 
Myanmar and the Salween River internationally. Unless otherwise specified, the term Salween River will 
be utilized throughout the thesis.  
24
 Formerly known as Karenni State, and still referred as such by many Burmese 
25
 This state is officially designated as Kayin State, re-named by the military government in an attempt to 
‘Burmesify’ many names believed to be relics of the British colonial times. However, it will be referred 
to as Karen State throughout the thesis, given that the majority of literature reviewed has utilized this 
name, and the fact that all my informants called it thusly.   
 
Picture 1 - The Salween River: Thailand to the left and Myanmar on the right side. Source: 
Author 
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which are ethnic minority states
26. The region’s impressive landscape and unique 
biodiversity has led to the Upper Salween being proclaimed a UNESCO World Heritage 
Site in 2003 (International Rivers 2012a). The river is home to at least 140 species of 
fish, of which one-third are endemic (Salween Watch 2011). More than 10 million 
people, representing at least 13 different ethnic groups, depend on the Salween river 
basin for their livelihoods (FAO 2011). Moreover, the area around the Salween River 
basin has been identified as one of the world’s most fertile areas for teak by ecologists 
(Salween Watch 2004, 14).  
The Salween’s high potential for hydropower generation stems from its topography, 
which provides an ideal physical setting for dam construction due to the height of the 
surrounding gorges (Osborne 2007, 4). Hydropower developers and dam builders from 
China, Thailand, Japan, along with international institutions such as the World Bank 
and the ADB, have long been interested in the prospects of projects along the Salween 
River basin (Salween Watch 2004, 4). However, the remoteness and lack of basic 
infrastructure throughout much of the area have made such developments technically 
and economically infeasible until recently (Magee and Kelley 2009, 115). But the recent 
economic growth and acute electricity shortages in the region have made planning such 
dam projects more of a priority. In Myanmar, six dams have already been approved by 
the Deputy Minister of Electric Power. All of these six dams are located in active civil 
war zones (Salween Watch 2013). This brings to the forefront the debate whether and to 
what degree it is feasible to begin construction of such large projects in such volatile 
situations and without the consent of the local people.  
 
The idea to build dams on the Salween River is not a new one. Japanese and Australian 
consulting companies in cooperation with the Thai and Myanmar governments have 
researched and produced major studies investigating potential large dam construction on 
the Salween (KRW 2004, 11). Preliminary studies were then commissioned by Thailand 
and Myanmar in the early 1990s. Conducted by Japan’s Electric Power Development 
Company, 10 potential dam sites were identified on the river (Magee and Kelley 2009, 
121). What makes the Salween River so attractive for hydropower development is the 
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 Myanmar is divided into seven states and seven regions. Regions are predominantly Burman (the 
dominant ethnic group), whereas states are areas mainly inhabited by ethnic minorities.   
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fact that it drops some 5,000 m over its 2,800 km course (Magee and Kelley 2009, 115). 
Thai energy planners had identified the Salween as the “most favourable location for 
transboundary hydropower development, notwithstanding security and political 
concerns” (Magee and Kelley 2009, 123) and according to Thailand’s Electricity 
Generation Authority of Thailand (EGAT), the Salween’s hydropower potential lies at 
16,000MW (EGAT 2004).  However, due to the economic crisis that hit South East 
Asia especially hard in 1997, the plans to invest in these dams were side-lined by Thai 
developers suffering bankruptcy. Other issues impacting this decision are the river’s 
remoteness and the limited infrastructure available.  
The regions the Salween moves through are remote and sparsely populated, mainly 
inhabited by ethnic minorities, many of whom are subsistence farmers who depend on 
the river for their livelihoods (Magee and Kelley 2009, 117). Ethnic insurgencies have 
played a large part in the delay of the implementation of any of the suggested dam 
projects until recently. However, given that some of the major ethnic armed groups, 
such as the KNU, have signed ceasefires in early 2012, concerns have been growing 
that this may pave the way towards the beginning of dam construction on the Salween 
(Irrawaddy News 2013). These concerns were indeed not unfounded considering that by 
February 2013, Deputy Minister of Electric Power informed parliament that the 
government had already approved feasibility studies for six dams on the Salween
27
 
(Snaing and Kha 2014). Investment for these dams will come from five Chinese 
corporations, Thailand’s Electricity Generation Authority of Thailand (EGAT) 
International Co. Ltd and three Burmese corporations (Salween Watch 2013).  
According to Irrawaddy News, Minister of Electrical Power Khin Maung Soe stated that 
“the government would commission international consultants to carry out 
environmental and social impact assessments for all planned Salween dams” (Snaing 
and Kha 2014). In total, all of the dams are said to produce 17,000 MW of electricity, 
the majority of which will be exported (Campbell 2012).  
Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) and agreements for some of the Salween dam 
constructions were already signed and initiated between Myanmar and Thailand in 2005  
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 For a list and short introduction to these dams, please refer to Appendix 6 
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(KDRG 2006, 2). Subsequently, in 
2010, the Myanmar government 
signed further memorandums of 
understanding for the above 
mentioned hydropower projects, 
paving the way for various 
Chinese-Thai-Burmese joint 
ventures to develop them. 
According to those agreements, 
most of the power generated will to 
go to Thailand or China (Mang and 
Yan 2013). Information on the 
dams and how far the 
implementation process has gone is 
limited due to the controversies 
surrounding their construction and 
the awareness of both the Thai and 
Myanmar Governments of the 
potential for bad publicity, shrouding the process in secrecy. Moreover, access to 
information with regards to conducted Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs)
28
 or 
other studies is virtually non-existent and all information gathered here is mainly based 
on local newspaper articles and civil society reports.  
5.3 The Hat Gyi Dam
29
 
The Hat Gyi Dam is located in Karen State about 47 km from the Thailand-Burma 
border. The project is being jointly developed by EGAT International Co and China’s 
Sinohydro Corporation (Salween Watch 2013) after the signing of a Memorandum of 
                                                 
28
 Environmental Impact Assessments began to be formalized and implemented in various countries in the 
1980s in order to help address concerns relating to environmental and social impacts of dams. EIAs are 
defined as “a decision tool employed to identify and evaluate the probable environmental consequences 
of certain proposed development actions in order to facilitate informed decision-making and sound 
environmental management” (Cashmore et al. 2004, 295). 
29
 Also sometimes spelled Hutgyi, Hutgi or Hatkyi 
Map 2 - Proposed Salween Dam. Source: (Living River 
Siam Association) 
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Understanding (MoU) with the SPDC government to construct several hydropower 
dams on the River  (Simpson 2007, 549). Sinohydro’s role in the Hat Gyi dam is not 
only limited to that of the biggest investor. It will also be responsible for the design, 
procurement and implementation works of the project, making this a lucrative business 
for the company (China Economic Daily 2006). The Hat Gyi Dam is the first of the 
dams on the Salween to be constructed and is posed to have an installed capacity of 
1,360 MW (ERI 2008, 5). It should be noted that recommendations from the pre-
feasibility studies that were initiated as early as 1998, suggested a low-height, run-of-
river dam with a capacity of 300 MW (Magee and Kelley 2009, 124) in comparison to 
what is actually being proposed now. Nonetheless, agreement to begin work on the dam 
was stalled until 2009 (Zerrouk 2013, 73), mainly on the grounds of security concerns 
associated with the area and the on-going conflict with ethnic armed groups there. Such 
concerns are not unwarranted, especially since in at least two occasions EGAT staff has 
been injured and/or killed due to the continued armed violence (Zerrouk 2013, 75).  
Of the 1,360 MW produced, 10% is slated for Myanmar’s domestic consumption30 
whilst the rest will be sold to Thailand. According to EGAT’s calculations, nine villages 
in Myanmar will be directly impacted by the dam project. This figure is negated by 
Karen River Watch’s director Saw Nay who claims that more than 20 villages in the 
upper Hat Gyi dam area will be forced to relocate (Saw Yan Naing 2008).  
The issue of transboundary laws and the Salween  
The potential costs of tensions between riparian nations over transboundary waters are 
high. They can hinder regional integration and be a danger to both trade and stability 
(Jägerskog 2013, 50). On the other hand, if transboundary waters are managed properly, 
they can serve as “a focal point for cooperation, thereby diminishing tensions between 
countries while promoting regional integration and development, both within a basin 
and in a wider region” (Jägerskog 2013, 50).  
However, building dams without the necessary treaties in place can potentially result in 
conflict situations and is strongly advised against by Scudder who states that:   
                                                 
30
 Although where exactly this 10% will end up going is unclear: will the people of Karen State benefit, 
or will it be going to industry and the large cities? 
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Large dams should not be built in international river basins without either a 
treaty between the basin states or a willingness on the part of the dam-
building nation to abide by the guidelines incorporated within the UN’s 
convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
watercourses (Scudder 2006, 299).  
The problem with the Salween River is that China, Thailand and Myanmar have yet to 
sign any agreement on the use of the River, allowing them each to technically do as they 
please on their part of the River. Given that China is backing plans to dam its part of the 
Nu/Salween River, that may spell various consequences for the downstream nations, 
and without an international framework to abide to, there is nothing Myanmar or 
Thailand could do to protest (if they decided to do so).  
The importance of Hat Gyi area 
The area surrounding the dam site is also of strategic importance to the KNU. The 
Salween River is an important part of everyday life for people living in the region. It is 
also vital for transportation, not only between villages and States in Myanmar itself, but 
to many of the villager’s main trading partner – Thailand. This connection is just as 
important to the ethnic armed groups. Many of the refugee camps that have been set up 
on the Thai side of the River receive considerable support from international NGOs, 
especially since Myanmar was closed off to such organisations until recently. This 
connection between international NGOs and IDP camps in Thailand is important due to 
the fact that many of these camps have been dominated by KNU-affiliated authorities. 
These camps not only provide shelter and supplies for thousands of personnel of the 
KNU/KNLA, and/or their families, but they have also tended to serve as unofficial base 
areas for the KNU and other insurgent groups (South 2011, 33). Thus, succeeding in 
building the dams on the Salween in general, and the Hat Gyi dam in particular, would 
essentially destroy a vital support system that has been in place for decades for the 
insurgent groups and substantially cripple their operation possibilities.  
Not just that, but Thailand’s involvement in the dam construction has meant a greater 
interest from the government and military’s side to achieve full control over roads with 
close and direct access to the Thai border, with Paul Sein Twa - the director of KESAN 
– noting that “the Burmese army needs to make the dam site more attractive to the Thai 
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investors” (Macan-Markar 2009). A closer analysis of the government’s motive behind 
the dam construction will be presented in the next chapter.  
This chapter served to introduce and explain what exactly constitutes a large 
hydropower dam and what its positive and negative impacts may entail. It further 
introduced the Hat Gyi dam itself and described some of the problems and conflicts 
associated with it. The following chapter serves to present the various government 
actors involved in the project and what their motives behind dam construction in 
Myanmar are in order to gain deeper insights into the economic and political drivers 
pushing for the Hat Gyi dam’s completion.  
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6 State perspectives: China, 
Thailand and Myanmar  
It has been noted previously, that taking a closer look at various actors involved and 
understanding the (potentially) unequal relations between these different actors is key in 
order to understand the patterns of human-environment interaction and how they 
correlate to environmental problems. It is important to present the various players, their 
motives and their interests in dam construction in Myanmar in general, and on the 
Salween River in particular. This chapter aims at demonstrating the various government 
actors involved and the companies that represent them on the ground, in order to gain an 
overview of some of the motives behind their actions. Doing so helps answer some 
questions, such as why the Myanmar government has decided to focus its energy supply 
generation so much on hydropower, even though the construction costs can be quite 
astronomical. Why are foreign governments interested in dam construction in Myanmar, 
and what do they have to gain from it? Is the government of Myanmar being pushed 
around by such economic heavyweights as China and thus have no other choice but to 
comply due to the precarious nature of their own economy, or do they have their own 
agenda at play? International actors will be presented first due to the fact that their 
policies in turn have a strong influence on how Myanmar’s government develops its 
own policies.  
6.1 China  
Whilst the construction of large dams worldwide has been decreasing since the 1980s, 
China’s investment in the industry has been on the rise, not only domestically, but also 
overseas. Since the 1950s, large dam projects have truly become a booming business 
and investment there, resulting in China dominating the large dam scene, by building 
some 22.000 dams more than 15 metres tall within the last 60 years (Lewis 2013). 
China has indeed stepped up to become one of the global leaders in dam construction, 
egged on by an exponentially growing economy that needs energy in order to keep 
flourishing, but also by the gap left by the traditional dam funders, due to the emerging 
concerns over the environmental impacts of large dams. The hallmark of this expertise 
is represented by the construction of the Three Gorges Dam, one of the largest dams in 
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the world whose construction took over a decade, boasting a reservoir that backs up the 
Yangtze River for hundreds of kilometres, is 200 metres high, able to achieve an 
installed capacity of 22,000 MW and resulting in the relocation of over 1.2 million 
people (Bosshard 2012). Drawing from its experiences, China sees itself as a leading 
dam-building expertise exporter, seeing the investment in large dams abroad as a “win-
win” situation for both China and the host country (International Rivers 2008, 3).  
6.1.1 Reasons for China’s investment in hydropower abroad 
China’s hydropower development is nothing new, as we have seen. However, what is 
new is the government’s increased attention to and emphasis on renewable energy 
sources and the benefits of sustainable development linked to them. China’s 11th Five-
Year Plan for Development of Renewable Energy states that “consumption of non-fossil 
fuel will account for 15% of the primary energy consumption by 2020”, and carbon 
emissions are posed to be reduced 40% - 45% by 2020 compared to 2005 (Xingang et 
al. 2012, 1), with hydropower representing a huge component of energy production in 
this regard. Already now, China’s pure hydro installed capacity is 260 GW - more than 
Brazil, the United States and Canada combined (IHA 2014). The Chinese government 
has realized the environmental implications the country’s remarkable growth over the 
past decades has had. Growing to become one of the most influential players in the 
global economy (World Bank 2015a), has come at a price and China now faces air 
pollution challenges with huge health impacts, water shortages, and desertification – to 
name a few. At the same time, sustained economic growth is necessary for China, 
considering 11.8% of the population still live below the income poverty line (UNDP 
2014).  
A way to mitigate a worsening of the environmental situation whilst sustaining growth 
is investing in renewable energy production. At present, coal and oil still represent 
China’s main source of electricity generation31. Hydropower can help reduce the stark 
dependence on power plants and fossil fuels. Investing in hydropower helps diversify 
China’s energy mix and also reduce its reliance on oil. This is not only a factor for 
environmental stability, but also geopolitically, since China has become the second 
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 85% of China’s primary energy supply to be exact (Clemente 2015) 
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largest consumer of oil – oil which it largely imports from abroad (McDonald, 
Bosshard, and Brewer 2009, 297). This is also linked to China’s geopolitical concerns 
in the region, since said imported oil has to traverse through the Malacca Strait to reach 
China. This dependence (both in regards to oil and the Malacca Strait) troubles China, 
who fears that in the event of a political crisis or even war, it would be relatively easy to 
cut them off in what has been dubbed the “Malacca dilemma” (ICG 2010, 8). This 
would cause major problems for China, who currently imports 80% of all of its oil 
supplies through the Malacca Strait (Kolås and Tønnesson 2006). Through Myanmar, 
China can access to the Indian Ocean thus circumventing the problem of dependency. 
Moreover, in building up infrastructure linked to large dams, such as roads, China may 
also be able to link such developments to its long-term strategic ambition of a “golden 
Quadrangle trade zone” which would consist of Yunnan Province, Myanmar, Thailand 
and Laos (Geng 2006).  
What is more, since the companies awarded the bid abroad are often Chinese companies 
themselves, investing in hydropower abroad actually serves to boost the local economy 
in China. Contracts for engineers, materials, and equipment all go to Chinese firms, who 
often employ and take Chinese workforce with them to work on the dam sites. These 
trade concessions are often linked to aid plans set up, by for example providing “both 
investments and concessional loans for dam building and linking this to the export of 
electricity coupled with the import of Chinese manufactured goods and trade deals for 
Chinese firms” (Urban et al. 2013, 312).  
By offering developing nations an attractive alternative to Western financing and aid 
through its “non-interference” policy, China has, among other things, spurred a 
comeback of large dams construction (Pearse-Smith 2014, 124), especially in 
developing nations who are following in China’s footsteps and choosing to invest in 
large hydropower dams as an alternative to fossil fuels. This of course bodes well for 
China’s companies investing overseas and has been capitalized upon: as of November 
2014, Chinese hydropower companies are involved in nearly 300 dam construction 
projects worldwide (International Rivers 2014a).  
On the other end of things, China has also been witnessing the growth of environmental 
civil society groups willing to speak out and openly protest such plans. Indeed, it was 
the efforts of “the burgeoning Chinese environmental movement” that eventually led to 
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Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao suspending the dam projects slated for the Chinese part of 
the (Nu-) Salween River (International Rivers 2014c). This, in conjunction with the 
negative experiences from the Three Gorges Dam
32
, made further investment in large 
hydropower domestically a no-go area for a while. Add to this the fact that domestic 
competition for contracts has been quite high, and the fact that the Chinese government 
actively started to encourage companies to invest overseas in what is termed the “going 
out” strategy which provides companies with incentives to pursue international markets 
(International Rivers 2008, 5), and a clear image emerges as to why China is so 
interested in pursuing large dam construction abroad, especially in neighbouring 
countries where the energy generated can be fed into the national grid.  
Myanmar, then still a full-fledged dictatorship, ostracized by the international 
community and hungry for investments, and with few (if any) environmental laws and 
conditions, was the perfect man for the job. By 2005 and within the span  of only a 
decade, China had already constructed six hydropower plants and one thermal power 
station in Myanmar (Geng 2006).  
6.1.2 Actors involved in the dam industry in China  
The number of Chinese actors involved in overseas hydropower development is quite 
complex and will not be presented in detail. It does deserve mentioning however, seeing 
as many companies are directly linked to the Chinese government itself. China’s top 
government institution, the State Council, is involved in overseas dam projects through 
diplomatic means (meeting with heads of foreign states, promising development 
assistance etc.), as well as in a more direct manner, since the State Council has to 
approve overseas projects that will exceed the costs of US $200 million (McDonald, 
Bosshard, and Brewer 2009, 298). Moreover, many companies may play different roles 
within hydropower development, depending on the project. Thus, Sinohydro for 
example can act as a developer, builder and contractor depending on the project (Urban 
et al. 2013, 316).  
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 The project has set the record for number of people displaced (more than 1.2 million), and has been 
plagued by issues of corruption, spiralling costs, environmental impacts, human rights violations and 
resettlement difficulties (Bosshard 2012) 
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Sinohydro 
Given Sinohydro’s involvement in the Hat Gyi dam we will be looking at in greater 
detail in the next chapter, a short introduction to the company is deemed useful for 
context. Sinohydro is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and transnational corporation. Not 
only is it China’s largest dam building company, it is also the world’s largest 
hydropower construction company, with a 50% share of the international hydropower 
market (International Rivers 2012b). It is made up of 23 further subsidiary companies 
and two shareholding companies (International Rivers 2008, 11). Within China, 
Sinohydro has been in charge of building around 80% of hydropower projects. 
Internationally, the SOE has worked in over 50 countries, and has been involved in 
some controversial dam projects, such as the Merowe Dam in Sudan (International 
Rivers 2008, 12). Sinohydro has since then developed environmental and social 
policies, which were introduced in 2011. However, these policies are very generic, 
including such principles as “respecting local culture, religion and customs” and 
“undertaking business in compliance with the rule of law”, “contribute to local society 
development”, and to “commit to limiting the impact of our business activities on the 
environment” (Sinohydro 2014).  
China and the Salween 
China’s going out strategy has paid off in the case of Myanmar, with Chinese 
companies representing the country’s main cooperation partners when it comes to 
investment and technical support in dam building (Kattelus, Rahaman, and Varis 2014, 
89). China is “by far the largest financier of hydropower” in Myanmar, with Chinese 
SOEs being involved in almost every large-scale hydropower project there (Doran, 
Christensen, and Aye 2014, 88). With regards to the proposed dams on the Salween 
River, Chinese companies are involved in each one of them (Salween Watch 2013).   
6.2 Thailand 
Like China, Thailand has made remarkable strides with regards to its economic 
development and has been classified as an upper-middle income economy since 2011, 
moving up from its status as a low income country in less than a generation affording it 
the title of development success story (World Bank 2015b). Thailand too demonstrated 
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high economic growth of 8-9%/year during the 1980s and 1990s, but has taken a step 
backward in the eve of the Asian Crisis of 1997 (World Bank 2015b), but still 
represented the highest GDP per capita among the GMS countries. Moreover, per-capita 
energy use continues to increase, reaching almost three-quarters of the OECD average 
(IEA 2013, 54). This stark development and economic growth has however been 
predicated on an increase in primary energy needs, which have seen an average annual 
growth rate of 5.4% (Asian Institute of Technology 2010, 7) and has resulted in 
Thailand becoming increasingly reliant on energy imports, especially fossil-fuels, which 
in 2008 made up 50% of the country’s energy supply (Watcharejyothin and Shrestha 
2009, 1783). A growing amount of concern the environment, as well as Thailand’s (and 
ASEAN’s) own commitment to diversify fuels used in power generation, have been 
only some of the drivers for Thailand to consider power import as an integral part of its 
power supply source in the future (Watcharejyothin and Shrestha 2009, 1783). Given 
Thailand’s focus on oil as a primary source for its energy and the volatility of the 
market, a diversification of its energy imports would seem not only wise, but necessary.  
Moreover, from a geopolitical standpoint, Thailand’s main developmental focus has 
been to ensure “sufficient electricity for unrestricted industrial development and to act 
as a regional hub of an ASEAN power grid” (Simpson 2007, 543). The dams on the 
Salween represent an important component of both those ambitions.  
Thailand and hydropower 
Thailand has constructed more than 40 major dams since the 1960s. The experiences 
from such major dam projects, such as the controversial Pak Mun Dam which has 
affected more than 20.000 people in Thailand, have resulted in significant opposition 
towards such ventures from rural communities (International Rivers N/A). Thus, as we 
have seen happen in China, local community groups and NGOs have joined together 
and increasingly resisted and protested new large power plants in Thailand since the late 
1980s (Middleton 2012, 293). According to International Rivers, the strong opposition 
to these dams has essentially halted any possibility of future dam construction in 
Thailand itself, with local communities still fighting for a permanent decommissioning 
of the dams (International Rivers N/A). The result has been a shift in focus from 
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domestic hydropower production to importing cheap energy from neighbouring 
countries, especially Laos and Myanmar, in order to sustain economic growth. 
Greater regional integration, which will be discussed in more detail below, coupled with 
limited domestic hydropower, has enabled Thai power planners to look towards Laos 
and Myanmar in particular for the country’s energy needs. Add to that the fact that civil 
society opposition in Myanmar is still constrained, especially in comparison to the 
growing domestic opposition to dams and power plants, and one can understand the 
attraction of sourcing energy needs from abroad under such favourable conditions.  
What is however problematic is the fact that so far, such hydropower projects are not 
subject to Thai environmental regulations and public review (Greacen and Greacen 
2012, 14).  
6.2.1 Thailand’s energy needs  
An important driver in Thailand’s energy consumption is the country’s love of malls. 
Whilst Thailand is obviously not the only country in the world that has exhibited a large 
interest in expanding its shopping malls (the UAE, Japan and the USA come to mind), it 
does create certain problems in a country so dependent on importing energy, as well as 
exacerbating the problem of energy efficiency. Due to its location, Bangkok’s shopping 
malls – located in one of the hottest big cities in the world – consume a huge amount of 
electricity due to their air conditioning systems. Siam Paragon mall – a huge complex - 
consumes “nearly twice as much power annually as all of Thailand’s underdeveloped 
Mae Hong Son province, home to about 250,000 people” (Pasick 2015). Due to 
Thailand’s climate and the fact that these massive malls are so well air conditioned, they 
have become the de-facto ‘place to be’ for many locals: Siam Paragon for example, was 
the most tagged location on Instagram worldwide in 2013 (Panyalimpanun 2015). 
Bangkok currently has about 60 community malls, and that number is only set to 
increase with at least 28 more set to open in 2015-16 (Panyalimpanun 2015). However, 
that huge energy demand spells dire consequences for Thailand’s neighbours, whose 
hydropower dam projects are set to help provide the electricity for these energy-hungry 
malls. Moreover, Bangkok’s rapid growth over the past decades, coupled with its 
unique form of urbanization (focusing on townhouses and detached housing which 
consume a lot of electricity), has resulted in high electricity consumption (Marks 2014). 
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Moreover, the government has refrained from chastising companies not conforming to 
green building codes, whilst electricity pricing only varies minimally between industries 
and home residents (Marks 2014). 
And whilst Thailand’s new Power Development Plan (PDP 2015), presented in May 
2015 and which presents Thailand’s energy and investment plans for the upcoming 21 
years, includes an Alternative Energy Development Plan and an Energy Efficiency 
Development Plan, demonstrating an acknowledgment of the need to invest in cleaner 
energy, Thailand still plans to double its installed energy capacity to reach 70 GW up 
from 32 GW (2011) by 2036 (Deetes 2015a). This in turn, will only be possible through 
massive imports from both Laos and Myanmar, especially with regards to hydropower. 
Indeed hydropower energy imports accounted for 7% of Thailand’s installed capacity in 
September last year (Deetes 2015a) with that number set to rise up to 15-20% in the 
next 20 years.  
6.2.2 Thailand’s energy provider: Hungry for Myanmar’s 
electricity 
The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) was established in 1968 and 
has grown to become an influential political actor (Greacen and Greacen quoted in 
Middleton 2012, 295). EGAT served as Thailand’s monopoly generator of electricity 
until 1992, which helped achieve the country’s rapid electrification, but also resulted in 
disregard for environmental and social impacts. EGAT is the generating body, 
purchasing company, supplier and distributer of electricity in/to Thailand (Zerrouk 
2013, 71).  
EGAT’s dominance still remains largely uncontested and the Thai Ministry of Energy 
was only established in 2002, with an energy regulator not being put in place until the 
creation of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) in 2007 (Middleton 2012, 297).  
Facing “increased fossil fuel prices, the need to diversify its energy mix, growing public 
concern about climate change and strong opposition to building new large power 
stations at home”, EGAT has increasingly turned to importing hydropower from its 
neighbours (Middleton, Garcia, and Foran 2009, 30). This is also supported by the 
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military-led government, which has expressed its concern that the country has become 
too dependent on expensive natural gas (Boot 2014b).  
What is interesting is the fact that Thailand and EGAT have tended to set aside 
relatively high margins of available surplus of unused energy (from 15% up to 39% in 
some years) (Deetes 2015a) and which even has been labelled as “out of touch with 
historic trends in electricity demand” (Greacen and Greacen 2012). Peak demand 
figures and calculations are important since electricity cannot be “cost-effectively stored 
at national-scales”, meaning that supply must be balanced with demand at all times 
(Greacen and Greacen 2012, 10). These calculations in turn determine, for example, the 
amount of power plants necessary to ensure adequate power supply (ibid.). Thailand’s 
high focus on energy security so far has come at the expense of environmental concerns 
as well as the price to consumers. According to Greacen and Greacen, every Power 
Development Plan (PDP) has so far made unrealistically high peak demand forecasts 
and based on their analysis, the 2030 Peak Demand could actually amount to about 
13,200 MW less than what has been calculated by the PDP (Greacen and Greacen 2012, 
13). This represents a marked difference, with huge impacts beyond Thailand’s borders, 
but could be said to make economic sense for EGAT since it is in their interest to 
maintain high-energy demand and low-energy costs (Zerrouk 2013, 71). 
Thailand and the Salween 
Thailand’s plans to build dams in neighbouring countries were first proposed 30 years 
ago, but have gained further momentum in the last years with then Prime Minister 
Choonhavan famously putting forth the idea of turning “battlefields into marketplaces”  
(Magee and Kelley 2009, 115). Thailand has been involved in studying the potential for 
hydropower on the Salween since 1981. These studies identified 10 potential dam sites 
on the Salween (Magee and Kelley 2009, 121). According to Burma Rivers Network, 
EGAT is involved in some capacity in at least 4 of the 6 dams proposed for the Salween 
River.  
Thailand’s mitigation plans for the Hat Gyi Dam  
An EIA has been conducted by the Environment Research Institute at Chulalongkorn 
University in Bangkok, but has yet to be made available to the public. Moreover, the 
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EIA has been criticized for downplaying the environmental and human impact of the 
potential dam (Magee and Kelley 2009, 125). What is more, the problem with the Hat 
Gyi dam is that it is a transboundary dam structure placed on a River that has yet to 
have an international and transboundary political and/or diplomatic mechanism in place 
for dealing with issues that will undoubtedly carry impacts for both Myanmar and 
Thailand. This makes things a bit tricky, whilst also providing EGAT with a nifty legal 
loophole with regards to EIA implementation. Since the dam will be located in 
Myanmar, EGAT claims Thai villages will not be impacted and not flooded, which 
implies that they do not have to conduct an EIA assessment. Moreover, given 
Myanmar’s as of yet weak administrative and legal machineries and lack of concrete 
EIA guidelines, EGAT could well claim to have fulfilled its CSR obligations (Shining 
2011, 82). Whilst Thai law is more stringent than Myanmar law, whether or not it can 
be applied in this case is rather ambiguous given the transboundary nature of the project 
(Shining 2011, 83).  
EGAT does state however that it “guarantees to support communities that are directly 
impacted by the Hat Gyi Dam project” (Shining 2011, 3). It goes on to say that it has 
“detailed long-term plans to mitigate any and all project impacts, such as potential 
flooding or the possible extinction of local fish species”, as well as assuring it will 
compensate the villages directly affected by the dam (Shining 2011, 3). Residents from 
the nine villages inside Myanmar identified as being directly impacted by the dam will 
receive appropriate resettlement accommodations in Bago town, and will get support for 
ancillary community development programs along the Thailand-Myanmar border, as 
well as a social welfare system that will be put in place (Shining 2011, 3).  
The compensation will supposedly include the fee for transferring villager’s belongings. 
EGAT also states that it will cooperate with biological engineers in order to study the 
fish species in the Salween and around the dam site. Based upon the study, EGAT will 
pursue to design and make a fish ladder to allow the fish to swim from the downstream 
to upstream for laying their eggs (EGAT quoted in Shining 2011, 44).  
 EGAT has also attempted to conduct public relations activities with affected 
communities on both sides of the border and promote the dam. This is interesting, 
especially given the cloud of secrecy that generally surrounds the project, something 
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which is enshrined in a confidentiality clause in the MoU signed by EGAT and the 
government of Myanmar (Cropley 2006).  
Interestingly enough, due to pressures from the Thai National Human Rights 
Commission (TNHRC) – which argued that the continued fighting so close to the border 
would eventually spill over into Thailand – the government halted the dam project for 
some time and established a Committee studying Human Rights violations with regards 
to the Hat Gyi Dam. A further sub-committee titled the “Information Disclosure 
Subcommittee on Hutgyi Hydropower Project on the Salween River” was formed in 
2009 (Shining 2011, 31), but was disbanded again after the new government took power 
in 2011.  
Whilst EGAT has fulfilled its obligations of “public participation”, this has mainly been 
done on Thai soil (especially given that Thai law in these matters is more stringent than 
in Myanmar). A Public Information Forum was held in Ban Sob Moei in 2009 and 
2011, as well as in two other villages on the Thai side of the River and invited 
academics and civil society groups, among others, to participate (Shining 2011, 49). 
Whilst this is more than can be said to have happened on the Myanmar side of the 
River, there are still a number of problems with EGAT’s public participation 
mechanism. Villagers were not given enough time to prepare, were given reading 
material that can only go so far when some parts of the population cannot read, and has 
tended to emphasize the positive impacts of the dam, repeating that “the Thai side will 
not be flooded” – something disputed by villagers and civil society organisations.  
6.3 Dams and the government of Myanmar  
“By 2030, the government hopes 100% of the country’s electricity will 
come from hydropower plants, which are the most cost-effective option” - 
SPDC official from the Ministry of Electric Power (June 2006) (KHRG 
2007, 35) 
As we have seen, Myanmar has a huge hydropower capacity. Currently, there are 24 
hydropower projects in operation in Myanmar, all with a capacity greater than 5MW, 
with 7 more being under construction and preliminary agreements for 35 new projects 
having been signed, according to a statement by Min Khaing, the director of the 
department of hydropower implementation at the Ministry of Electric Power. If 
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completed the amount of power generated from hydropower plants in Myanmar would 
total 43 GW (up from the currently installed 3 GW) (Vrieze 2015).  
6.3.1 The evolution of Hydropower in Myanmar under the 
military government 
The exponential focus on hydropower in Myanmar began around the 1990s. The 
regime, wanting to shift focus away from all the negative media attention it received 
and in a bid to distract its people, decided to put the issue of “development” high on its 
agenda (KRW 2004, 9). The linking of limited control and economic concessions 
helped broker many of the ceasefires with ethnic armed groups in the early 1990s, 
which in turn led to creation of the Border Area Development (BAD) programme. What 
is more, since the SPDC came to power in 1988, evidence indicates there having been a 
“hard sell” of the country’s natural resources, without the earnings of those projects 
trickling down to the local population, nor any “long-term planning guiding foreign 
investment projects being approved”  (McCarthy 2000, 261). Indeed, rumours have it 
that the Council Chairman of the SPDC, Sr. General Than Shwe, fancied himself the 
reincarnation of King Anawrahta, the Pagan-era monarch who was a prolific dam and 
canal builder (Akimoto 2004), inspiring him to follow in those footsteps. 
Until only recently, broad government-to-government bilateral agreements were 
provided for a specific time period regarding the sale and purchase of specific amounts 
of energy (Doran, Christensen, and Aye 2014, 87). This has since then shifted towards a 
more project specific negotiating policy with neighbouring countries in order to 
encourage regional investment in its energy infrastructure (Doran, Christensen, and Aye 
2014, 87).  
Given the authoritarian nature of Myanmar’s previous regimes and the country’s 
isolation until recently, has meant a great dependence on foreign ODA from fellow 
Asian nations such as Japan. Japan’s aid was dominated by support for large-scale 
infrastructure, an idea predicated on the assumption that this would help lay the 
foundation for private investment and the flourishing of entrepreneurism, as well as 
buying them political influence (Reilly 2013, 143). Thus, Japan funded Myanmar’s first 
big hydropower construction, the Baluchaung Dam project, in 1960. The construction 
was marred by vast human rights abuses, forced labour, rape accounts and arbitrary 
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killings reported being perpetrated against the local Karenni population by the 
Tatmadaw (Parry 2006). At the same time, the majority of the villages surrounding the 
dam do not have access to electricity, to this day (Simpson 2007, 550).   
During Myanmar’s socialist and isolation period, the government did not build another 
major dam until 1985. Since then, Myanmar’s hydropower development has seen 
significant change. The industry began to truly take off in the late 1990s-early 2000s 
with the junta recognizing the country’s huge potential, resulting in the restructuring of 
the Ministry of Electric Power and its Department of Hydropower. It also signed the 
Inter-Government Agreement on Regional Power Trade in the Greater Mekong Sub-
Region Countries, demonstrating its hopes for becoming a regional player already then 
and exporting power generated to other GMS countries through the Asia Power Grid 
(Magee and Kelley 2009, 123).  
This acceleration in hydropower development in the last two decades has seen the 
installed hydropower capacity grow from 258MW in 1990 to 2,700MW in 2012 and 
hydropower generation going from 1,181GWh to 7,688GWh (EIA 2012).  
However, Myanmar’s key load centres are concentrated in the central and lower parts of 
the country, which is why hydropower development so far has mainly concentrated on 
those regions close to the national grid (Magee and Kelley 2009, 122). It also means 
that energy has been concentrated on feeding the main economic centres of the country, 
namely Yangon, Mandalay and more recently Naypidaw
33
 (Greacen and Palettu 2007, 
106).  
Under the concessions ushered by Myanmar’s regime, China and Thailand, among 
others, profited greatly. For example, China’s first build-operate-transfer hydropower 
project, the Shweli 1 Dam in Northern Shan State, has seen Chinese companies 
receiving as much as 80% of the revenue generated, as well as receiving the majority of 
the generated electricity (Beck 2007). The remainder of the electricity generated is said 
to be supplying domestic military-owned mining operations, instead of, as stated by 
General Myint Hlaing, “develop ethnic people’s social life” and benefitting the people 
(Salween Watch and PYNG 2007, 8).  
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 Naypidaw was instituted as the country’s new capital in 2005.  
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6.3.2 The current government’s perspectives on dams  
In his inauguration speech in March 2011, President Thein Sein announced the 
government’s intention of inviting foreign investment into Myanmar, stating that it was 
in order to help develop both the nation and its people: “we will make sure that fruitful 
results of the prudent plans will go down to the grassroots level” (The New Light of 
Myanmar 2011). Since then, the government has continuously re-confirmed its strong 
focus on poverty reduction, specifically linking it to economic reforms (Buchanan, 
Kramer, and Woods 2013, 11). An important way to achieve this is through 
electrification and the construction of hydropower stations. This was again underlined 
when Union Parliament Speaker and Union Solidarity and Development Party 
Chairman Shwe Mann told the government during parliamentary discussions in June 
2014 that the development of Myanmar’s energy supply through new dams and coal-
fired plants was “imperative” for the country’s future development (Snaing and Kha 
2014). However, even Shwe Mann emphasized in his address to the parliament that 
proper impact studies and compensation measures need to be put in place, noting that 
those displaced by dam projects should receive jobs in return (Snaing and Kha 2014).  
As we have seen, the previous government decided to actively focus on electrification 
through hydropower in the early 2000s. Indeed, the country’s two first five-year 
development plans (2001-2005 and 2006-2010) largely looked to hydropower in order 
to increase growth of its domestic market (Kattelus, Rahaman, and Varis 2015, 48). 
However, that is not the only reason large dams are pushed for to such a degree. In fact, 
the government has called the string of dams slated for the Salween River “signposts of 
modernity” (Gray 2006), which implies that dams represents more than just an income 
or electricity providing. They represent Myanmar’s move into the “modern age”, 
Myanmar’s new era after its status as a pariah for so long.  
This is demonstrated to an extent when current Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, U 
Myint Hlaing, addressed the Parliament and declared that  
While the global countries are facing shortage of food due to climate 
change, the people of the nation do not need to worry about difficulties 
thanks to dams and river water pumping projects implemented by the State 
leaders with farsightedness and food sufficiency through cultivation of 
76 
 
summer paddy, double and mixed cropping patterns (U Myint Hlaing 
2012).  
Thus, whilst others will suffer dire consequences from climate change, Myanmar will 
thrive thanks to dam projects. Other officials also have tended to be focus on the 
benefits of dams. This becomes very clear when inspecting articles from the 
government-owned newspaper “New Light of Myanmar” covering hydropower dams in 
the country. Every article relating to dams that was available online tended to describe 
the dams in much detail (“it can store 2.88 million acre-feet of water at full brim”) 
whilst also describing all the positive attributes they have to offer  
Thaphanseik Dam, the largest one of its kind across the nation, supplies 
water to 518,035 acres of monsoon paddy and 294,654 acres of summer 
paddy and other crops totalling 812,689 acres and benefits over 800,000 
people from 369 village-tracts in 10 townships of Sagaing Region (The 
New Light of Myanmar 2014).  
In 2009 the newspaper reported that 
In the time of the Tatmadaw Government, the natural resources are being 
utilized with the own technology and human power for ensuring efficiency 
of electricity of the increasing population and the rising living standard. 
Therefore, the hydropower plants will emerge one after another in the 
future. (…) In the future, the country would achieve the sufficiency of 
electricity and would have the surplus power. As a result, the electricity 
sufficiency will contribute to the uplift of socio-economic standard of the 
national brethren and to the development of regions (The New Light of 
Myanmar 2009).     
 At the same time, ethnic armed groups opposing dam construction projects were 
“demonized”. Thus, when talking about an exchange of fire around the Hat Gyi dam 
site area where a survey project of the site was underway resulting in one of the Thai 
workers from EGAT being killed, “New Light of Myanmar” reported that  
KNU terrorist insurgents are perpetrating a string of atrocities to jeopardize 
stability of the State, community peace and tranquillity and prevalence of 
law and order. In the meantime, they are undermining nation-building 
endeavours being carried out by the government (The New Light of 
Myanmar 2007).  
77 
 
Moreover, given the positivity towards dam projects permeating within the government 
apparatus, government officials seemed taken aback when civil society groups and 
community representatives voiced their concerns during a workshop organized by the 
World Bank Group in January 2015, with one of the ethnic participants stating that  
Dams and hydropower do not have a beautiful name in Burma. In fact our 
lessons have been of suffering. The postponed Myitsone Dam project on 
the Irrawaddy River in Kachin state, for example, has left hundreds of 
resettled families in the relocation site without any assistance for years 
(Deetes 2015b).  
Thus, it is fair to conclude that a disconnect exists between the government’s view of 
dams as modernizing the country and generally being viewed as good, progressive and 
useful to both government and local people, and the opinion of local communities who 
are and will be impacted by such dams, with dialogue between the two having been 
relatively minimal up to date. Workshops as the one mentioned above are a good start to 
initiate dialogue and make local voices heard. Whether or not local concerns will then 
be taken into consideration in the planning of dam projects in the future is however a 
different question.  
Concern for regional energy trade 
In order to achieve better electrification rates and economic growth region-wide, 
regional energy trade and cross-border hydropower development is not only seen as 
viable, but necessary and profitable (Kattelus, Rahaman, and Varis 2015, 43), with 
Myanmar and others beginning to recognize the country’s potential at playing an 
integrating role in linking South and Southeast Asia in this respect (Kattelus, Rahaman, 
and Varis 2015, 43). Indeed, whilst the above mentioned first development plans 
focused on hydropower for domestic use, the third five-year plan (2011-2015) shifted 
that focus towards hydropower usage for export purposes in order to increase the 
regional power trade with the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and Bay of Bengal 
Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) countries (Kattelus, 
Rahaman, and Varis 2015, 48). Whilst this may come with its own set of problems and 
exert adverse effects on Myanmar’s socioeconomic development due to the potential 
negative impacts hydropower development can exhibit, such as environmental impacts, 
the endangerment of water-related livelihoods, increased socioeconomic inequity and 
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political unrest (Kattelus, Rahaman, and Varis 2015, 44), the geopolitical power 
implications can prove to be an important motive for hydropower development for 
export in Myanmar. Thanks to these foreign companies’ extensively funding pipeline, 
hydropower and transport networks in Myanmar, the country is on track to becoming a 
“regional economic corridor and natural resources production hub” (Talbott 2012).  
Hydropower as investment 
With most of Myanmar’s planned hydropower dam projects set to export the energy 
generated to neighbouring countries, hydropower represents a revenue stream not to be 
underestimated. Map 3 below shows how nearly all of the projects slated for 
construction will be built through 
foreign investors. The energy 
policies promulgated to push for 
hydropower export are in turn 
supported by ongoing economic 
reforms (Robinson 2012). This 
way the government is promising 
favourable economic opportunities 
in Myanmar to foreign investors 
supported by new legislations and 
Free Trade agreements (Kattelus, 
Rahaman, and Varis 2015, 51). 
One of these new laws is the new 
Foreign Investment Law (which 
can be found in more detail in 
Appendix 7) which in essence 
serves to improve the financial 
flexibility for foreign companies and expands the number of banks and choices for 
investors.  
Hydropower then is poised to become not only the number one source of electricity for 
the country itself, but also a major export earner (Kattelus, Rahaman, and Varis 2014, 
88). Thus, for example, “in the first seven months of the 2010-2011 fiscal year alone, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 3 - Hydropower stations under planning in 
Myanmar in 2010. Source: (Kattelus, Rahaman, and 
Varis 2015, 49) 
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one-third of foreign investment in Myanmar went into the hydropower sector” (Urban et 
al. 2013, 306) and Shweli 1 and Tapein 1 hydropower projects produced US$120 
million worth in exports in 2011 (Adam Smith International 2015). Moreover, an 
analysis of the extraction industry sector has indicated that “the potential value of 
annual hydro production exceeds US$15 billion (41 GW) if all proposed FDI projects 
are approved” (Adam Smith International 2015, 9). This could prove to be a huge 
revenue stream for Myanmar’s newly expanding economy. Myanmar’s policy towards 
such foreign investment in hydropower has tended to mostly be comprised of joint 
ventures which are based on agreements being made between the government and 
public or private companies, “with the requirement of 10-15% free share, and 10-15% 
free electricity” for Myanmar (Deetes 2015b). The growing importance of hydropower 
as an income generator is exemplified by the fact that in December 2007, the conclusion 
of 13 hydropower projects in Myanmar was prioritised over all other projects, 
“including those in the increasingly significant oil and gas sector” (Magee and Kelley 
2009, 124). In the past, much of the revenue from such projects landed in the hands of 
senior ranks of the military and those funds that did go towards the state budget were 
often utilized for purchasing military hardware which was used in the country’s many 
on-going conflicts (Simpson 2013, 132).  
The Centre versus the Periphery: Money for whom?  
As has been noted, the electricity generated from the Hat Gyi dam and slated for the 
Myanmar market will most likely go towards providing energy for the industrial zones. 
Whilst such investments are important for 
Myanmar’s economy to grow and will bring 
certain benefits that should not be discounted, 
one must also take a closer look at who will 
actually profit from all of this. As Saw John 
Bright emphasized, “If they develop these kinds 
of factories and industrial zones here, where 
will the source of power for these kinds of 
business activities come from? Dams!” (Bright 
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Figure 2 - Control of major businesses 
and revenues in Myanmar. Source: 
(MPM 2013, 14)
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2014). Figure 1 exemplifies how major businesses have been run in Myanmar so far and 
by all accounts things have not changed much for the better at the moment, with 
Myanmar ranking 156
th
 out of 175 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Index (Transparency International 2014). Large “crony-owned companies and foreign 
companies often have to work with the military and their conglomerates in order to 
conduct business in the country” (MPM 2013, 14). What Figure 1 indicates is that the 
ones benefitting from big business in Myanmar is generally the Central government 
ministries. So far, all revenues from natural resource projects have gone to the central 
government (MPM 2013, 19). Which leads us back to the ongoing conflict with the 
KNU and other ethnic armed groups. One of the main points of contestation is the way 
the Constitution addresses “ethnic demands for self-determination, particularly 
ownership, management and revenue sharing” (MPM 2013, 19). In fact, the 
centralization of natural resource ownership and management is enshrined in Section 37 
of Chapter 1 of the Basic Principles of the Union. Section 37 reads as follows:   
“The Union  
(a) is the ultimate owner of all lands and all natural resources above and below the 
ground, above and beneath the water and in the atmosphere in the Union  
(b) shall enact necessary law to supervise extraction and utilization of State owned 
natural resources by economic forces  
(c) shall permit citizens right of private property, right of inheritance, right of private 
initiative and patent in accord with the law” (Government of Myanmar 2008, 10).  
 
In order to address some of the above-mentioned issues, the 2008 Constitution also 
established the creation of state and regional level governments, which could be labelled 
a huge step towards further decentralization and more accountability to local 
populations. In practice this has not yet materialised. So far, assemblies have lacked 
“institutional and human capacity, have had limited understanding of local governance 
issues, and power has been inadequately shared between national and regional bodies” 
(Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013, 8). Whilst the new process initiated by the 2008 
Constitution allows for some degree of devolution and power-sharing, such as that the 
“Region or State Hluttaw shall have the right to enact laws” (Nixon et al. 2013, 12), the 
clear delineation of how and what the Region will be able to enact and be in charge of 
has yet to come about. Moreover, in the “Energy, Electricity, Mining and Forestry” 
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sector, the region’s responsibilities are “limited to power generation that is off the 
national grid, regulation of salt products, polishing local gems (but not mining gems), 
and firewood” (Nixon et al. 2013, 13). Large projects still fall under the central 
government’s authority. Thus, civil society groups lament that the changes implemented 
by the government so far are not enough:  
The current political environment is just about business, not about the 
solution. What we want is not business, we want the solution. 
Decentralisation of power. That is what we want. If we can make that 
happen, then we can decide how we use and manage our own natural 
resources, we can manage the cash revenues ourselves etc. (Bright 2014) 
This allows us circle back to the first paragraph of this sub-chapter. If the central 
government receives the revenues, and decides when and how the dam is to be built and 
where the electricity goes, then where does this leave local villagers? As noted by Saw 
John Bright, electricity from the Hat Gyi dam will go to Thailand and probably industry 
in Myanmar, leaving local people potentially in the dark, as can be seen by previous 
examples and with revenues going to the centre. Sai Khur Hseng talking about a dam in 
Shan State noted “No, they did not get any electricity from the dam yet. The electricity 
goes to the capital and to the mining industry” (Sai Khur Hseng 2014).    
Hydropower as an internal political tool  
However, dam construction does not only offer economic benefits and electrification 
prospects for the government. It has also been criticized by local civil society groups 
and ethnic armed groups alike as being a tactic in order to gain ground over ethnic 
armed groups within their sphere of influence. The impact here is threefold and can be 
described thusly: the government plans and implements dam projects (without former 
consent); this leads to development projects around the dam, such as road and bridge 
construction (which can arguably be considered positive infrastructure development) – 
however all this infrastructure also results in easier access for the Burmese Army to 
enter formerly restricted areas, a fact often lamented by ethnic armed groups who see 
this as a violation of their ceasefire terms (MPM 2013, 3). Moreover, dam construction 
in such areas means that routes used by ethnic armed groups for supplies and 
communication purposes are now cut off, considerably weakening the armed groups 
whilst providing an advantage to the Burmese Army, as noted in one of the interviews I 
conducted with KESAN representatives (Bright 2014). Reservoir areas behind dams 
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will flood areas that provided armed groups with shelter or that were being utilized as 
transit zones (Simpson 2013, 141).  
A civil society representative has also been quoted saying “from a political power view, 
we can think that the government is using dams as a weapon to control and flood these 
areas, so it can create more conflict” (Vrieze 2015). This also provides them with 
“legitimacy” to increase military presence around the construction sites under the 
pretext of having to ‘defend and protect’ them from insurgents (KHRG 2007, 37). Thus, 
looking at some of the dams on the Salween for example, the Shan State Army South 
(SSAS) still has sporadic clashes with the military around the Tasang Dam site, whilst 
the Dagwin, Wei Gyi and Hat Gyi sites provide security for the KNU in addition to 
representing some of the busiest routes for Karen refugees fleeing into Thailand (KHRG 
2007, 38). Additionally, the KNPP also operates around the Wei Gyi Dam site, which 
would mean the government could severely impact the operating areas of two ethnic 
armed groups with one dam construction (Simpson 2013, 141).  
Another way dam construction is utilized in a tactical manner to impact ethnic armed 
groups is through the enticement of ethnic businessmen and insurgents. This means that 
the government suggests business deals to ethnic armed leaders and other businessmen, 
which is a way of neutralizing movements for autonomy and “doing through 
commercial means what the government could not fully achieve militarily” (Gray 
2015). This can be considered harmful as these deals still do not take into account or 
consult general public opinion of the local population actually living near the dam sites, 
bypassing consultations and only dealing with paramilitary groups in charge in the area.    
Beyond the factor of legitimization, these infrastructure projects have served to provide 
the ruling military with new-found access ways to the periphery areas of the country, 
allowing for an easier access of men and materials (including military equipment) and 
the ability for closer control of the ethnic minorities (Steinberg 2005, 9). The central 
government has, in the words of Dr. Brennan, been “very shrewd in how they go about 
all this”. In order to build such large infrastructure projects, one needs other large 
infrastructure in place in order to facilitate the building of the former large projects. The 
fact that has dams running along the Salween River is important because you have to 
build roads and infrastructure to get there. And if you have roads getting there, you can 
move troops in there much quicker and control the environment much better. What is 
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more, if you have foreign, such as Chinese, investment in such dam projects, then they 
will want to ensure that the internal security of Myanmar is intact in order to ensure 
their investment is secure. So this may also lead to them helping supress conflict arising 
around the infrastructures. But at the same time, that connection between these regions 
is needed. As we move towards the Asian economic community at the end of this year, 
the freedom of movement, of goods, and of people, this will be a key component of that 
(Brennan 2015).  
6.3.3 Relevant new laws concerning the environment  
With the transition from military to civilian rule, Myanmar, under the leadership of U 
Thein Sein, has undergone a wide array of reforms in order to make them conform to 
international standards (Doran, Christensen, and Aye 2014, 87). These include laws and 
regulations within energy and environment related policy areas, and the World Bank, 
the ADB, and JICA are only some of the actors involved in helping Myanmar develop 
policies, plans and legal frameworks to achieve those goals.  
However, it is not only new laws that have been put in place, but also new 
governmental bodies. An important one to mention here briefly is the Myanmar 
Investment Commission (MIC), since it essentially is in charge of deciding which 
projects can and will be approved in Myanmar. MIC is a government-appointed body 
under the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development that was originally 
created in 1994, but due to the onset of reforms in 2012, MIC was transformed into a 
more independent body (NCEA 2015). This has meant that representatives from the 
private sector and civil society have been invited to be included in the board. However, 
the key decision-making positions are still held by senior government officials (NCEA 
2015), which begs the question as to how transparent and neutral the decision-making 
can be. The Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry (MOECAF) is 
represented in the MIC panel.  
These new laws, which can be found in more detail in Appendix 7, impact hydropower 
development in Myanmar in a variety of ways. They put in place the legal framework 
that demands that a restriction be placed across all sectors if “it is detrimental to 
traditional ethnic cultures and customs or is damaging to public health, natural 
resources, the environment or biodiversity” (Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013, 29). 
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It also specifies major development projects that require the implementation of EIAs, as 
well as basic pollution controls be instituted by investors. However, the MIC – whose 
key positions are still head by senior government officials – can allow foreign 
investment into restricted sectors if it is considered as being in the national interest. The 
new laws establish a comprehensive waste and pollutant monitoring scheme, and have 
created a draft set of rules for EIAs.  
Land Reform 
In the domain of land reform, the new laws have prompted stark opposition. In general 
terms, Myanmar’s domestic laws have allowed the government “wide authority to 
expropriate land”  (KHRG 2013, 21) whilst ignoring the traditionally informally 
established land use patterns that have been customary so far (Transnational Institute 
2013, 11). Furthermore, whilst a certain degree of devolution is supposed to be taking 
place in the country, the central government actually does not need to seek approval 
from the provincial governments for the implementation of large-sized investments 
(they do however need to be informed beforehand) (Transnational Institute 2013, 4) and 
the laws have even been dubbed “a legal tool for land grabbing” (Transnational Institute 
2013, 6) by some.  
Further complicating the situation is the fact that ethnic armed groups may have their 
own systems of land registration, which only serves to confound issues of transparency 
and corruption. In areas of contested authority, communities may even be unaware of 
their land being given as concession (Guest 2015, 24). 
Free, Prior, Informed Consent (FPIC) and Myanmar’s laws on Indigenous 
Peoples  
FPIC is an interesting case, in that it is considered a requirement before any 
development on the land of indigenous peoples can commence, whilst at the same time 
still being a rather controversial human right (McGee 2009, 571). FPIC is enshrined in 
the UN’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples (UNDRIP) in Article 10 
which reads that  
Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or 
territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and 
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informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement 
on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option of 
return (United Nations 2007b, 6).  
Whilst the UN Declaration is not legally binding, it does espouse to establish an 
“important standard for the treatment of indigenous peoples and will undoubtedly be a 
significant tool towards eliminating human rights violations against indigenous people 
worldwide and assist them in combating discrimination and marginalization” (United 
Nations 2007a). Whilst Myanmar has not ratified the ILO’s Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention (Convention Nr. 169) – which is a legally binding document- it did, 
however, vote in favour of endorsement of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in 2007. It should be noted that under the Myanmar Constitution 
and indeed most domestic laws, there is no acknowledgment of any concept of special 
minority or indigenous groups who have additional or special rights (MCRB 2014, 
134).  The latest draft of Myanmar’s proposed EIAs refers to a consultation process, but 
does not specifically make reference to FPIC.  
FPIC in itself does not come without its own set of problems. For example, it raises 
such questions as  who exactly has the right to FPIC, given that it has generally tended 
to be associated with indigenous peoples, as enshrined in the UNDRIP. However, as we 
have seen, indigenous peoples as such are not necessarily recognised in the case of 
Myanmar. Moreover, FPIC begs the question of whose consent is required when it 
comes to natural resource use. Considering that large dam projects may have 
unforeseeable effects on various populations after it has been in operation for some 
time, as well as the effects it may have on downstream communities, how far should 
FPIC go (Transnational Institute 2013, 7)? Despite its difficulties, the implementation of 
FPIC is not in question here. Rather, a close examination of how it should be 
implemented needs to be looked at in more detail. As we will see further on, the 
problem in Myanmar has been that consent or even consultation has in no shape or form 
been conducted so far, having dire implications for local people.  
Having introduced the reasons for the push to build the Hat Gyi dam from the 
perspective of the three main government’s involved in its construction, local 
perceptions from fieldwork conducted will be presented.  
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7 Local perspectives and 
experiences  
All of the local cases studied below, with the exception of Ba Sob Moeng, are located 
within Karen State. The State borders Thailand to the East, Mon State and Bago Region 
to the West and South, and 
Mandalay Region, Shan State and 
Karenni (Kayah) State to the 
North. Map 4 serves to 
demonstrate the approximate 
location of the case studies to 
follow and the Hat Gyi dam site in 
order to provide a better overview.  
Karen State has experienced a flux 
as to who controls which part of 
the State for a long time and it is 
still officially administered by two 
different entities: the Myanmar 
government and the KNU
35
. To 
further complicate things, DKBA 
Brigade 5 controls some areas as 
well, which exemplifies the 
overlapping and confusion 
prevalent on the ground when it comes to who has control.  
Official administration is divided between the government of Myanmar and the KNU. 
The KNU “defines its territory as a semi-autonomous state called Kawthoolei and 
divides this territory into seven districts, each controlled by a separate brigade” (CPCS 
2014, 18). It has also established its own departments of education, health, law and 
                                                 
35
 As of 2014, the KNU controlled and operated in Than Taung, Taungoo, Nyaung Lay Bin, Hlaing Bwe, 
Hpa-an, Hpa-pun, Kawkareik, Kyar-Inn Seik Gyi, Kyeik-don, and the Northern part of Tanintharyi region 
(MPM 2014a). Both villages looked at belong to KNU administered areas.  
 
Map 4 - Map depicting the case studies and the dam. 
Approximation of location of Hat Gyi Dam site (Black); 
Ban Sob Moei Village in Thailand (Red); Kawkue 
Village (Purple) and Na Piaw Daw Village (Orange). 
Source: (KHRG 2011) 
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forestry within its administration (CPCS 2014, 18). This system has led to considerable 
inconsistencies and overlap between the two differently controlled divisions.  
Traditionally, Karen State has focused on agriculture and farming together with animal 
husbandry to provide for people’s livelihoods (CPCS 2014, 18). However, this has been 
expanded upon due to the relatively recent ceasefire agreements being signed with 
ethnic armed groups and thus the improved stability within the State. Thus, several 
extractive and business development initiatives have been introduced, most notably the 
ADB’s plan to construct the Asia Highway through Karen State (CPCS 2014, 18).  
Services provided in Karen State can be characterised as limited, with education, 
electricity and telecommunications being available in the State’s capital, Hpa’an, but 
being extremely limited in rural areas (CPCS 2014, 19). Below I shortly describe the 
three fieldwork sites and how people were informed about the plans for the dams, 
before summing up people’s views and uses of the river and their views on the dam.  
7.1 Kawkue Village: Presentation and findings  
Kawkue village is a small 
village, located in Hpa`An 
township in Karen State and is 
about an hour’s drive away 
from the State’s capital city.  
The village is located right next 
to the Salween river, 
approximately 20 km 
downstream from the proposed 
Hat Gyi Dam site, and boasts a 
population of around 500-700, 
all of whom are Pwo Karen from what was conveyed to me. The village’s main 
economic trading partner seemed to be Thailand, with much of the vegetables being 
grown for export. The river is used for fishing and farming, as well as irrigation, and is 
also being used as drinking water as I discovered during informal conversations 
afterward. The current flow of electricity is ensured through a few installed solar panels, 
 
Picture 2 - A large part of this area is part of Kawkue 
village. During the rainy season, this area is flooded by the 
Salween River. Close to the hills in the back is where the 
conflict area and Hat Gyi dam site lies. Source: Author 
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as well as generators, that however do not provide enough for full electrification. Asked 
about how they feel about electricity, one of the village leaders said that whilst they do 
really want electricity, they want it to be “natural and for it to not be damaging to the 
environment” (Informant 1 2014).  
When asked whether there have been any changes in how they grow vegetables, he 
answered that their plantations had changed now because the soil nutrition has become 
worse and is already lower now than it was before. Being downstream from the majority 
of the dam cascades planned, especially Hat Gyi Dam, this would probably also have 
impacts on the river flow, making it even less.  
Taking into consideration the issue of free, prior and informed consent, as well as the 
fact that clearing of the dam site for construction has already begun according to some 
of my contacts, it appears striking that the villagers had not received any information 
from any government authority or corporation on the dam construction. The only reason 
there was some awareness amongst the villagers, was that they started working with 
KESAN two years ago and had been informed about plans to build dams on the 
Salween by them. All the information they have received is from civil society 
organisations. One of the consequences they fear the dams will have is that 
unemployment will rise, resulting in many more people migrating to Thailand and other 
countries. Already 50% of the village inhabitants work there according to my 
informants, making them fear for the survival of the village if many more leave. The 
statement that “for the next generation we want the natural water from the Salween to 
remain free flowing and free of dams; we want to conserve the river for our children” 
(Informant 1 2014), underlines such fears. Moreover, he sounded quite adamant about 
the fact that neither he nor the villagers would change their minds with regards to the 
dam being built, even if there were more consultations put in place: 
We are responsible for our next generations, so we won’t change our 
minds on this. Also, the companies only talk about the benefits, never 
about the impact. And we are very worried about the impact this will have 
on the next generation (Informant 1 2014). 
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Considering conflict and the various armed groups, my informant mentioned that there 
was indeed armed conflict in the vicinity in the 1990s, but has since stopped
36
. 
Moreover, whilst they used to be forced to pay taxes to the armed groups before, they 
now actually donate to them, specifically supporting the KNU, not the DKBA. Some of 
their reasons for doing so is fear of the armed groups, but also that they stem from the 
same ethnic group. Yet they also think that the “KNU’s protest against the government 
is good, because we ourselves cannot protest the government; so the KNU can do it 
better” (Informant 1 2014). He also mentioned that companies and the “government 
don’t come here because of the conflict, so this serves as a kind of protection for the 
people” (Informant 1 2014), indicating the strong underlying fear of the government 
still prevalent among many people.  
One of the main messages that came across during my group interview with retired 
villagers was the close relationship they had to the Salween River. They described their 
dependence on the food they cultivate, stating that it is enough for them to live off, but 
not to generate income. In the cold season they did not use to have such materials as 
blankets or mosquito nets, so they had to sleep around the fire. This is significant, 
because of where much of the gathered wood came from, namely the Salween (broken 
trees and wood that gets swept in via the current). They were relatively unaware of dam 
construction nearby, stating that “we heard something, but where and when it is to be 
built, we do not know” and another asking me directly “where? Where is it being 
built?” The confusion prevalent about the dam and where electricity will go is also 
evident from one respondent asking “so if the dam gets built, then we can get 
electricity? Isn’t that better?” There was further discussion about the subject of access to 
electricity. Whilst one person suggested that more electricity can be good and benefit 
the people, others vehemently objected saying “no, electricity won’t be good for us”! 
This debate and uncertainty stems from the confusion villagers feel when it comes to 
the subject of electricity. As was explained to me by an informant from KESAN:  
They’re confused about electricity. They’re not quite sure what it means. If 
there’s electricity but they can’t get fish anymore; or the other way around, 
                                                 
36
 It should be noted however, that armed fighting still continues 10-20km further upstream from the 
village. 
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if they can still fish, but then don’t have electricity…they don’t know. It’s 
very confusing to them.  
After we climbed up a hill, reaching a pagoda and providing a viewpoint for the entire 
area, the village leaders and others showed me how far their village reaches and what 
areas get flooded during rainy season. The majority of the land usually floods, and when 
it later on slowly recedes, puddles of lakes will often form, and various fish remain 
trapped in these newly formed ponds, providing valuable subsistence for the people in 
the village.  
7.2 Na Piaw Daw Village
37
, Kalone Island on the 
Salween 
Na Piaw Daw is a beautiful, little 
village situated on an island on the 
Salween River and is part of 
Hlaing Bwe Township. The entire 
island boasts around 4000 people 
(3000 households), and the village 
itself has around 1500 inhabitants. 
Hlaing Bwe Township is an 
agricultural area and all along the 
road to the village we could see 
plantations and rice fields. The 
road to the township was paved this time around, as it offers trading opportunities and 
is, as far as I understood, supposed to be connected to the Asian Highway. Whilst 
driving to the village, the repercussions the extension of the Highway has had on local 
people and the plans to broaden the road for more extensive commercial use were 
explained to me. What was especially emphasized was that this road leads to the Hat 
Gyi dam site, meaning that trucks providing materials and that are entering from 
Thailand will now have much faster and easier access to the dam site.  
                                                 
37
 Na Piaw Daw means “The Forest of Banana plants” 
 
Picture 3 - Gardens on Kalone Island. The ground here 
is very fertile due to sediment from the Salween River 
and is an important source of food for the local people. 
Source: Author. 
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The people of Kalone Island live off farming and their main produce is beans, peanuts, 
sugarcane, vegetables and Burmese chocolate. The main source of income stems from 
trading these goods, with merchants coming in from the cities to collect them and then 
bringing them to, for example, Hpa’an. According to one informant, the island is 
famous for its good quality vegetables, which means they can earn a lot of money from 
it. The Salween is important because it provides “good quality for growing food. The 
water of the Salween River can enter the middle of the island as well during rainy 
season, making a lake on the island. We depend on the Salween for nutrition purposes, 
because it makes the soil so fertile” (Informant 2 2014). During the rainy season the 
river is also important for collecting large amounts of firewood, which gets swept in 
from the current upstream.  
We began talking about the Hat Gyi dam site, and what people may know about its 
construction. I learned that they had in fact not been informed in any official capacity 
by the government or by the construction companies. “We have just heard talking about 
the dam, but we don’t know specifics. We don’t know where it’s being constructed or 
by whom. We only hear people talking about ‘something’” (Informant 2 2014). “The 
monk” working with the DKBA had sent them a letter which talked about the Hat Gyi 
dam, but “it didn’t say where or when and what it will mean for us” (Informant 2 2014).  
Food plays a central role in Karen culture and a common Karen greeting is Aw mee wee 
lee ar – “Have you finished eating?” (KBDDF 2011, 25). Thus, we halted the interview 
in order to enjoy lunch together, which had been thoughtfully prepared by the women of 
the family. It was a wonderful traditional meal, with plates filled with different dishes 
being laid on the table. Eating together, I have come to learn, is not only a big part of 
Karen hospitality (my hosts in the city often told me filled with pride, about the famous 
Karen hospitality), but is also important to form bonds and express respect. During 
lunch with the village leader, we discussed the complicated tax system the village has to 
adhere to. Since Na Piaw Daw – and the whole island – is located in a mixed governed 
area (meaning there is KNU involvement, BGF and the government from what I 
understand), the inhabitants are forced to pay informal taxes to three different entities: 
officially to the government, but also unofficially to the BGF troops and the KNU.  
After that short interlude, we continued our discussion about the Hat Gyi dam. Similar 
concerns were raised as in Kawkue village, with my informant saying that whenever the 
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dam will be built, they will be unaware of its effects on them, and whilst they know that 
it will produce electricity, they still do not know if they will receive any of said 
electricity.  
We worry about the dam, because the water will decrease and the soil will 
be affected. We worry we won’t be able to get enough water for 
transportation. And in the rainy season, when we need the water for the 
crops, we don’t know how much of the field it will flood (Informant 2 
2014).  
People have no experience of openly talking to the government or anyone else about 
their issues. They have been self-reliant in every respect until now. Thus, Kalone Island 
has been in charge of their own education, health and everything else so far, with no 
support from the government, something which could perhaps be attributed to the 
confusion regarding the mixed and separated governing zones between the KNU and 
the government. The villagers have even taken matters into their own hands with 
regards to electricity, with it being mentioned that every household has solar power, 
which they installed themselves. How much is generated from these installations and 
how the energy is utilised is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper.  
The general concerns of the villagers can be echoed in my informant’s plea directed at 
me  
Please protest against the dam. If the dam is completed, we will have to 
relocate. If they build the dam on the Salween, it will hugely impact the 
downstream area, because we depend on the Salween for agriculture. It 
will have a negative impact. We are afraid of that (Informant 2 2014). 
7.3 Ban Sob Moeng Village in Thailand  
Ban Sob Moei is located in Mae Hong Son Province in Northern Thailand. It is a remote 
village, at the confluence of the Moei and Salween Rivers and only accessible via boat. 
It comprises around 172 households and has an estimated population of 1300 people. 
The majority of the population of the village are ethnic Karen, and more than 80% hold 
the Thai citizenship (Shining 2011, 10). The main occupations held are fishing, 
agriculture, weaving and boating (Shining 2011, 10).  
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The village is also located only 47km from the Hat Gyi dam site. On the Thai side, this 
will be the first village to be affected by the dam. Officially, the statements have 
claimed that no Thai village will be impacted by the dam, but this has yet to be verified. 
Villagers here are more knowledgeable of the on-going situation than their Myanmar 
counterparts, given that EGAT has in fact held numerous public disclosure sessions here 
and in a few other villages nearby (Shining 2011, 3). The first Public Information 
Forum was held in Ban Sob Moei in 2009 and included representatives of “EGATi, the 
Thai National Human Rights Commission, and villagers from both sides of the Salween 
River, as well as academic researchers, media and many NGOs” (Shining 2011, 49). 
The purpose of the Forum was to hear more about the villagers’ perspective on the 
proposed Hat Gyi dam. Further meetings were held that same year, with EGATi 
representatives coming to speak to the villagers about the necessity of the dam, noting 
that if Thailand backs out, Myanmar and China would still move forward with it 
(Shining 2011, 50).  
As we wait for people to join us after their Church mass, NGO representatives give us a 
general overview of the situation and the Hat Gyi dam. We are then joined by Decha 
Srisawaidaoruang, the village’s Thai-Karen headman, with many other villagers taking 
seat on the grass behind him. Whilst the villagers of Ban Sob Moei are clearly more 
aware about the project than the villages on the Myanmar side of the border, 
Srisawaidaoruang still emphasizes the little information they are given regarding the 
dam project. That, in conjunction with the current political state of Thailand, has them 
worried that EGAT will be able to use this to their advantage and sign power sharing 
agreements with counterparts on the other side, without proper vetting and transparency 
in place (Srisawaidaoruang 2014).  
Since there have been so many group visits to the village, the people there have been 
made aware of the dam construction, but lament the lack of transparency of information 
on the project. There have been various research groups and dam builder groups coming 
to them, yet no one has given them any clear and exact information. What is interesting 
to note is that according to Srisawaidaoruang, “it is not that the villagers accept it or 
oppose it. They aren’t 100% opposing the project if it benefits the country. “If there is 
good or adequate assessment of the impact, then they will see how they will react to this 
project” (Srisawaidaoruang 2014).  
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The Salween itself is of great importance to the villagers. It is not only used for 
agricultural purposes, with many citing riverbank agriculture as their main source of 
income, but it also has spiritual value and is important for transport purposes. During 
rainy season, the roads to Ban Mea Samlab, a border town close by and important for 
trade, are inaccessible, so the Salween becomes their only mode of transportation. 
“When there is an emergency, like someone is sick, if we have to choose between the 
road and the river, we choose the river” (Srisawaidaoruang 2014). Moreover, as 
Srisawaidaoruang notes, the villagers have no idea of how to use aquaculture and the 
type of fishing linked to that (in order to compensate for the potential lack of fishing 
opportunities after the dam is built), and are thus worried about their occupation and 
income capabilities. Another concern is related to health impacts of the Hat Gyi dam, 
since “the flowing river will be stopped by the dam, the water in the reservoir might be 
polluted” resulting in more widespread malaria, and “since this is the area of malaria 
already on the border, they are worried there will be more” (Srisawaidaoruang 2014).  
It has such an impact on our livelihoods, if we have to leave this village 
and move to a relocation site or move and live in the town, it would be 
very difficult for people like us to adjust our livelihoods and our way of 
life to live in the new place/town. Because of the language, the 
communication, the education and our traditional way of life 
(Srisawaidaoruang 2014).  
Many of the people of Ban Sob Moei village are actually Karen refugees, who fled the 
conflict on the other side of the border and joined their Karen relatives here. This is a 
huge problem for many of the citizens since they do not necessarily have a Thai 
citizenship card. The land they farm is given to them by the community, but they do not 
have any titles for the land they live on. It is also a problem considering compensation. 
A Karen woman speaking at the Q&A session noted in this regard that “if the dam is 
built, they (refugees) only have the non-Thai card, not citizenship, so it will be unlikely 
that her and her colleagues will get adequate compensation or any mitigation measures 
provided by the government or dam builders” (Srisawaidaoruang 2014).  
Srisawaidaoruang also proudly explained when asked about Internet accessibility, that 
the school grounds are a wifi zone, with everyone having access to it. Every household 
uses solar panels, and there is a landline village telephone, but many people have their 
own cell phones (Srisawaidaoruang 2014). These are not ignorant people who are 
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“stuck in their way of life”. They are connected, they want their children to be educated, 
they want a bright future for their families and the next generation. But they also want 
the next generation to be able to inherit their way of life. “Our livelihoods. Living in 
this village. Even though we have wifi, that doesn’t matter. What is important is that we 
live in our community like this. The tradition of this village is very, very important to 
us” (Srisawaidaoruang 2014).  
7.4 The people’s connection to the Salween 
The Salween is more than just a river flowing through the country to the sea. To many 
people the River is revered as the “sacred Mother of Rivers, who has provided for their 
basic survival needs – from food to herbal medicines – from time immemorial” (KDRG 
2006, vii). Srisawaidaoruang, the leader from Ban Sob Moei village, agrees with this, 
saying that:  
The River is holy to many of the peoples who live around it and survive 
thanks to it. There are festivals dedicated to the River, such as the 
ceremony to worship the spirit that protects the village, or March 14, which 
celebrates the extension of the life of the Salween River, as well as the 
forest surrounding it (Srisawaidaoruang 2014).  
Thus, the River is of huge cultural and spiritual importance to various ethnicities on 
both sides of the border. During one of our trips to the villages, my friend played me a 
Karen song about the Salween River, composed and performed by the refugee band 
Equal 49 and translated it for me. This is what one of the songs verses says:  
The Salween is our life, the Salween flows all the time, it is like the sign of 
the Karen. The river is part of our ethnic culture. We are working to 
support the river. We all have to work together to stop the dam from being 
built
38
. 
Beyond its cultural and religious significance, the River literally represents life for 
many of the people living by its shores. As one of my friends from KESAN noted, “they 
(the villagers) can’t do any other work. The water dictates how they will do the 
agriculture. Also, if there is no electricity, they can still stay here. But if there is no 
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 The full song text can be found in Appendix 3 
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water, they can’t stay” (Interview 2014). Another informant from Kawkue village 
emphasized that “We cannot imagine a life without the river” (Interview 2014).  
The River also represents a “final refuge”: on both sides of the River, makeshift villages 
and refugee camps have been set up for those fleeing the conflict further inland. As a 
Reuters article notes,  
Sandwiched between the SPDC troops and Thailand -- which already has 
120,000 long-term Myanmar refugees and is loath to take more -- they see 
the Salween as a final refuge. If the waters rise, they have nowhere to go” 
(Cropley 2006).  
As such, the River also then represents the final safe haven for thousands of people who 
have lived in fear and run away from ongoing violence.  
What the locals use the Salween for 
As we will see further on, villagers rely on the Salween for a multitude of things: They 
rely on it for “fish, and the animals and plants that inhabit the rich jungles nourished by 
the river” (Zerrouk 2013, 73). In the words of a villager from Paung Township (in Mon 
State),  
Normally, we do not have to spend a lot of money in our daily lives 
because we can get fish, crabs, herbs, nipa palm leaves, roofing materials 
and firewood from the river, and various kinds of vegetables, fruits and 
cooking oil from our farm. We can stand firmly on our land without 
money. We do not have to worry about a job, because we have full bins of 
paddy, a tank full of oil, fish in the Salween River, chicken and pigs at the 
house – we only have to buy salt from outside (MYPO 2007, 21).  
As indicated then, the Salween River and its surroundings have provided people with 
everything they need to survive. In the group interview I conducted, one woman 
explained to me that the water is even used for drinking water since there are no wells 
around. “In the summer we can divert the water to our fields. There is no water in the 
well, ever. So everyone drinks from the river, not just humans, also animals” (Interview 
2014). Not only that, but the Salween River is also important for when they stir the 
cement to build their houses.  
97 
 
In Ban Sob Moei village, a clear description of all of the uses of the River was provided 
to us:  
From riverbank gardening, each family can produce around 100 kgs of 
dried tobacco, they grow it on the riverbank, and the cost is around 200 
Baht
39
 per kilo. So this is their major income. Vegetables are good for the 
health and for the school students that stay here as well. It is enough so that 
their children can study outside in other cities, for the education of their 
children. The Salween also provides sand for the construction so to 
generate income for them as well when the land communities use the sand 
for any house construction (Srisawaidaoruang 2014).  
This emphasizes the importance villagers place on the Salween River for the future of 
their children. The construction of the dam will mean that villagers can no longer 
predict the flow of the River, something that they have grown accustomed to and is part 
of their daily lives. It can potentially have dire consequences for the downstream 
communities, who, as we have seen, rely on the River for every aspect of their lives.  
How people view the damming of the Salween  
Having seen what the Salween River represents to many people and how it is utilised, 
we now turn to see how people may view the damming of the River.  
One local villager went as far as saying that “The Salween River is our means of living. 
If the dams are built, it is the same as killing us. We depend on these mountains and 
rivers (Saw Nyunt Thaung 2015). Asked by local grassroots organisations during a 
protest against the dams, why they did not want the dams to be built, villagers 
responded “We do not want to leave our homes and live somewhere else. We love 
living in our own village. This dam will destroy our homeland”. Even if offered a new 
house, villagers were adamant about wanting to remain in their houses, in their villages 
and on the River (KESAN 2015). Local communities and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) have admitted being concerned that the dam plans will lead to increased 
militarization, human rights abuses, environmental destruction and loss of local 
livelihoods (Boot 2013). 
                                                 
39
 Baht is the currency in Thailand. 200 Baht roughly translates to $ US5.90 or around 47 NOK.  
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The view from the ground: How the ceasefires have impacted the local 
population  
The ceasefires signing, despite the violations that have occurred, have had quite an 
impact on the local population. The KHRG has found that the ability to travel more 
freely has had the biggest impact on villagers’ lives and livelihoods (KHRG 2014, 15). 
Moreover, fewer cases of forced labour have been reported. Another positive impact has 
been that villagers feel safer to report cases of land confiscation to local authorities, and 
have indeed taken up to report such abuses (KHRG 2014, 10). However, a consequence 
of increased peace in the region has also lead to the construction and fortification of 
more army bases, something that has resulted in villagers feeling that the ceasefire is not 
sustainable and leaves them fearing for their personal security (KHRG 2014, 10). This 
correlates with the fact that civilians have still been arbitrarily detained, tortured, and/or 
killed if they have been suspected of collaborating or associating with an ethnic armed 
group (KHRG 2014, 15). Villagers have reported the “temporary or permanent 
confiscation of their land for army camps, dam construction, large-scale agriculture and 
mining projects since January 2012” (KHRG 2014, 16). This was often done through 
the use of government laws – such as the previously described “Vacant Fallow and 
Virgin Lands Management Law” - classifying the land as uncultivated or state-owned, 
with little or no consultation of affected communities (KHRG 2014, 16).  
Thus, we can see that the ceasefire, whilst positive, still carries with it other undesired 
consequences, making it something of a catch-22 for local people. The decrease of 
violence and abuse is undoubtedly an improvement and has changed everyday life for 
many people. At the same time however, this also opens up avenues for the Tatmadaw 
and the government to increase their presence in these former no-go areas and increase 
infrastructure projects. This in turn can lead to land confiscation and the construction of 
such projects that are not necessarily wanted, or in the interest of local people.  
7.5 Civil Society and ethnic armed groups’ views  
Democratic regimes tend to allow more open activism and the freedom for people to 
voice their opposition to certain subject matters. Communities living under less 
democratic regimes may suffer more environmental insecurities due to the fact that they 
simply do not have the option to protest in any capacity (Simpson 2014, 56). Indeed, 
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before the opening of the country in recent years, open dissent was not tolerated in 
Myanmar. In order to counter this and continue their work, many NGOs either fled into 
the border regions where the central SPDC had less control (if at all), or would set up 
their headquarters in neighbouring countries, especially Thailand (Doyle and Simpson 
2006, 755). Such NGOs then would often re-enter Myanmar incognito in order to 
undertake research. Simpson contends that, at least during Myanmar’s authoritarian 
regime, environmental activism represented much more than the fight for a more 
sustainable and green future. It represented a form of resistance politics, “most often 
based around opposition to efforts by the regime to pursue environmentally and socially 
disastrous energy projects” (Doyle and Simpson 2006, 758). Thus, in the case of 
Myanmar, green issues were and are, inextricably linked to human rights, specifically 
the rights of ethnic minorities. It also opened up an arena for an entire generation of 
civil society organisations and representatives to be educated abroad and have close 
contact with other international NGOs also operating from Thailand. This however is an 
entirely different subject that could fill another Master thesis and is beyond the scope of 
this analysis. Suffice to say that working from the “outside” has also impacted civil 
society in Myanmar, which is now slowly coming back into the country and registering 
officially there in order to finally be able to operate legally.  
Thus, despite decades of suppression and persecution, Myanmar has developed a 
substantial and diverse civil society network. Within the climate of political reforms, 
new spaces have opened up for grassroots and civil society actors to grow further and 
voice their opinions more loudly and openly. Moreover, a new law passed in 2011 
which allows for protests, given they ask for permission five days in advance, has 
provided civil society with more opportunities to openly go against government policies 
and engage with local communities further. Some of the key demands they have 
brought forth is that of more transparency with regards to foreign investment and large 
infrastructure projects, and that consultations, compensation procedures and practices be 
put in place (Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013, 37). It is the nationwide public 
disagreement about the construction of the Myitsone dam has been credited as inducing 
the suspension of the dam plans by the current government – a win for local civil 
society groups. And whilst the resources at their disposal so far are limited, anti-dam 
campaigners are trying their hardest to have their voices heard. For example, a group of 
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young people formed a pop group, Salween Angels, and recorded songs protesting 
against the dam’s construction in 2006 (Parry 2006).  
An example of local Karen civil society  
The Karen Environmental and Social Action Network (KESAN) was formed in 2001 by 
Karen activists from different organizations who shared a common interest in 
addressing the problems their communities face (ERI and KESAN 2003). It is the first 
Karen NGO of its type to “specifically focus on the relationship between social and 
environmental issues, [doing] so in a way that reflects Karen priorities” (ERI and 
KESAN 2003) . It does so by working closely with grassroots communities in order to 
promote the management of local resources through traditional means (ERI and 
KESAN 2003). This kind of participatory approach works by villagers and local 
communities coming up with a proposal, something which is then discussed by a 
development committee within the village community. However, in order to establish 
such a committee in the first place, KESAN works to empower villages and raise their 
awareness on such matters, encouraging them to become a team and then encouraging 
them to come up with their own ideas and plans for their community (Bright 2014). 
They work with local communities, train them and provide them with material, such as 
cameras, so that they can collect data on their environment (such as the various fish 
species in the Salween River) and analyse how things are changing (Bright 2014) – in 
what has also has come to be known as Thai Baan Research (Sretthachau 2004).  
Having worked mainly from across the border in Thailand until recently, they have been 
able to cooperate with other international organisations, such as International Rivers, 
and gain much information that perhaps would be inaccessible within Myanmar given 
the past restrictions. Thus, KESAN, amongst other things, goes to different villages 
close to the dam sites in order to speak with residents there and to hear what the 
situation is on the ground, as well as help inform people about what is happening and 
what their rights are. Moreover, KESAN organises various protests and events to voice 
local people’s opinions about the possibility of dam construction on the Salween. Such 
gatherings have been held for some years now, especially marking the International Day 
of Action for Rivers Against Dams on March 14
th
. Together with the organisations of 
Burma Rivers Network, Karen River Watch and Salween River Watch, among others,  
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KESAN has initiated multiple big 
campaigns against the Salween dams. One 
such project has been the collecting of 
61.000 signatures and 131 civil society 
organisations against the Salween Dam 
Project and subsequently sending an open 
letter to the Government of Thailand, 
Myanmar’s Ministry of Electric Power and 
the Chinese Government (Nyein Nyein 
2015). Another event organised by various 
civil society organisations was the “Save 
the Salween”, held in late March 2015 in Hpa’an and which aimed at bringing together 
“local river-reliant communities environmental experts, and the general public for panel 
discussions, an art exhibition and a field visit to a Karen village that is likely to affected 
by proposed hydropower projects” (Nyein Nyein 2015). One of the demands voiced by 
community based organisations is the inclusion of discussions about the dam projects be 
put on the table in the peace negotiations between the KNU leaders and the government 
and make it a priority (Karen News 2015b). Given the evidence, it is not hard to see 
why such discussions are vital in the future. As stated by Paul Sein Twa, director of 
KESAN: 
Local people do not want any dams on the Salween River, especially in 
Karen State, without the free, prior and informed consent of impacted 
communities. The government and the Karen National Union need to 
broaden the decision making process so that it is transparent, inclusive and 
democratic (Mang and Yan 2013).  
Political negotiations between the KNU and the government must address the issue of 
local ownership of resources (Saw Khar Su Nyar 2012). Such campaigns and 
cooperation between different civil society organisations are not limited to Karen State, 
with many organisations from different ethnic groups joining forces and working 
together to save the Salween. Internationally, a petition has been sent to Thailand’s 
National Human Rights Commission over human rights abuse allegations regarding the 
Hat Gyi and Tasang Dams on the Salween (The Nation 2014).  
 
Picture 4 - Villagers protesting alongside 
environmental groups against the building of 
the Hat Gyi dam on the International Day of 
Action for Rivers and Against Dams. Source: 
(Karen News 2015a) 
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Civil society abroad 
However, it is not only within Myanmar that civil society groups have joined forces to 
protest the dam constructions on the Salween. Both in China and Thailand, civil society 
actors have become involved in debates surrounding the Nu and Salween dam debates 
(Magee and Kelley 2009, 130). In 2005, 15.000 members of the Karen ethnic group 
living on the Thai side of proposed dam sites signed a petition opposing the Salween 
River dam projects and urged regional and international communities to join their 
protest (TERRA 2006, 3). Further international campaigns have taken place, including 
protests in front of Thai embassies in various cities around the world, as well as petition 
letters being sent to the Minister of Energy in Myanmar and the Thai Prime Minister. 
Moreover, the debate around the Nu River dams has grown over the years, with 
academics and average citizens taking part in debates around the subject, which in the 
past resulted in the originally proposed dam cascade being halted (International Rivers 
2008, 23). China had already considered plans to construct 13 hydropower plants on its 
portion of the river since the 1990s, but those plans were halted in 2004 by China’s 
President Wen Jiabao, with what has been described as a great victory for the Chinese 
environmental movement (International Rivers 2014b). Environmentalists were 
however taken aback when the Chinese government announced their intention via the 
new Energy Development Plan, to build several controversial dams that had previously 
been suspended, including five on the Nu River, starting in 2015 (Yan 2013, 1). Indeed, 
only last year an expert panel
40
 has already all but green-lighted the first dam by 
agreeing that a pre-feasibility study for a dam in Tibet met the needed requirements 
(Areddy and Jie 2014). The result of the cumulative impact of these dams in addition to 
the ones planned on the Myanmar portion of the River has not been assessed as of yet, 
but could prove to be severe.  
How the ethnic armed groups view the dam 
                                                 
40
 Comprised of the China Renewable Energy Engineering Institute, Tibet’s economic planning 
department and associated organisations 
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Although my data and sources are limited, the ways the ethnic armed groups operating 
in the area view the dam construction seem to vary considerably from battalion to 
battalion
41
. During this year’s International Day of Action for Rivers and Against Dams 
event organised by Karen civil society organisations, Lieutenant from KNLA’s Brigade 
5 Saw Eh Roe announced to the protesters:  
We stay in the dam area and prevent it from happening for you. You are 
our parents and we are your children. Therefore we are doing our part to 
try and stop the dam for you! (…) If the companies try to force their dam 
projects in conflict areas, they will be in danger as well. Therefore, I want 
to tell them to avoid coming here will be best for them (KESAN 2015).   
In the same vein Captain Thein Whin from the DKBA has stated with regards to the Hat 
Gyi dam that “There is no benefit for the civilians if the dam is built. There will be a bit 
problem for our Karen people, for the civilians and also for the resistance. That is why 
we oppose it. We have to stand for the majority” (Karen News 2015b).  
In an interview with Karen News, General Baw Kyaw Heh from the KNLA discussed 
the consequences of the Hat Gyi dam (among other things), saying that “The connection 
between military operations, dam security and the number of refugees and IDP’s is clear 
to us – but they will never acknowledge it” (Karen News 2014a). He continued stating 
that  
There are no proper mechanisms in place to ensure that benefits will go 
Karen people or that, problems will be avoided or solved. When there is 
still no rule of law, how can anyone be sure that the impacts would be 
protected against? (…) Conflict over this dam has already started, restarted 
and restarted again. The dam plans were born in war. They are part of the 
military strategy to consolidate control over the Manerplaw area where the 
KNU and democratic alliance forces were headquartered. (Karen News 
2014a).  
These different statements from various ethnic armed groups operating around the Hat 
Gyi dam site area have been taken from local newspapers. Whilst it is impossible to 
truly gauge to what extent these statements are provided to gain popular support and are 
                                                 
41
 It would seem that the KNDO, the DKBA and the KNLA support local opposition of the dams 
(KESAN 2015; Karen News 2014b; Karen News 2015).  
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actually followed through on, they do indicate an awareness around the subject matter 
and the deeper consequences of the dam construction in general.  
Having a full overview of all the relevant actors involved and their interests behind 
damming the Salween and how local communities feel about it in comparison, a joint 
analysis of all the above information will be provided in Chapter 8. Both the 
international and national/local dimensions will be taken into account and will be 
examined through a political ecology lens.  
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8 The Hat Gyi Dam as conflict 
multiplier  
“If there is a political will for peace, water will not be a hindrance. If you 
want reasons to fight, water will give you ample opportunities” – Uri 
Shamir, Israeli hydrology professor (Olsson 2012, 13).  
Whilst the ceasefire agreement between the KNU and the government has been in place 
since 2012, resulting in a decrease in clashes, they have yet to abate completely. In fact, 
recent reports do not suggest much of 
an improvement, as we can see in Map 
5. What the map also demonstrates is 
that much of the fighting is carried out 
in the vicinity of the Hat Gyi dam site. 
As Sai Khur Hseng mentioned, whilst 
the dam itself cannot be said to cause 
the outbreak of violence per se, one 
does have to ask “why is all the 
fighting concentrated by the dam 
sites?” (Sai Khur Hseng 2014). 
Indeed, the government’s efforts to 
“step up military protection around 
large scale economic projects were the 
decisive factor” in the recent outbreak 
of violence and the breakdown of the 
ceasefire between the KIO and the 
government (MPM 2013, 3).  
In recent months more and more government troops have moved into areas of the Hat 
Gyi dam site, clashing with local ethnic armed groups and violating the ceasefire 
agreements. Additionally, there have been claims by both refugees and aid groups that 
the government’s military troops are responsible for forcibly removing thousands of 
villagers around the dam sites (Gray 2015). Multiple civil society groups have 
expressed their concern that there is a link between the on-going conflict and the dam 
 
Map 5 - Map of the Conflict area around Hat Gyi 
Dam Site. Source: (KRW 2014, 6) 
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(Macan-Markar 2009) (Win 2014) (Karen News 2014b). KNLA general Baw Kyaw 
Heh has said that "it is clear that investment in Hatgyi and similar projects are 
obstructing the peace process in Myanmar, particularly in Karen state” (Win 2014). 
Others report threats being made by the Burma Army towards ethnic armed groups, 
warning them that they will be “wiped out” from the Hat Gyi dam area (Karen News 
2014b) (Naing 2014). This has led both civilians and ethnic armed groups to question 
whether the government is interested in peace, or in natural resource development 
(Mang and Yan 2013): “The increased Burma Army security around the dam sites and 
blatant disregard for concerns of impacted communities are heightening tensions, and 
throwing into doubt the government’s sincerity in conducting ceasefire talks” (Saw Eh 
Na 2012). Exactly how delicate the situation is and how easily this can result in further 
armed conflict is exemplified by a statement by a Quartermaster from the KNDO who 
stated that  
After the KNU leaders signed a ceasefire, Burma Army troops increased 
their activities in Ler Mu Plaw, Pa Gaw, Papu, Mae Ka Hta. They sent 
more soldiers and supplies. The Burma Army also sent more troops and 
one more battalion of Border Guard Force (BGF) to Hatgyi at Mae Pa. 
This forced us to respond by sending more of our troops to the dam site 
and to other places (Saw Eh Na 2012).  
This demonstrates how a continued “tit-for-tat” militarization of the area could have 
dire consequences for local people and result in further bloodshed. It also indicates the 
increased risk for local people, with the risk of human rights violations rising in parallel 
to such militarisation. Local residents from around the Hat Gyi dam site have reported 
to KRW that the recent fighting in the vicinity of the site has been motivated by plans to 
build the dam, with one resident saying that “BGF soldiers had told him that 
construction of the dam must begin in 2015 or 2016” (KRW 2014, 11). This pressure to 
begin construction, which may have to do with certain legal issues within the MoU 
agreement, may only put more pressure on the Burma Army to expedite the process and 
“drive out” the ethnic armed groups in the area at a faster degree, which carries with it 
very serious consequences amid the national ceasefire negotiations and for local 
residents. Until now, already 50.000 people are said to have fled the Hat Gyi Dam area 
(The Nation 2014).  
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This is moreover linked to the usage of the Hat Gyi dam as a tactic by the government 
forces. According to Saw John Bright,  
The government would like to cut the transportation, the access of ethnic 
communities from place to place. Many people use the river as a form of 
transportation; it is very good to travel from place to place, to travel from 
one ethnic area to another. There are so many mountains, so it’s very hard 
to travel otherwise and so river transportation is really great for them. If 
you build the dam, then you have no more access to go from place to place. 
I am ok with saying this: I believe the government has a military strategy 
to cut the transportation and kind of things like that, because the ethnic 
armed groups control the area. So if they build the dam, the upstream will 
be flooded, making it impossible to travel from for example, Karen to 
Karenni State, or from Karenni to Shan State. Another thing is that when 
they build a dam, they will of course need security, so in the name of 
security, the Burmese troops will come and take over the area and then 
expand. These are the main things we are worrying about (Bright 2014).  
The Hat Gyi Dam and the issue of decade long relocation   
Given all the statements from EGAT concerning mitigation processes of the dam 
construction and the public participation promulgated by it (as presented in chapter 6), 
there have been few consultations on the Myanmar side of the river and none of the 
measures described seem to have been implemented by EGAT. Whilst no one truly 
knows the extent to which construction has actually begun given the secrecy 
surrounding the project, the consequences have already been felt by villagers residing 
close by. To the ethnic communities living by the riverbank, these dam projects have 
come to “symbolise violence, anxiety about the future and a tool used by authorities to 
secure a greater grip over their lives” (Gray 2015). Whilst one KNLA captain has even 
been quoted as saying in 2006 that “if they build the dams, the KNLA will have to 
fight” (Cropley 2006), other minority leaders are quoted today as stating that tensions 
arising over the dams could “even re-ignite civil war in Myanmar” (Gray 2015). These 
statements exemplify the fragility of the ceasefire and that these large projects are in no 
way ‘neutral’ and development inducing. 
Already in 2006, Baxter reported that according to reports by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2000 Karen had fled across the border to 
Thailand within a three month period. In contrast, KHRG reported that another 20,000 
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people had been forced to flee their villages and become IDPs (Baxter 2006). This claim 
is supported by accounts from the former executive vice president of the Thai 
construction firm MDX, Suphajee Ninubon, who stated that “immediately following the 
signing of the MOU, 20,000 local residents in the Hat Gyi Dam area were relocated 
from their homes” (Simpson 2007, 549). This demonstrates that the impact of the Hat 
Gyi dam stretches far longer than just the years that it will be physically constructed. 
The battle for the area surrounding it has been going on for decades and has impacted a 
vast amount of people, many of whom will never be able to return to their homes and 
will not be part of any compensation offered by either the government, or EGAT. What 
is more, KHRG also reported that not only were people forcibly relocated, but they 
were subsequently used as forced labour to build the access roads near the dam site 
(Baxter 2006).  
Many actors, many opinions and many interests 
This demonstrates the power struggle between the ethnic armed groups and the 
government over control of land and natural resources. One way of exerting power is 
controlling access to a diversity of resources. The government is attempting to manage 
who exploits those resources in Karen State, the conditions they are exploited under and 
for what purposes they will be used (Bryant and Bailey 1997, 40). The KNU and DKBA 
on the other hand are attempting to prove that the government in fact does not have the 
authority to do so and are stipulating that they should be the ones to wield the power in 
this part of the region.  
However, what confuses the picture even more is the multitude of actors who have 
stakes in this project and who all serve different interests. There is no such thing as one 
united KNU or DKBA. As we have established, multiple commanders run their own 
sub-divisions within the armed groups and may not always align with the overarching 
policy of the KNU for example, but rather serve their own interests. Many of the civil 
society members I spoke with mentioned that whilst generally the KNU might be 
opposing the dam construction, other battalions have already signed concession deals 
with the government in exchange for them supporting the project: “Some groups work 
with the government. So that’s the problem. The armed groups still control the area, but 
some work with the government” (Bright 2014). Moreover, due to the sensitive nature 
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of such concessions and agreements, no information is provided, which only serves to 
confuse matters even more. As Sai Khur Hseng mentioned, “there is no transparency for 
these projects, because they don’t publish anything. We don’t know what they agree on” 
(Sai Khur Hseng 2014). So, even though we might say that the ethnic armed groups 
largely control the areas and exert the power, we can see that that is in fact not 
necessarily the case, which in turn has consequences for existing power relations 
between established actors by bringing in new players. This can potentially weaken the 
KNU’s position vis-à-vis the government, as well as carry with it negative 
consequences for local villagers who once again will not have been part of any 
decision-making process in something that will affect their livelihoods and will only 
lead to further insecurity for them.  
Another problem we encounter in Myanmar generally, but which also has implications 
for the Hat Gyi dam, is the government’s lack of control over the Burma Army. Whilst 
the government does hold the power in general terms, they  
don’t have as much power as they should have due to the structure of the 
military, where regional commanders basically operate on their own, 
controlling their own armies, their own crops, and have their own mini-
economies in the areas where they’re commanding, and so a lot of the time 
the central government is not commanding those regional commanders as 
tight as they should (Brennan 2015). 
Even President Thein Sein has stated several times that he has ordered the Tatmadaw to 
cease an offensive with army commanders ignoring the order and continuing attacks 
against ethnic armed groups regardless (Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013, 11), 
making the lack of civilian oversight an ever more pressing issue.  
8.1.1 Actors and their power 
Identifying power and the various ways it is obtained, exercised and resisted by 
different actors when it comes to resource governance is crucial for the analysis of dams 
and conflict in Myanmar. This section summarises the position of the various actors 
involved in the case of the Hat Gyi dam, and their interrelations. .  
As we have seen in Chapter 6, China has quite the incentive to invest in hydropower in 
Myanmar, and particularly the Salween River. It is also an economic powerhouse, 
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providing it the necessary financial backing to actually invest in these billion dollar 
construction projects, which could be said to provide China with all the power vis-à-vis 
the Myanmar government in this regard. Simply put, if China is not happy with a deal, 
then no money, no investment, no dam.  
However, let us put this hypothesis to the test. In a controversial (for the Myanmar 
government) move, President Thein Sein decided to suspend the Myitsone dam project 
on the Irrawaddy River valued at nearly US$ 4 billion and funded by China (Ling 2015) 
due to  “public backlash over the dam’s social and environmental impact” (Motlagh 
2012). This was hailed as a milestone for Myanmar and its democratization efforts. 
Indeed, looking at China’s response, one can see how the backlash from such behaviour 
could truly sour relations and impact trade between the countries: Up until 2012, China 
was Myanmar’s biggest trade partner (Ling 2015), yet since the suspension of the 
Myitsone dam, analyst Yun Sun has commented that China had “suspended almost all 
new major investment in Burma” (Yun Sun quoted in Boot 2014a). Whether this has 
been explicitly due to the Myitsone dam incident or China’s internal economic woes is 
debatable, yet the fact remains that China has apparently lost its number one spot as 
Myanmar’s main investment partner. Given Myanmar’s still fragile economic state, one 
might say that Thein Sein played a risky gamble and lost much needed investment, 
resulting in a negative outcome for Myanmar. However, things are not that simple. In 
fact, Myanmar holds quite a few aces of its own up its sleeve. Myanmar, due to its vast 
and still much unchartered natural resources, has become a much sought after partner 
for many Western nations ever since it embarked on its road to democracy, in effect 
meaning that Myanmar, in theory, does not have to solely rely on China anymore in 
order to provide infrastructure investments. This is not to say that China does not play a 
role in Myanmar anymore, or that relations are frozen with trade plummeting 
completely. It is simply to showcase that Myanmar has other options available now, 
options it did not have five years ago when the country still suffered from sanctions. 
Moreover, according to Ling, media have been reporting that “the country, since halting 
the Chinese dam project, has switched toward Britain, France and Norway, seeking 
cooperation with renowned multinational firms with good quality equipment and strong 
capital for its new hydropower projects” (Ling 2015). Thus, the argument that money 
alone equals power when it comes to China’s role in Myanmar is too simplistic and 
does not necessarily carry weight.  
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Whilst Thailand is also an investor and main beneficiary of the Hat Gyi dam, theirs 
seems to be a more symbiotic relationship with Myanmar than one where one holds 
more power than the other, especially after the military coup in Thailand in 2014 which 
has left Thailand more isolated than before and looking for friends and allies – among 
which neighbouring Myanmar. Again, Thailand may invest in the dam, without which 
the construction would not be financeable, but it also reaps many benefits from the 
arrangement. Not only will they receive 90% of the electricity generated, but it would 
also seemingly benefit them if the Myanmar government utilised the dam construction 
for tactical reasons in order to weaken the KNU. This is due to the fact that Thailand 
has been the one hosting most IDP camps and refugees fleeing the on-going conflict in 
Karen State.  
However, at the same time, it is exactly the fact that China, Thailand, and indeed the 
whole South-East Asian region, are so energy-hungry that is one of the most important 
drivers behind the Myanmar government’s push to build such large dams as the Hat Gyi 
dam. Moreover, regional organisations, such as ASEAN
42
, are pushing for such projects 
as the ASEAN Power Grid, which hopes to establish interconnecting arrangements for 
electricity, and will also utilise the GMS interconnection initiative to provide the region 
with more cheap and clean energy, curtesy of Myanmar’s and Laos’ hydropower 
potential (Nicolas 2009, 23). The World Bank has stated that Myanmar has the potential 
of being the energy bridge between South Asia and ASEAN energy system (World 
Bank 2008, 63). Former EGAT governor Rattanopas even went as far as stating that 
“the dream of the ASEAN power grid cannot be realized without the Upper and Lower 
Salween dams” (Salween Watch 2004, 25). Moreover, ASEAN also has a programme 
area focusing on renewable energy in order to “increase the diversity of energy supply 
and to reduce the environmental impact of energy use in the ASEAN region” (ASEAN 
2010, 21). Myanmar’s large hydropower potential can play a big part in achieving 
ASEAN’s goals with regards to renewable energy.  
Thus, it may be concluded that the Myanmar government holds considerable power in 
the region. Myanmar has the advantage at the moment that after years of sanctions and 
                                                 
42
 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, established in 1967 and currently has 10 member states, 
namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand (ASEAN 2009). It represents a cooperative framework intended to foster greater 
regional development through mutual assistance. 
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isolation, the potential within the country is enormous, something recognized by the 
international community. Myanmar is the new “popular kid” in the region, with lots of 
work still ahead investment-wise, but also a lot of untapped potential. More than that, its 
geostrategic positioning between China and India, and the gateway to the ASEAN 
region in addition to its natural resources makes it stand out when it comes to making 
“new friends”. What is more, as we have seen, the decentralization efforts within 
Myanmar are on their way, but still far from full-fledged federalism, allowing the 
central government to basically still exert control over the majority of important and 
large scale decisions in the States and Regions. Thus, the central government has the 
power to decide to build dams, and where these dams will be built, whilst at the same 
time stating that such projects are done in the name of development. However, 
development as a term in and of itself is not always as clear-cut and positive as we have 
generally come to believe. Adams notes that “development itself is a product of power 
relations, of the power of states, using capital, technology and knowledge, and the 
market to alter the culture and society of particular groups of people” (Adams 2009, 
198). He emphasizes that development is about control of nature and of people and that 
it creates losers as well as winners (Adams 2009, 198). As prevalent in the case of the 
Hat Gyi dam, “those who drive change co-opt or reflect dominant ideologies and often 
draw on financial capital from outside interests” (Adams 2009, 199). Thus, 
development can obviously benefit people and is a necessity in building a nation, but 
with it comes power; power to decide over what will be developed, what industries, 
where these industries will be put up and who will lead them. Moreover, what some 
may dub development, local people may view as the destruction of their livelihoods and 
homeland.  
Another aspect of power, as noted by Bryant and Bailey, is “about attempting to avoid 
or at least minimize the costs associated with the manufacturing process” (Bryant and 
Bailey 1997, 40). In this case, this power could be said to lie with the Chinese and Thai 
governments and companies, since they determine – with the help of the Myanmar 
government – the location of the dam sites, and build the dams (with all the 
environmental and social impacts and costs that may bring with it) in Myanmar, whilst 
receiving the finished clean energy product.  
113 
 
Another important actor not to be discounted is the ethnic armed groups operating near 
the project site. The history of the KNU and its long opposition to the government are 
important tools for understanding the current conflict and why the KNU opposes the 
dam construction. Not only does it go against their belief that Karen State and its 
resources should be handled by the Karen people, but the Hat Gyi dam threatens their 
very existence and source of power by cutting off the important gateway they have to 
Thailand. Through armed conflict, the KNU has been able to stand its ground to an 
extent against the central government. Indeed, one of the reasons why construction of 
the Hat Gyi dam has been delayed for so long has been the ongoing conflict between the 
two sides and the impact that would have had on the construction and security for the 
workers there (Schroeder and U 2014, 211). Thus, the ethnic armed groups do have a 
certain advantage in being able to destabilize the area enough to halt construction. This 
form of power then is predicated on actual brute force rather than anything else. 
However, at the same time, the KNU acknowledges the detrimental effect the conflict 
has had on the local population.  
Grassroots and local villagers are not helpless bystanders in this debate. Whilst the 
actors involved are powerful and plentiful, they too have tools they can utilize in order 
to protest the dam construction, albeit to a lesser degree than other actors. As we have 
seen, many civil society groups are active within and outside the borders of Myanmar, 
working together to inform people about what is happening and aiming to protest the 
current plans. Whilst civil society opposition in China against damming the Nu/Salween 
River there was successful in the past, the future for those dams is still unclear given the 
news that plans to build at least some of those dams have resurfaced. In Myanmar, the 
civil society organisations, such as KESAN and Shan Sapawa, are working on 
information sharing, both with local villagers, but also with the government, in an 
attempt to bridge the gap between the two. However, this information sharing can also 
be considered as exerting power, especially towards the local population. This is not to 
in any way diminish the work such organisations are doing on the ground, but it simply 
serves to demonstrate, that everything bears implications and potential power relations. 
Representing people’s only source of information is a huge responsibility and one must 
then be careful as to where information comes from and from whom. Since local people 
are so dependent on civil society organisations for receiving information on the dams, 
this positions such organisations as potentially powerful mobilizers and influencers. On 
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the other hand, without such organisations, local people may stay in the dark about any 
such plans and only hear about it once they are asked to move, as has been the case in 
the past. Armed with the support of local civil society organisations, people have been 
staging protests against the dams and publicizing them in newspapers and online in 
order to showcase their disagreement in hopes of stopping construction, especially when 
there have been no consultations beforehand. 
8.1.2 Participation  
The importance of participation and the power it can have for those impacted by various 
development projects are vital in order to not only guarantee success, but also that it 
will actually be beneficial for everyone involved. As noted by Arnstein, participation 
can be seen as “the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently 
excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the 
future” (Arnstein 1969, 216). Participation in the context of the Hat Gyi dam is of great 
importance for understanding power relations, as well as being able to better discern the 
beneficiaries of the dam construction in comparison to those who will suffer the 
consequences. It offers a perspective often overlooked by policy-makers (Scudder 
2006). Hickey and Mohan note how the concept is in general terms associated with 
terms such as “empowerment” (Hickey and Mohan 2005, 237) and stipulate that  a 
general agreement has emerged on the fact that that “some form of participation by the 
beneficiaries is necessary for development to be relevant, sustainable and empowering” 
(Hickey and Mohan 2005, 237). In the case of dam construction, Scudder – in analysing 
50 different dam projects worldwide – found that “resettler participation (in the 
decision-making process) had a significant influence on the outcome of the resettlement 
process” (Scudder 2006, 68). He goes on to say that  
at the very least, involving resettlers requires not just their active 
participation in decision-making, but also the involvement of their 
expertise and their lifestyles. Participation should start during the options 
assessment process because that is when the environmental, social and 
equity implications of various options will be first considered (Scudder 
2006, 88). 
He also notes that negative outcomes of resettlement can be avoided, since there have 
been recorded instances of positive outcomes have occurred, citing the Aswan High 
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Dam in Egypt and the Pimburetewa in Sri Lanka as examples. In both instances, success 
“was related to the resettlers’ incorporation in a downstream irrigation scheme” 
(Scudder 2006, 74).  
Moreover, Scudder emphasizes that a large dam should not be built, where  
a participatory planning process involving the full range of affected 
stakeholders has been neglected and where the efforts have not been made 
to avoid mainstream dams and dams that threaten cultures and require the 
resettlement of thousands of people. Such conditions would, for example, 
stop the construction of further dams on the Mekong, including those 
within China. They would also avoid the construction of dams along the 
Amazon and the Salween River (Scudder 2006, 299).   
Dr. Brennan also emphasized that considering the question of dams in conflict areas in 
Myanmar, “it was the thing that if we didn’t get it right, it was going to blow up in the 
face of the ceasefire agreement” (Brennan 2015). Speaking of the example of the 
Myitsone dam in Kachin State he noted that “this is what happens when you build 
infrastructure without community consent and tangible engagement and community 
participation in the development and construction of it” (Brennan 2015).  
Grassroots organisations in Myanmar, such as the KRW, have indeed said that the lack 
of “a consultation with local populations and no provision of relevant information” was 
worrying local people (Saw Nyunt Thaung 2015). A consequence of this lack of 
participation and “decades of displacement and seizure of [village] land without 
[paying] compensation, the destruction of the local environment and militarization by 
the Burma Army and its militias to occupy areas near dam sites” may well be increasing 
human rights violations (Saw Nyunt Thaung 2015). KESAN’s director, Paul Sein Twa, 
has also emphasized that local villagers will not support the dam construction without 
FPIC, stating that  
Local people do not want any dams … without the free, prior and informed 
consent of impacted communities. The government and the Karen National 
Union [ethnic rebels] need to broaden the decision-making process so that 
it is transparent, inclusive and democratic (Irrawaddy News 2013). 
Yet, as we have seen in the various case studies here, not only are local communities 
not involved in the planning and decision-making process, they have not even been 
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informed by the government or the construction companies involved about a large dam 
being constructed on the Salween River.  
Saw John Bright from KESAN in a similar vein, noted that  
It’s just business as usual. There have been no improvements. No public 
consultations. They don’t work with the FPIC principle. Just now43, the 
government announced they held a press conference on the biggest dam to 
be built on the Salween (Kunlong dam). They said that that was a 
consultation. But actually this is not a consultation. They just come and 
talk about their plans (Bright 2014).   
Khant Zaw Aung mentioned something similar when asked whether more consultations 
would make a difference in public opinion about the dam. He said that “Some agree and 
some disagree, so if the government would hold consultations, they would only share 
information about the advantages of the dam. So that would influence the community” 
(Khant Zaw Aung 2014). A villager from Baw Traw Village, which also lies along the 
River in Karen State emphasized: “We live in this area, but we did not know anything 
about the process and how the dam will benefit us and how it will impact our lives” 
(Karen News 2015b) further indicating the stress and anxiety related with such project 
implementation.  
This was again echoed in what Sai Khur Hseng mentioned about government 
consultations concerning large dams. He noted that in Shan State the government held 
one consultation where they held a presentation only presenting the positive impacts of 
dams:  
It showed that dams were good. They said two villages would be affected 
by the dam. When I went there, there were many more than two villages 
affected. And they said that only 245 people would be affected. But, the 
two villages already make up more than 400 people. I don’t know how 
they calculated it… (Sai Khur Hseng 2014).  
What this demonstrates is not only a huge lack of trust towards the government from 
civil society members, but also a lack of engagement from the central government. 
Reasons for such lack of engagement may be that government officials genuinely 
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cannot understand why local people would not support such a project, or it could also be 
linked to the large sums of investment involved in such projects.  
In response to the lack of public participation in the decision-making process and the 
strong resistance exhibited by villagers alongside the Salween River, grassroots actors 
have called on all large-scale economic investment to be suspended during peace 
negotiations, and that both the government and the KNU have to first address such 
issues as local ownership of natural resources before proceeding with the projects 
(Burma Partnership 2012). So far, this has yet to be done.  
Others suggest that government officials have started to pay more attention to such 
grievances and listening to local voices more. This sentiment is echoed by Dr. Brennan 
who noted that “there is a lot of good stuff happening” with for instance Snowy Hydro, 
an Australian company, doing consultancy work on one of the dams and are basically 
“staking their reputation on doing good assessments, environmental and impact 
assessments and the like, on these dams” (Brennan 2015). However, he also mentioned 
that things are not being done in the right order: “The ceasefires have to come first 
before the dams can” (Brennan 2015).  
A lack in consultation with and participation of local residents in such large 
development projects may result in negative consequences – mainly for those same 
local residents (Scudder 2006, 61-62). However, in this case, the lack of participation is 
being done in an active conflict area (despite the ceasefire agreement in place), which 
increases the volatility of an already shaky ceasefire agreement.  
8.1.3 To dam or not to dam?  
We have now been introduced to 
the long history between the Karen 
within Myanmar and the long-
standing civil war between the 
KNU and the central government. I 
have shown that energy and 
electricity are vital to a nation’s 
development and that Myanmar has 
 
Picture 5 - Source: Reuters (Boot 2012) 
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abundant natural resources to garner said energy. We have also seen the various 
stakeholders in the construction of the Hat Gyi dam, what their motives are, what they 
stand to gain and/or loose, and how they have been going about addressing the issue. 
Moreover, we have seen that indeed environmental issues in Myanmar cannot be 
understood in isolation from the economic and political contexts within which they are 
created. When analysing the damming of the Salween and its link to conflict, Dr. 
Brennan notes that “resources are obviously one of the key driving forces of conflict. 
And along the Salween, an untapped river in a country that doesn’t have great 
electrification, the dams were an inevitability. China was coming in, that was always 
going to happen” (Brennan 2015).  
Despite this inevitability, one of the main things criticized when looking at the Hat Gyi 
dam is the fact that the entire process is “not being done right” (Brennan 2015). 
Hydropower has undeniable advantages and could potentially help electrify the entire 
country. And people want electricity. As Sai Khur Hseng mentioned, “if we ask local 
people, do you need electricity? They will answer ‘we need it’!” In the same breath he 
however also said “but can we get enough electricity if we build the dam?”, underlining  
the lack of benefit sharing that has been prevalent in the process of dam construction in 
Myanmar so far. The problem with initiating such a large project with such enormous 
consequences for the people living in the region when the ceasefire is still so shaky 
brings with it stark problems and influences the way people may view the central 
government. As has been made clear throughout this thesis, yes, a ceasefire is indeed in 
place, yes, negotiations are on-going, but no, there is no concrete and lasting peace in 
Karen State as of yet. What has come up in many reviewed articles is the question of 
how it can be expected to build up business when there is still no signed peace 
agreement in place? Moreover, how can dams be constructed when the majority of the 
rural population in Myanmar is heavily dependent on rivers and streams for both their 
livelihoods and their culture (BEWG 2011, 53)? What is being lamented is the fact that 
people perceive the government as favouring business opportunities over peace (Eh Na 
2013). As a veteran Karen insurgency leader stated in another study, “For development 
to work there must be good government, transparency, rule of law, reliable 
administration and institutions and no corruption. If they come in now, it will just enrich 
the generals and their cronies”, with ethnic minority leaders agreeing that the 
government is wrong to continue the planning and construction of such mega-projects 
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“projects before reaching an equitable political resolution to the longstanding conflict” 
(Gray 2015). KNLA’s chief of staff General Baw Kyaw Heh stipulated  
The connection between military operations, dam security and the number 
of refugees and IDP’s is clear to us – but they will never acknowledge it. If 
they don’t then how can this hydropower development not harm the peace-
building process? There are no proper mechanisms in place to ensure that 
benefits will go to the Karen people or that problems will be avoided or 
solved. When there is still no rule of law, especially in the recent and 
ongoing conflict areas, how can anyone be sure that the impacts would be 
protected against? There are not even good laws or proper social and 
environmental policies (Eh Na 2013).  
There are still multiple problems and questions to be answered about the dams, among 
which facing the consequences of the past and the question of forced relocation for 
example. Forcibly moving people from their homes, as has been the dominant strategy 
in the past, has dire consequences - both for the local population, and the state. One 
example of such a consequences from an environmental perspective is, as grassroots 
organisations such as KESAN and Earth Rights International (ERI) stipulate, that 
communities that have been forced from their homes or left out of fear for their lives 
and who have essentially become IDPs due to the dam, are forced into utilizing 
environmentally destructive practices such as “slash-and-burn cultivation methods. This 
is done instead of their more sustainable and traditional rotational techniques, merely to 
feed themselves” (Doyle and Simpson 2006, 756), which in turn may lead to ecological 
deterioration due to “poverty, exploitation and inequality”, as stipulated in political 
ecology (Jones 2008, 672). As Saw John Bright mentions, 
Villagers who deal with the river depend on fisheries, and then villagers 
who are a little higher up in the mountains they do plantations through 
rotational techniques. However, right now they don’t have much place to 
shift to, so that’s a problem, since there are companies coming in and 
buying up land to use for mining and other activities. So when they make a 
plantation in the area for one or two years, and they try to move to another 
place, at that time the company has already come in to do its business 
activities without villagers knowing about it, how can they continue and 
earn their livelihoods? It leaves villagers with nowhere to go.  
120 
 
This illustrates the importance of having proper laws and practices in place before 
industries move in to ethnic minority areas and also spells out the possible 
consequences for environmental degradation if they are not in place.   
Moreover, all these big hydropower plants are not necessary needed to help electrify the 
country, even if they had been conceived for that purpose instead of export (Sai Khur 
Hseng 2014). According to Sai Khur Hseng, implementing such large dams could be 
avoided if the government invested more into repairing and renewing old dams already 
built and repair the transmission lines (Sai Khur Hseng 2014). Saw John Bright from 
KESAN agrees by stating he thinks it represents a very possible solution: 
We support off-grid solutions. Because all of these kinds of mega-dam are 
about centralizing power, controlled by central government, and connected 
to the national grid. This power is then controlled by the government and 
whatever they want to do with it, they do. That is not what we want. We 
want to have electricity, we want to have source of power that is useful for 
people, only for domestic use, not for big industry. All this kind of mega 
dam is for industrial development, not for the people. That’s the problem 
(Bright 2014).  
Many other organisations in Myanmar, most prominently REAM Myanmar
44
, are 
building up and promoting the use of renewable off-grid energy sources to help electrify 
the country in a sustainable manner. However, the National Electrification Plan (NEP)
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only considers such renewable off-grid solutions for a limited amount of remote 
villages, preferring to invest in more large dams and other forms of energy production 
and electrify the entire country by 2030.  
In response to the argument put forward by Sai Khur Hseng, Brennan noted that yes, 
Myanmar has all the necessary ingredients already, but at the same time they are trying 
to build up their economy and country. Moreover, from a geopolitical point of view, 
Myanmar is trying to balance the investment coming in from the West and from China, 
something which their natural geography allows them to do. By being China’s entry 
point to the Indian Ocean, Myanmar has a huge power advantage. Like Russia, 
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threatening, or actually going through with turning off the tabs when it comes to oil and 
gas pipelines to Europe, so Myanmar can do the same in the future to China.  
This is of huge importance. So in the long term, I think it’s a really good 
move to be doing hydropower and become Southeast Asia’s hub of 
electricity, particularly if they aren’t using it in the short term. So building 
this for the long term future of Myanmar and the short-term geopolitical 
stability it could provide, is a wonderful strategic move. But it just has to 
be done right and in an environmentally sound way and in a way that 
brings people together, not tearing them apart. And at the moment we’re 
seeing the latter rather than the former (Brennan 2015).  
To be sure, there does seem to be a change in attitude from the central government as of 
late, with Dr. Brennan, NVE and other organisations having commented on the fact that 
the government does indeed seem to want to “get things right” and do things the right 
way from now on. Supporting this argument is Myanmar’s wish to join the MEITI so 
soon
46
 and it wanting to draw the “most stringent EIA laws” according to an informal 
discussion I had with a lawyer at the Conference in Chiang Mai. Moreover, the 
Myitsone dam issue provides a further example of the government’s “new attitude”. 
Whilst conflict has broken out in Kachin State, in large part due to discussions over said 
dam
47
, Brennan remarked that  
The Moratorium on the dam was huge in Kachin State, and that was a blow 
to give to China. In a way what they were hinting at was for China to back 
off and give them the time to consolidate power and take things slowly. 
And that was the biggest concession that the government has given in the 
whole ceasefire process. They (the government) could have gone in and 
done it the “old way” - by force, something which a lot of people wanted to 
do. It was a concession in that, ok, yes, the government’s hands were tied, 
but they still could have gone in full force. In not doing so, it opened the 
space for a bit more dialogue (Brennan 2015). 
Brennan also emphasized that the government seems much more aware of the problems 
connected to such mega-projects, remarking that it is a step in the right direction: 
“knowing what some of the potential risks are and how it could hurt their credibility and 
the viability of the projects in themselves, was the first step. And that awareness wasn’t 
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there to begin with. So, I think we’re getting closer now” (Brennan 2015). My 
discussion with my contact at NVE
48
 supported the sentiment that the government is 
indeed trying to change how they do things with regards to hydropower dams:  
Under the old regime, dams have a bad tack record for sure. MOEP really 
wants to improve their reputation in hydropower, to improve all the 
processes related to hydropower development. They have a keen interest in 
doing so. They need to do so in order to attract private investors, in order 
to get the project to be accepted by the local villages and local government. 
So they see that they need better processes than they had before in order to 
implement their hydropower strategy (NVE 2015). 
It was also stated that the current government is aiming to achieve and implement 
international best practice with regards to dam construction and that the local 
population, as one of the stakeholders involved in the projects, will be informed and 
consulted, with their opinions and inputs representing an important part of the process 
(NVE 2015). In this regard, it is also interesting to note that in its work with MOEP and 
other ministries, NVE has approached the KNU together with representatives from 
MOEP and the Norwegian embassy, in order to jointly discuss a potential dam site in 
Pegu Region
49
, something I believe is the first time to have happened. The meeting was 
arranged in order to set up “terms of reference for a pre-feasibility study regarding a 
potential hydropower project on the Bawgata River” (South 2014). Initially it had been 
proposed to build a large dam on the river, with the KNU rejecting the idea and insisting 
on the community being consulted at all stages of the project (South 2014). The 
representative of NVE noted that the meeting went very well. Afterwards there seemed 
to be a small hick-up with regards to ownership of the study
50
 - an issue that seems to 
since have been resolved, with both MOEP and KNU agreeing to joint ownership of the 
study (NVE 2015), a positive sign indeed! As mentioned by the NVE representative, 
“there is good will from both parties to take up some practical work together, so I think 
it’s a good project as such” (NVE 2015). 
With such changes spelling hope for future hydropower projects, they will not however 
apply to the projects already signed by the previous military government, which is 
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 In order to implement a pre-feasibility study, NVE needs a client to work for. This is what ownership 
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problematic. So far, there has been no consultation or participation process, or even 
information provided by the government and/or companies involved in the construction 
of the Hat Gyi dam; the EIA laws are in the works, but not in place yet; and most 
problematic of all, the area is still an active conflict zone. And the Hat Gyi dam is not 
the only one where a large hydropower project has led to an increase in clashes between 
Burmese Army troops and ethnic armed groups. Whilst there have been attempts to 
mitigate the situation through peace negotiations and the creation of codes of conduct, it 
still remains unclear who exactly controls and operates within contested areas (MPM 
2013, 10). The KIO has clashed with government forces near Sang Gang Hydropower 
Dam Poject on the Taping River (2011); the KNPP attempted the blow up a power grid 
before signing a ceasefire agreement with the government in 2012; the RCSS-SSA
51
 
clashed with the army near the projected Tasang Dam site despite the 2011 ceasefire 
agreement signed by both parties; and the SSPP-SSA
52
 has clashed with government 
forces on multiple occasions in northern Shan state where the Shweli dams (as well as 
the controversial Shwe Gas pipeline) are located (MPM 2013, 5-7). These multiple 
examples are drawn up to demonstrate that we are not talking about a single incident or 
clashes being restricted to one specific dam site. Rather, this is an endemic issue that 
needs to be addressed by the Myanmar government and ethnic armed groups already 
within peace negotiations, given the tight correlation between economics, natural 
resources, (ethnic) politics and conflict in this case.  
 
                                                 
51
 Restoration Council of Shan State/ Shan State Army (operating in Southern Shan State) 
52
 Shan State Progress Party/ Shan State Army (Operating in Northern Shan State) 
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9 Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine how economic drivers within dam 
development, both domestic and international, and local grievances attached to their 
lack of access to economic benefits (among other things) contribute to conflict on the 
ground. In order to help demonstrate the intricacies involved in the subject matter, a 
description of the history of the country was provided in order to showcase the 
underlying causes and grievances already prevalent. Moreover, detailed descriptions of 
the various actors involved, ranging from the international sphere to the very local, were 
presented, as well as indicating their motives behind their actions. My aim has been to 
show the different and complex angles involved in the debate around the Hat Gyi dam 
and that implementing such large-scale development projects in such volatile regions 
where there is still on-going conflict and no proper legal framework in place, is 
dangerous and reckless. It also demonstrated the lack of attention given to the local 
population, who will suffer the consequences from the dam construction but have so far 
lacked proper information on the issue. My limited primary data confirmed what other 
studies have shown: the local population has received no information about the dam 
construction process by EGAT or the Myanmar government, leaving them not only 
excluded from the decision-making process, but feeling further marginalized and 
disengaged from the central government whom they mistrust. What is more, the data 
shows that the construction of the Hat Gyi dam without consultations and inclusion of 
the local ethnic minority groups, armed and unarmed, contributes to the militarisation of 
the area and undermines the peace process.  
Rivers, floodplains and wetlands are vital for the protection of our ecosystems, 
providing flood protection, enhancement of water resources and carbon capture: 
“healthy rivers are critical for helping vulnerable communities adapt to a changing 
climate – protecting them now is a community’s health insurance policy for the future” 
(Yan and Pottinger 2013, 8). Stacked against this is the notion that “each and every 
society’s capability of development, or indeed its ability to survive, depends on 
continuing access to energy in appropriate forms and quantities and at acceptable levels 
of cost” (Cook quoted in Odell 1990, 79), which in the case of Myanmar will invariably 
entail electricity generation through hydropower. However this idea of energy security, 
whilst indeed important for any developmental aspects, has also served as an excuse by 
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governing elites – especially in authoritarian states – to pursue grand energy projects at 
the expense of marginalised populations (Simpson 2007, 539). Such projects, notes 
Simpson, are rarely vetted via environmental or social impact assessments in such 
regimes, or if they are implemented, then they tend to often serve as simply a “rubber-
stamping exercise” with little, if any, input from the local population which will suffer 
the brunt of these projects (Simpson 2007, 539). Add to this the fact that in the case of 
Myanmar further complexities arise given the way business interests and development 
are entangled in the peace process, and we find ourselves with a powder keg ready to 
explode at any time. Some have commented that business interests are in fact taking 
precedence over politics with regards to peace negotiations, however, business and 
economic power in the form of business concessions, development and fair distribution 
of natural resources (all of which are demanded by ethnic armed groups) form an 
integral part of ethnic grievances and thus are tied to the political negotiations taking 
place (MPM 2013, 1). Thus, in the case of Myanmar, economics is both a “driver and a 
solution” to the ongoing conflict. The unfair distribution of natural resources and 
revenues extracted thereof, the negative impact development projects have had (and 
continue to do have) on local peoples, as well as the high level of poverty (itself related 
to the previous two points) have all contributed to the outbreak and continuation of 
violence (MPM 2013, 1).  
Thus, this thesis aimed to shed some light on the cultural implications of big 
infrastructure projects in the country and the importance of big donors and enterprises 
investing in Myanmar to respect and research such cultural implications more through 
the lens of political ecology. In doing so, more emphasis has been placed on plurality of 
explanation rather than simply cause and effect, which will hopefully have resulted in a 
more multi-faceted analysis considering the “historical, political and economic contexts 
at different spatial and temporal scales” (Castree in Budds 2004, 324). What is more, 
many of the people I interviewed asked me to help them, to advocate for them once I 
am back home, to make sure people are aware of the fact that they do not want these 
dams to be built and that they are afraid for their livelihoods, their future and way of 
life. Whilst the main aim has been to provide neutral accounts of the situation in 
Myanmar and go into detail of the actors involved, I am also hoping to give those 
people more of a voice.  
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Aung Naing Oo likened the conflict between the various stakeholders in Karen State 
and the government to a “Tha-book-oo” which is the name of a local fruit. He went on 
to say that “it has a labyrinth of fabric inside so intricate that no one knows the 
beginning, the middle or the end” (Aung Naing Oo 2014). That is how I felt at the 
beginning of this journey, and to this day, the issues appear highly intertwined and 
complex. It is my hope that this thesis has laid the groundwork and helped untangle 
some of the complexities of the conflict in Karen State, the history and the implications 
of the Hat Gyi dam for conflict and people and explain why it is so important to take 
into consideration the history, culture and the many fears and divisions still prevalent 
when it comes to such large infrastructure projects. As Dr. Brennan said, “building the 
dams in volatile regions without having first done ceasefire agreements, without local 
support, community involvement, you really put the whole process, the whole 
development of Myanmar on its knees” (Brennan 2015). This is exactly where I see one 
of the biggest problems lying. What seems only all too certain is that proceeding with 
the planned dam projects without full consultation and consent of the local population 
only serves to exacerbate the tension, plunging both sides back into intense fighting and 
conflict (Mang and Yan 2013). I firmly agree with Buchanan et al. (2013, 10) that 
development projects should benefit local communities and allow them and their 
representatives to decide whether these projects go ahead and how they are managed. 
“Failure to do so will both undermine conflict resolution and national reconciliation and 
also create new ethnic grievances, thus contributing to Burma’s cycle of conflict”. 
Unfortunately, so far it seems that politics and economics (power) is causing 
hydropower to be developed that benefits the rich and disadvantages the poor.  
Coupled to this is the current political and economic reform process initiated by the new 
government since 2011, which has already resulted in a stark increase in foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Its strategic geographic position between South and Southeast Asia 
and its huge growth (and export) potential thanks to its natural resources have not gone 
unnoticed, with China, Thailand, India as well as other nations already vying for 
contracts there (Kattelus, Rahaman, and Varis 2014, 85). Geopolitical aspects 
surrounding trans-boundary water management, corporate social responsibility of 
foreign and domestic enterprises and the upholding of human rights will undoubtedly 
come to the forefront of discussions more and more in the future. From the perspective 
of Myanmar’s government, natural resource management, and hydropower in particular, 
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represents a huge revenue potential, as well as cementing the country’s geopolitical 
importance within South East Asia. By becoming the equivalent of Asia’s “battery”, 
Myanmar will be able to exert more power and dominance in the international sphere, 
among other motives.  
Clearly then, natural resource extraction will play an important part in any future 
developments in Myanmar, making their appropriate management in transparent, 
accountable manners with rule of law and public participation all the more important. 
There are many incentives to including local population and local governance in the 
planning process of large development projects. And indeed, one of the main things 
people are asking for is to be more involved, to feel like the government cares about 
their opinion and their lives and to make sure their future is secure. As Sai Khur Hseng 
said, “if the government says they will suspend all dams on the river until we consult 
the people, that would be positive. Then we can debate more and give our reasons for 
opposing the dam and find alternative ways. But if they go ahead, there will be more 
conflict as things stand now” (Sai Khur Hseng 2014). Although the current government 
seems to be recognizing this, it still needs to act in a way to prevent such conflict from 
occurring rather than forging on with the dam plans as is. There are indeed promising 
developments happening in the case of hydropower development in Myanmar. But 
unfortunately, those developments will most likely not apply and not come fast enough 
for the Hat Gyi dam. Moreover, the companies operating in the region need to become 
more aware of the local situation and particularities at hand and apply more CSR. After 
the Myitsone incident in Kachin State, the Chinese companies re-thought their strategy 
there and realised that more compensation in social service building, such as schools 
and hospitals, was needed in order for the project to work and benefit the people as 
well. Yet this lesson, arguably too late in the case of Myitsone, does not seem to have 
been translated to the Hat Gyi (or other dams for that matter). Furthermore, local people 
need to be able to access information and have consultation opportunities with the 
companies involved before any construction begins. The majority of the people are still 
uninformed and do not know to what degree they will be impacted by the dam, or when 
it is slated for construction even. The villages on the Thai side of the river have more 
access to information and are more knowledgeable on the situation, but also lack 
possibilities to directly influence the project planning procedures. As Scudder writes, 
resettler participation in the project planning is vital and has a significant impact on the 
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outcome on the resettlement process (Scudder 2006, 68). He also mentions that negative 
outcomes are unnecessary since positive examples of resettlement and dam construction 
have occurred and have showcased what is needed in order for those impacted to 
become beneficiaries (Scudder 2006, 86). The area the Salween River traverses through 
has high biodiversity significance and is home to a large variety of ethnic groups whose 
culture and traditions are threatened if the process of dam and infrastructure 
development is not done in a correct manner. Moreover, the impact of such large 
development projects in an area of such cultural diversity, with some ethnic groups 
living along the river being the only ones left from their ethnic group, such as the Yin 
Ta Lai in Karenni State. This impact needs to in the very least be acknowledged and 
mitigated in order to help preserve these distinct cultures and their way of life. 
Myanmar is a melting pot of ethnic groups and cultures. So far, many internally have 
come to view that as a weakness. But it can be one of the country’s biggest strengths, 
and by beginning to work together as partners, more understanding, acceptance and 
development can be fostered, with everyone profiting. If, however, dam builders and the 
government fail to acquire consent, such projects could plummet the region back into 
the shadow of a decades-old conflict (Mang and Yan 2013). Dams may not constitute 
the root of the problem, but they can definitely exacerbate the conflict and foster further 
animosity. In a country filled with such potential, vibrant people and fascinating 
cultures, that would be a true crime.  
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Appendix 1 – Planned hydropower 
projects in Myanmar 
 
Figure 3 - Planned hydropower projects in Myanmar. Source: (Kattelus 2009, 156) 
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Appendix 2 – Interview guide 
1) Name 
2) Age 
3) Marital Status 
4) Ethnicity/Religion 
5) Would you like to tell me a bit about your family/living situation?  
6) Could you tell me about what you do in your everyday life? What is your daily 
routine?  
7) What is your main source of income?  
8) Could you tell me a bit about your community and your village?  
9) Has any of this changed in the last few years? If so, do you know why this might 
have happened? 
10) What do you know about the possibility of dam construction close by?  
11) What do you think/how do you feel about that?  
12) How do you think the dam construction will change your life?  
13) What information have you gotten on the dam and from whom?  
14) Has anyone from the government come to speak to you about it?  
15) How do you use the river? For what activities? How does it relate to your 
everyday life?  
16) Who do you trust most to help and to support your community?  
17) How do you see the future for you and your community? What are your hopes 
for it?  
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18) Could you tell me one thing you find very valuable, that you would like the next 
generation to inherit?  
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Appendix 3 – Karen Song about the 
Salween 
Song about the Salween River “The Salween” – Band name: Equal 49 
 
Verse 1:  
“We have to move away from the river. What can I do? The water comes to flood our 
village. Please, God, listen to our voice and help! This may be happening now, but we 
must fight it.  
Chorus:  
Government, you give away your country, you don’t respect human rights, SPDC 
(military government), you are violating human rights, you have no democracy, you 
don’t respect your country! 
Verse 2:  
Please God, listen to our prayers. If they build the dam, they will destroy everything, the 
livelihoods, animals.  
Chorus:  
Government, you give away your country, you don’t respect human rights, SPDC 
(military government). You are violating human rights, you have no democracy, you 
don’t respect your country! You’re very greedy! Now you are holding all of our 
opportunities.  
Verse 3:  
 
The Salween is our life, the Salween flows all the time, it is like the sign of the Karen. 
The river is part of our ethnic culture. We are working to support the river. We all have 
to work together to stop the dam from being built.  
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Appendix 4 – Overview of Myanmar’s 
Peace Process 
 
Government 
 
Armed Groups 
led by: 
Union Level Peace Team: 
1. give up arms/transform into BGF 
→ now allowing ethnic armed 
groups to keep their arms 
2. set up a political party 
3. contest in elections m 
 
Led by: 
UNFC, United Nationalities Federal 
Council 
1. political talks (according to the 
2008 federal constitution drawn 
by ethnic and democratic 
opposition groups) 
2. union accord - agreement on 
power sharing and resource 
sharing = amending the 2008 
constitution 
3. approval from parliament 
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Peacemaking bodies 
Central Committee Policy making 
Body 
1. Chaired by President Thein Sein 
11-members including: 
1. Vice President U Nyan Tun 
(replaced U Tin Aung Myint Oo, 
Aug.16, 2012) 
2. Vice President Dr. Sai Mauk 
Kham 
3. Speaker of the Upper house U 
Shwe Mann 
4. Speaker of the lower house U 
Khin Aung Myint 
5. Commander-in-Chief of the 
Defense Services Vice Senior-
General Min Aung Hlaing 
6. Minister of Home Affairs 
Lieutenant-General Ko Ko 
7. Defense Minister Lieutenant-
General Wai Lwin (replaced 
General Hla Min) 
8. Border Affairs Minister 
Lieutenant-General Thet Naing 
Win (replaced Lieutenant-General 
Thein Htay) 
9. Attorney-General Dr. Tun Shin 
10. Director of President’s office U 
Min Zaw 
Working Committee Implementing 
Body 
Myanmar Peace Center Secretariat 
 
UNFC members 
Ceasefire 6 members: 
1. KNU, Karen National Union 
2. KNPP, Karenni National Progress 
party 
3. SSPP/SSA-N, Shan State Army-
North 
4. CNF, Chin National Front 
5. NMSP, New Mon State Party 
6. PNLO, PaO National Liberation 
Organization 
Non-Ceasefire 5 members: 
1. KIA, Kachin Independence Army 
2. NUFA, National United Front of 
Arakan 
3. WNO, Wa National Organization 
4. LDU, Lahu Democratic Union 
5. PSLF/TNLA, Palaung State 
Liberation Front/ Ta-ang National 
Liberation Army 
6. *KNO, Kachin National 
Organisation (merged with KIO) 
Transformed Armed Groups 
 DKBA BGF 1011 to 1022 Kayin State 
 
Non-UNFC 
following the UNFC's leadership 
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Democracy and Development Party 
(KSDDP): 2 elected MPs 
 KDA PMF 3 to 7, runs businesses and 
carries out development projects 
 KNG PMF 
 KNU Peace Group 1 elected MP, 
USDP member 
 KNU Peace Force BGF 1023 Kayin 
State Democracy and Development 
Party (KSDDP) 
 KNDP, KNPDP, KNPLF, KNUSO BGF 
1004 & 1005, Business groups 
 NDA-K BGF 1001, 1002, 1003, 1 
elected MP. 
 PNO Pa-O National Organization 
party: 8 elected MPs 
 PSLF PMF Mann- pan & Mann Ton, 
Ta-Aung (Palaung) National Party 
(TPNP): 2 elected MPs 
 ALP, Arakan Liberation Party, aka 
Rakhine State liberation Party 
(involved in WGEC) 
 DKBA-5, Democratic Karen Buddist 
Army- Brigade 5 
 (follows KNU’s political leadership) 
 KPC, KNU/KNLA Peace Council 
 (UNFC unofficial observer) 
 KNLP, Kayan New Land Party (UNFC 
observer of the, under pressure from 
the govt to transform into a PMF (April 
7, 2010) but continues to function as a 
ceasefire group) 
unofficially following UNFC 
principles and plan 
 UWSA, United Wa State Army 
 NDAA-Mongla National democratic 
Alliance army 
 RCSS/SSA-S, Shan State Army-
South 
 AA, Arakan Army 
 ABSDF, All Burma Student's 
Democratic Fron 
 MTUF, Mergui-Tavoy United Front 
Others 
 NSCN-K, National Socialist Council of 
Nagaland - Khaplang (primarily 
demanding economic and social 
development for their area) 
International Actors 
 MPSI, Myanmar Peace Support 
Initiative headed by Norway 
 PSDG, Peace Support Donor Group 
 IPSG, International Peace Support 
 
CBOs and NGOs 
Monitoring 
 e.g. Mon Regions Peace Monitoring 
Group, Shan Women Action Network, 
Karenni Civic Society Network 
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Group 
 Nippon Foundation, Japan 
Others 
 China, India, ASEAN, OIC, USA, 
Finland 
Policy and peace advocacy 
 e.g. Women’s League of Burma, 
White Holding Hands, Peace Network, 
Kachin Peace Network, Generation 
Wave 
Peace talk Facilitators 
 Karen Peace Support Team Shalom 
Foundation 
Ceasefire implementation 
 CIDKP, Committee for Internally 
Displaced Karen People 
 KORD, Karen Office for Relief and 
Development 
 SRDC, Shan Relief and Development 
Committee 
 
Source: (MPM 2014b) 
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Appendix 5 – Myanmar’s Electrification 
Energy Demand 
Over 70% of Myanmar’s population resides in rural areas, 74% of which are said to be 
lacking access to energy  in comparison to the average of 33% of people lacking access 
to energy in Yangon (ADB and Accenture 2013, 16). Even in Yangon, those living in 
the lower socioeconomic neighbourhoods may only receive as little as one hour of 
power a day during dry season (ADB and Accenture 2013, 18).  
As of yet, industrial development in Myanmar has been relatively limited and thus its 
demand for energy has also remained considerably low. However, given that the 
government is aiming to increase industrial activity from 26% of GDP in 2010 to 32% 
by 2015 (ADB and Accenture 2013, 16), energy demands will also increase, putting 
more strain on the current electricity provision. Furthermore, with demand growing an 
estimated 15% annually, a massive expansion in power generating capacity will be 
necessary (Ferry 2014). Agriculture is Myanmar’s key industry, accounting for 36% of 
its GDP and could have a huge potential for expansion. Adequate energy supply 
services are pertinent for all the expansion of all of these sectors. 
 Rural Electricity Access  
The majority of Myanmar’s rural population has no access to the central grid, nor can 
they find reliable and affordable access to isolated mini-grids. The use of provisional 
energy sources such as small gensets, disposable batteries, diesel lanterns or candles, 
consumes a disproportional high share of people’s income and harms the environment 
(Bodenbender, Messinger, and Ritter 2012, 14). Moreover, kerosene is not available as 
a substitute for electric lighting in Myanmar. It used to be subsidized by the 
government, but this was reduced in the 1970s, until it was halted completely in the 
1980s. Furthermore, the remaining expensive and low-quality alternatives do not meet 
the basic energy needs sufficiently. According to a report by MercyCorps on energy 
consumption in the Irrawaddy Delta, “Households can afford an average of 3.8 hours of 
light per night although they would like 5 hours on average”.  
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Energy Supply 
Myanmar’s primary energy supply, as aforementioned, is mainly met through 
traditional biomass (75%), followed by gas (10%) and crude oil (6%) (ADB and 
Accenture 2013, 13). In fact, wood alone accounts for about 62% of all primary 
consumption needs, carrying with it dire environmental impacts, such as widespread 
deforestation. The main of this can be summed up as being “small-scale agriculture, 
commercial logging, and fuel wood production, while the underlying cause is 
widespread poverty” (Kyi et al. 2000, 81). With Kerosene being too costly for most 
rural households and the electricity grid not extending to the vast majority of the 
country, people have been forced to turn to firewood as their main source of energy 
(Kyi et al. 2000, 82). However, Myanmar does have other options to supply energy. As 
we have seen, renewable energy and energy efficiency are usually characterized as 
"win-win" options in Sustainable Energy Development, meeting the objectives both of 
environmental improvement and poverty alleviation (Cecelski 2000, 1). And Myanmar 
indeed exhibits a large potential for renewable energy. Wind, solar and biomass energy 
hold great potential, but hydropower has been the main focus for commercial 
exploitation so far (ADB and Accenture 2013, 13). In terms of installed capacity and 
produced electricity, hydropower represents the biggest source of electricity in 
Myanmar, followed by gas, coal, and diesel stations (Bodenbender, Messinger, and 
Ritter 2012, 10). However, much of this is seasonal in nature, resulting in limited supply 
throughout dry months of the year, leaving those connected to the grid requiring 
alternative sources in order to access light (Nicholson 2012, 2).  
Add to this the fact that Myanmar has a very challenging topography and one of the 
lowest population densities in South East Asia, meaning that conventional grid-
extension may not be the best financial and viable solution for rural areas 
(Bodenbender, Messinger, and Ritter 2012, 11), and we can see why the issue of 
electrification is so problematic.  
The fact that the institutional set up concerning energy governance in Myanmar is 
extremely complicated only serves to add to the confusion and inconsistency of the 
energy sector so far. More than a dozen government agencies are involved in energy 
and electricity planning, disregarding the private and civil society actors involved that 
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only serve to further complicate and already confusing energy policy landscape (UNDP 
2013, 19).  
Even though Myanmar demonstrates significant internal energy access challenges, it has 
become major energy exporter for the region. This contradiction can help explain some 
of the challenges Myanmar faces concerning internal energy service provision. The 
previous military government prioritized oil and gas export rather than providing energy 
access for the population, leading to the huge current disparities (ADB and Accenture 
2013, 19). However, there have been signs of change since 2005 when private 
enterprises were allowed to begin supplying electricity, and the government is currently 
in the process of updating the antiquated Electricity Law.  
The government’s current electrification plan 
The current government has recognized the country’s dire need for energy and has made 
national electrification a top priority (Castalia 2014, 1). The Myanmar National 
Electrification Plan (NEP) has been drawn up after numerous consultations with 
international consultants and organisations such as the World Bank, and aims to achieve 
100% electrification by 2030. Not all States will be covered by this plan immediately, in 
which case off-grid “pre-electrification” options are slated to provide services for the 
short-/medium-term (World Bank 2014, 25). The NEP estimates that approximately 2.5-
3.0 GW of new generation capacity will be needed for modest, residential needs alone, 
not counting the commercial and industrial demands (World Bank 2014, 26). This 
represents over a doubling of the current capacity of 3,735 MW—2,780 MW (ADB 
2015, 2). In order to achieve this level of electrification, the government will place a strong 
emphasis on hydropower generation.  
 
 
140 
 
 
Figure 4 - Myanmar's wider energy-related government institutions. Source: (ADB and Accenture 
2013, 13) 
 
Figure 5 - Ministry of Electric Power Organizational Chart. Source: (Loi 2014, 22) 
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Map 6 - Myanmar's National Roll-out Plan. Source:(Castalia 2014) 
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Appendix 6 – Detailed description of the 
Salween Dams  
Wei Gyi Dam 
The Weigyi Dam is located in Papun District (Northern Karen State). EGAT signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Myanmar in December 2005 for its 
development, with the majority of electricity generated once more going to Thailand. It 
is estimated that it will produce 4,540MW with a flood height of 220 meters above sea 
level (Salween Watch 2007, 3). Although it is located in Karen State, it is actually 
Karenni (Kayah) State that will be impacted most by the construction of the dam since 
the dam’s reservoir will flood “many of the best low land forests and agriculture lands 
in the state” (BRN 2008c) in areas where illegal logging already threatens the forest 
areas in both Thailand and Myanmar (Salween Watch 2004, 18). It is estimated that it 
will displace/remove 30.000 people, among whom the Yin Ta Lai, an ethnic minority 
group (and a sub-group of the Karenni ethnic group) dependent on the Salween and who 
are “facing extinction” if the dam is built (KDRG 2008).  
Tasang Dam 
The Tasang Dam is the biggest of the dams proposed for the Salween River. Located in 
Southern Shan State, it is the most ambitious project on the Salween, given that it slated 
to become the highest dam in Southeast Asia. With its 228 m height, it is planned that it 
will even exceed the Three Gorges Dam in China (Brennan and Döring 2014, 3). The 
flood area is predicted to cover at least 640 square km and produce 7,100MW of energy 
– energy that is also set to be integrated in the Asian Development Bank’s Greater 
Mekong Sub-region Power Grid (ERI 2008, 5). The ADB, arguably a major backer of 
dam construction in the past, also conducted its own study of the Tasang Dam in 2002 
as part of a plan for a regional power grid, but decided not to pursue it further citing 
“serious socio-environmental concerns” (Gray 2006).  
Deals went ahead anyway and were initially signed between the government of 
Myanmar and Thailand’s MDX Group, together with China Gezhouba Group Co. (BRN 
2008b). According to the Burma Rivers Network, the local people living in the dam’s 
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prospected floodplain have been informed about the dam project, albeit with the 
omission of the possible negative consequences it may harbour, and were not given any 
opportunity to voice their concerns (BRN 2008b). One of the impacts of this project has 
been mass relocation, something that already begun before official MoUs were signed 
in 2006-7 (Gray 2006). Moreover, the dam lies in the middle of an active conflict zone 
in Shan State, with clashes between the SSA-S and the Burmese Army being reported 
for years (Michaels 2013).  
The ground-breaking ceremony was in March 2007, but construction has been stalled, 
and there has been little activity at the dam site as of 2008 (BRN 2008b). Authorities 
began “building access roads to this site as early as 1996, and more than 300,000 people 
in the area have been forcibly moved over the years”, human rights and minority groups 
claim (Gray 2015). 
Dagwin Dam 
The Dagwin Dam site lies on the border between Thailand’s Mae Hong Son Province 
and Myanmar’s Karen State, and will function as a pumped storage facility for the 
upriver Weigyi Dam (BRN 2008a). The Dagwin has been in planning since the early 
1980s, and in July 1996 Thailand signed an MOU with the government of Myanmar for 
the purchase of electricity stemming from it (BRN 2008a). A power purchase agreement 
however has yet to be signed. Its projected capacity ranges from 500-900MW, but 
would mainly serve to trap and regulate large amounts of water release by the Wei Gyi 
dam during peak hours (Salween Watch 2007, 3). According to civil society 
organisations, the Burmese military has been launching offensives in order to clear the 
site since the early 1990s. Thus, they note that before the offensives, the zone around 
the proposed dam site was a Karen liberated area with over 100,000 people living there. 
More than half of these people are said to have fled the area, with many ending up in 
refugee camps in Thailand (BRN 2008a). It should also be noted that both the Wei Gyi 
and Dagwin dam sites are located in areas adjacent to national and wildlife parks.  
Kunlong Dam 
Kunlong Dam, located in Northern Shan State, will have an installed capacity of 1400 
MW, of which 90% will be sold to China through a connection to the China Southern 
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Power Grid (Salween Watch 2013). An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) has 
been conducted, but no results have been made public, whilst construction is said to 
have already started in secrecy (Salween Watch 2013). Deputy Minister of Electrical 
Power Maw Thar Htwe told Parliament on Wednesday June 18 2014, that the Kunlong 
dam will indeed be constructed saying that “joint venture agreements with foreign 
investors have been signed, and the Kunlong projects are being implemented” (Snaing 
and Kha 2014).  
In 2010, Chinese energy firm Hanergy signed an agreement with the then-military 
government and joint venture partner Asia World, a Burmese conglomerate owned by 
Steven Law, who has been sanctioned by the USA and who is the son of the late drug 
lord Lo Hsing Han, to implement the project (Snaing and Kha 2014). This has been met 
with criticism from civil society groups, who voice concern over the fact that Asia 
World Company, “notorious for poor construction standards, has been contracted to 
start building the Kunlong dam” (Snaing and Kha 2014).  
Moreover, the dam is located within an active civil war zone fought between the 
Kokang resistance army and the Burmese army. Fighting between the two factions has 
led to at least 30,000 people fleeing into China, and has flared up again since February 
of this year (and is still in progress). The KIA and Palaung and Wa armies also operate 
close by, all of which are still openly in conflict with the Burmese Army, resulting in a 
very volatile situation, ready to explode at any time.   
Nong Pha Dam 
The Noung Pha dam site lies within Lashio township of Shan State on the mainstream 
Salween river. Very little information is available about this project, even though a 
MoU was signed between Myanmar and China in 2010 (Salween Watch 2013). Access 
to the dam site is very difficult. The dam is planned in United Wa State Army (UWSA) 
and Shan resistance forces territory. Whilst ceasefires with these groups are in place, 
fears of a large-scale military offensive in the area still prevail. Moreover, the UWSA 
has always been one of the largest ethnic armed groups operating in the country, making 
this a dangerous situation. 90% of the power generated is to be sold to China (BRN 
2014), whereas Myanmar will receive 15% free share. According to Burma Rivers 
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Watch, the project (in conjunction with Man Taung Dam) will generate millions for 
Myanmar (BRN 2014).  
Ywathit Dam 
Ywathit Dam will be located in Karenni (Kayah) State, north of the confluence of the 
Pai and Salween Rivers. A MoU was signed in 2010 between China’s state-owned 
Datang Corporation and Myanmar’s regime (in conjunction with two other dams that 
are to be built in Karenni State) (BRN 2011). The dam’s installed capacity is said to lie 
at 600MW, but the NGO International Rivers reports that the company’s website states 
it will produce up to 4500MW (Salween Watch 2013). This dam site is also located 
within a conflict zone, and in December 2010 there were reports that a convoy of 
Burman army officers escorting engineers to the dam site was attacked and three people 
killed (International Rivers 2011). Local population has yet to be informed about the 
dam projects and no one is permitted near the dam site (BRN 2011). Local people from 
the area around the Ywathit project site have been fleeing from the conflict for more 
than a decade already and the majority are now refugees on the Thai side of the river 
(Salween Watch 2013).  
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Appendix 7 – New laws and international 
standards impacting hydropower 
development in Myanmar  
New laws 
put in 
place 
What do the new laws 
entail? 
How do they impact the issue 
of dam construction? 
Year 
The 
Foreign 
Investment 
Law (FIL) 
 
The Foreign Investment 
Law (FIL) includes 
measures to regulate 
foreign investment to the 
advantage of domestic 
companies (Buchanan, 
Kramer, and Woods 2013, 
29). 
Most significantly for the 
question of hydropower, the law 
determines a restriction across 
all sectors if “it is detrimental to 
traditional ethnic cultures and 
customs or is damaging to public 
health, natural resources, the 
environment or biodiversity” 
(Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 
2013, 29). It also specifies major 
development projects that 
require the implementation of 
EIAs, as well as basic pollution 
controls be instituted by 
investors. 
2012 
Environme
ntal 
Conservati
on Law 
(ECL) 
 
The Environmental 
Conservation Law requires 
the Ministry of 
Environmental 
Conservation and Forestry 
(MOECAF) to put in place 
a comprehensive waste 
and pollutant monitoring 
scheme. 
Projects from international 
investors have to be approved by 
the Myanmar Investment 
Commission (MIC) who still has 
the ultimate decision-making 
power in this regard (NCEA 
2015). Given that key decision 
makers within MIC are still 
senior government officials, 
issues of corruption and 
transparency could potentially 
be a problem. 
2012 
Environme
ntal 
Impact 
Assessmen
ts (EIAs) 
 
Myanmar’s MOECAF has 
formulated a set of draft 
rules that, however, have 
yet to be implemented. In 
their draft, the MOECAF 
defines an EIA as a 
systematic assessment of a 
proposed activity or 
project that is prepared to 
aid in determining whether 
such activity or project has 
the potential significantly 
The draft regulations for the EIA 
procedures specifically state that 
public participation activities 
during the Scoping stage are a 
requirement, as well as public 
participation during the data 
collection, drafting of the report, 
and review stage (NCEA 2015).  
No detailed EIA regulations 
have been issued yet, but a 
formal approval of the draft 
regulations is expected for 2015. 
2015 
(expect
ed) 
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to affect the environment, 
humans and other living 
things, including socio-
economic impacts, and in 
deciding whether such 
activity or project should 
be allowed or not 
(MOECAF 2013, 3).  
The new 
Electricity 
Law 
 
Put in place to replace the 
old Electricity Law of 
1984 which did not 
include a legal framework 
for private sector 
participation in power 
projects (Baksheev and 
Finch 2015). The new law 
establishes a Electricity 
Regulatory Commission 
(ERC) to supervise the 
monopolistic electric 
power entities (Baksheev 
and Finch 2015). 
Whilst it gives MOEP and 
region and state governments 
more leeway in making 
decisions as to who is allowed to 
engage in electricity related 
works within their domain, the 
FIL (see above) still states that 
large power projects need to be 
approved by the government. 
Moreover, hydro and coal power 
plants must be “joint ventures 
with the government” (Baksheev 
and Finch 2015). This could 
mean better oversight of human 
rights issues if the government 
takes its new commitments 
seriously and implements 
initiatives to fight corruption and 
inform and consult with local 
populations impacted by the 
projects. 
2014 
Land 
Reform 
The new government, 
recognizing the multiple 
problems with concerning 
land rights in the country 
has passed new laws to 
help regulate land tenure. 
Moreover, the Lower 
House of Parliament has 
created the Land 
Investigation Commission 
to investigate land disputes 
in cases of confiscated 
land. 
In general terms, Myanmar’s 
domestic laws have allowed the 
government “wide authority to 
expropriate land” (KHRG 2013, 
21). One of the new laws passed 
has been the “Vacant Fallow and 
Virgin Lands Management Law” 
which allows the government to 
reallocate ‘wasteland’ to private 
companies. However, not all 
land classified as ‘wasteland’ by 
the government is actually 
uninhabited, but part of 
rotational cropping – something 
not taken into consideration by 
the law (KHRG 2013, 
21/Transnational Institute 2013, 
2). New laws still fail to take 
into account local customs and 
traditional land tenure systems 
2012 
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(KHRG 2013, 18). Moreover, 
conflict-affected areas might not 
be included in the national 
cadastre or may be classified as 
vacant land. 
Special 
Economic 
Zones 
(SEZs) 
Enacted in order to 
develop export oriented 
industries in Myanmar 
(KPMG 2014). It offers 
investors longer leasing 
concessions (up to 75 
years) and provides 
various other benefits to 
investors, such as 
protection against 
nationalisation. SEZs offer 
tax exemptions to different 
sectors. In Myanmar, there 
are currently three such 
SEZs, with the country 
setting up seven more 
local industrial zones, 
among which Hpa’an and 
Myawaddy in Karen State. 
The impact of the SEZs is that in 
order to build up industries, 
electricity will be vital. Where 
will the electricity for these 
Zones come from? More likely 
than not, large hydropower 
dams.  
2014 
The 
Myanmar 
Extractive 
Industries 
Transpare
ncy 
Initiative 
(MEITI) 
The initiative is “an 
international standard for 
openness around the 
management of revenues 
from natural resources. 
Governments disclose how 
much they receive from 
extractive companies 
operating in their country 
and these companies 
disclose how much they 
pay” (EITI 2014). 
One of the steps in this process 
is the creation of a multi-
stakeholder group which 
incorporates members of civil 
society organizations, companies 
and government representatives 
in order to oversee the EITI 
implementation (Mann 2013). 
MEITI will hopefully encourage 
more transparency in business 
deals and within the extractive 
industry. Myanmar hopes to 
become a compliant country by 
2016 or 2017. 
Myanm
ar 
applied 
for it in 
2012 
 
Source: Author 
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